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A B S T R A C T
The recent China–EU and China–USA trade disputes over solar pan-
els have no end in sight. This thesis attempts to examine the wel-
fare and environmental effects of upstream and downstream environ-
mental subsidies as well as an upstream trade policy, using a model
where a developed country (the North) imports renewable energy
equipment from a newly industrialised country (the South). Chapter
1 develops a two-country, three-good model to investigate the welfare
and environmental effects of unilateral Northern policies – consist-
ing of a downstream feed-in tariff premium for residential renewable
electricity generation and an upstream import tariff on renewable en-
ergy equipment. We consider two market structures in the equipment
sector – a Southern monopoly and an asymmetric Cournot interna-
tional duopoly producing a homogeneous product. We show, inter
alia, that domestic feed-in tariff premium always increases the en-
dogenous Northern import tariff, and vice versa. Pollution extern-
ality reinforces rather than necessitates the policy complementarity.
Chapter 2 conducts numerical simulations to illustrate Chapter 1 and
address issues not solvable analytically. We study both market struc-
tures and generate a Northern policy mix. Then we shift to bilateral
policies by introducing a Southern cost-reducing R&D subsidy. We
find that the counter-intuitive net installation-dampening effect of the
Northern FIT premium in the monopoly case is driven by its strong
indirect price-raising effect, since the premium induces a higher op-
timal domestic import tariff. We also compare the equilibrium levels
of policies, welfare and pollution harm across cooperative and non-
cooperative strategies, as well as the Northern policy mix and North-
ern single policy scenarios. Chapter 3 theoretically extends Chapter 1
by considering three main alternative renewable energy policy instru-
ments. Specifically, we examine how a Southern R&D subsidy and
a Northern output subsidy interact with the Northern FIT premium
and import tariff. Then we explore the effect of trade protection in
the presence of a binding emissions target or a binding renewable
energy share target. Emissions are unaffected under a binding emis-
sions target, but interestingly, they are decreasing in the degree of
trade protection under a binding renewable energy share target.
Key words: Renewable energy equipment · Environmental goods · Tra-
de and environment · Environmental subsidies · Strategic trade poli-
cy
JEL Classification: F12, F18, H23, Q42, Q58
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Part I
T H E O R E T I C A L F R A M E W O R K

1
W E L FA R E A N D E N V I R O N M E N TA L E F F E C T S O F
F E E D - I N TA R I F F S A N D I M P O RT TA R I F F S I N
N O RT H – S O U T H T R A D E I N R E N E WA B L E E N E R G Y
E Q U I P M E N T
3
A B S T R A C T
Chapter 1 develops a two-country, three-good model to investigate
the effects of a downstream feed-in tariff premium to residential re-
newable electricity generation, as well as an upstream import tariff on
renewable energy equipment in a developed country (the North). We
focus on unilateral Northern policies and consider two market struc-
tures in the equipment sector: a Southern monopoly and an asym-
metric Cournot duopoly consisting of a Northern firm and a Southern
firm producing a homogeneous product. Both countries also produce
polluting fossil-fuel-generated electricity and a numeraire good. We
show, inter alia, that the endogenous Northern import tariff is increas-
ing in the domestic feed-in tariff premium, and vice versa. Pollution
externality reinforces rather than necessitates the policy complement-
arity. Generally, trade protection ultimately leads to less domestic
renewable energy equipment deployment and lower environmental
quality, despite being partially offset by a higher optimal feed-in tar-
iff induced by itself under both market structures. However, surpris-
ingly, a higher feed-in tariff premium ultimately reduces domestic
equipment installation and the environmental quality under a South-
ern monopoly, in contrast to its net positive environmental impact
under an international duopoly.
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1.1 introduction
Since 2012, trade disputes over renewable energy (RE) equipment,
mainly China-EU and China-USA, have been escalating and have be-
come some of the biggest trade disputes between the world’s largest
economies. They also have the greatest installed capacity of modern
RE equipment. For example, China, the US, Germany, Italy, Spain
and France share approximately 60% and 70% of global installed
capacities of solar PV and wind power respectively by the end of
2015 (REN21, 2016). The EU imposed 37–68% anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy duties on Chinese solar panels in 2013. Chinese firms
can only be exempted from these duties if they take part in a pact
for a minimum price and a volume limit. Similarly, the USA im-
posed 31% duties for the majority of Chinese firms in 2015. This
trend is expected to continue or even escalate further in the future,
despite being subject to international pressure from the World Trade
Organization (WTO). One of the key reasons behind the disputes is
that the North (i.e. a developed country) has been providing gener-
ous feed-in tariff (FIT) subsidies to promote RE deployment. A FIT
scheme offers long-term contracts to renewable electricity generators
so that they receive a guaranteed price for the renewable electricity
they supply to the grid. There are two main types of FITs in the RE
sector. The first is a fix-price FIT (also called a FIT system as in Re-
quate (2015)) which pays eligible renewable electricity generators a
guaranteed feed-in price. Electricity market demand and supply, and
thereby electricity price, has no impacts on this system. The second
is a premium-based FIT system (also called premium system as in
Requate (2015)) which allows renewable electricity generators to re-
ceive a fixed or sliding premium on top of the electricity price. As
introduced by Requate (2015), a FIT can be further divided into (i) fin-
anced through a lump-sum or by a markup on the electricity price; (ii)
uniform or technology-specific; (iii) budget balanced or not balanced.
We study a fixed-premium-based FIT scheme that is lump-sum fin-
anced from the governments – uniform but not budget-balanced. We
choose to model a premium-based FIT so that we can show the effects
of a marginal change in conventional electricity price possibly due to
some unmodelled factors, e.g. changing market conditions and/or
regulations such as emissions pricing.1 Seeing these opportunities,
China entered and quickly dominated the global RE equipment mar-
ket (about two-thirds of the global market in 2014), mainly due to
its scale and supply chain advantages, according to recent studies
1 Since we are interested in the long run (usually refers to 15–25 years), we assume that
there is no uncertainty, specifically, no electricity price volatility. As pointed out by
Requate (2015), the uniform fixed-price FIT and fixed-premium-based FIT are equi-
valent under certainty. Therefore, all the conclusions in our model remain the same
under a fixed-price FIT which offers a fixed price as the sum of the conventional
electricity price and the premium.
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(Goodrich et al., 2013). Despite these confrontational disputes which
presumably reduce RE equipment installation and thereby harm the
environment, we also see both sides trying to cooperate to prevent the
dangerous and irreversible effects of climate change. The recent Paris
climate agreement in 2015 highlighted RE as one of the key pillars
to eradicate poverty, protect the environment and ensure prosperity
for all (REN21, 2016). Given the importance of promoting RE in the
energy mix, it is urgent and necessary for both the Northern and
Southern (the South refers to a newly industrialised country) govern-
ments to be more informed and adopt better trade and environmental
policies, to achieve economic welfare and environmental objectives
more effectively and efficiently at the national or global level.
This chapter aims to examine the welfare and environmental ef-
fects of trade and environmental policies in the RE equipment sec-
tor. More specifically, it develops a theoretical model to study the
interaction between an import tariff on RE equipment and a feed-in
tariff premium for renewable electricity generation, so as to examine
their welfare effects and ultimate environmental impacts. These two
policies both belong to a pragmatic set of policies adopted in the RE
sector. In particular, feed-in policies have been the most widely adop-
ted policies to support RE (REN21, 2016).2 The popularity of feed-in
tariffs is mainly because the emissions pricing has various factors that
undermine its attractiveness in the real world, despite that it is often
regarded as the most efficient way to promote less emitting technolo-
gies. For example, it is less appealing politically since it may substan-
tially hurt the energy-intensive industries; it alone is not sufficient
to support clean energy due to spillover effects, learning by doing
and so forth; it also suffers credibility problems, as the government’s
commitment to high future emissions pricing so as to induce current
innovation may not be credible when innovation reduces costs; and
it may have distributional consequences for fossil-fuelled generators
and consumers (Fischer and Newell, 2008). For these practical reas-
ons as well as the vitality and urgency of action on climate change
via promoting renewable energy, instead of focusing on the emissions
pricing, we examine the interaction between two most commonly ad-
opted trade and environmental policies in the RE sector.
RE shares some similarities with the conventional environmental
goods (EG) that are mainly used for end-of-pipe pollution abatement,
e.g. the presence of North-South trade and imperfectly competitive
2 FITs and feed-in premiums are adopted by 75 countries and 35 states/provinces/-
territories. Feed-in policies are undergoing a transitional period in response to chan-
ging market conditions. Some countries with mature RE markets have targeted
their FITs to specific technologies such as smaller-scale solar PV, while shifting to
competitive bidding for larger-scale projects. However, countries with less-mature
RE markets still rely on feed-in policies (REN21, 2016). Since this chapter focuses
on residential RE generation that are small-scale, modelling a FIT is still the most
pragmatic policy choice.
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market.3 However, our model also highlights some unique character-
istics of renewable energy, which distinguish it from conventional EG.
First, unlike the production of conventional EG which is dominated
by the North, RE equipment is mainly produced in the South but
sold in both the North and South. Residential RE equipment install-
ation mainly takes place in the North only.4 Second, RE generation
is intermittent, that is, it is not consistent over time. The energy stor-
age is not yet cost effective to eliminate this problem. Even if the
battery storage becomes economically and practically viable in the
short-to-medium term, it may only smooth out short-run variations
(e.g. day/night, rainy/sunny), rather than the much more challen-
ging long-run variations, such as seasonal variation at higher latit-
ude. Consequently, the time-intermittency of RE is crucial for the
long-run model in this chapter. Third, unlike conventional EG which
has little alternative usage, RE equipment can directly generate elec-
tricity which has economic value. Fourth, instead of directly abating
pollution, RE generation reduces pollution indirectly by crowding out
dirty energy, since it makes an almost perfect substitute. We consider
a two-country (the North and South) and three-good (electricity, RE
equipment and a numeraire good) model. Homogeneous households
in both countries demand two goods: electricity and a numeraire
good. Conventional fossil-fuel-generated electricity and renewable
electricity are perfect substitutes, and electricity suppliers can choose
to buy conventional electricity or can generate renewable electricity
themselves by installing RE equipment. Both countries produce non-
tradable fossil-fuel-based electricity and the tradable numeraire good,
whose markets are both perfectly competitive.
It is notable that we focus on modelling residential renewable elec-
tricity generation. Unlike utility-scale generation, residential RE gen-
eration does not require extra space and transmission lines. It util-
ises residential rooftop which has little alternative usage. Moreover,
electricity and heat is the largest sector which generates global CO2
emissions, accounting for 42%, and 26% of electricity and heat is asso-
ciated with the residential consumption (IEA, 2015a). So residential
renewable electricity generation has a great potential to reduce global
emissions.5 As the largest distributed generation, residential RE gen-
3 The market concentration in the RE sector has been rising fast. For example, the
global market share of top-10 solar-module producers (seven are Chinese) has been
rising rapidly from 38% in 2013 to nearly 50% (PV-Tech, 2016). Another trend in this
sector is that there is more vertical integration into even more concentrated upstream
input sectors. Moreover, about 70% of wind turbines worldwide are dominated by
top-10 producers (four are Chinese), according to REN21 (2015).
4 For example, the residential solar PV market in China is still virtually non-existent.
The headwinds include substantially lower residential power prices relative to the
industrial and commercial rates, non-attractive FIT schemes and some other risks
and issues in practice (IRENA, 2014b).
5 Residential solar PV generation has been growing rapidly worldwide recently
(REN21, 2015). In the US, the distributed solar PV generation accounts for more
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eration is also perceived as having the potential to combat market
power in utility industries. On top of the importance of residential
generation per se, another important reason is that residential genera-
tion offers richer analytical results since it is more responsive to some
key parameters, such as the incidence of good generating times, in
comparison with utility-scale generation. First, it faces more severely
decreasing marginal productivity as it encounters more space con-
straints. The decreasing marginal productivity is one of the main
driving forces for the policy complementarity between an import
tariff and a domestic FIT premium. Second, under a FIT scheme,
utility-scale RE suppliers just supply at a quantity where the aver-
age marginal cost equals the FIT. This is because they are always net
suppliers, so they enjoy the FIT premium regardless of different exo-
genous generation conditions. By contrast, households are generally
subject to the constraints that they can only sell excess renewable
electricity, since they are both producers and consumers of electricity
(also known as “prosumers”). Therefore, the key parameters, such as
the incidence and the productivity premium associated with a good
generating time, play more interesting roles in our model.6
We first investigate the simple case where the tradable RE equip-
ment is produced by a monopolistic Southern firm. Then we explore
a more realistic case of oligopolies in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly
consisting of a Northern firm and a Southern firm which produce ho-
mogeneous RE equipment at different marginal costs. The marginal
productivity of RE equipment in generating renewable electricity for
a household is diminishing in the quantity of equipment installed and
we allow for variable productivity of RE equipment at different times:
the productivity of every unit of installed capacity is proportionately
higher in good generating times than in bad generating times. Each
government aims to maximise its national welfare which is the sum
of domestic consumer surplus, potential domestic equipment firm’s
profit and potential government surplus if they exist, net of environ-
mental harm. The governments face two externalities that provide
rationale for intervention: imperfect competition in the upstream RE
equipment sector and pollution externality in the downstream fossil-
fuel-based electricity sector. The first-best policy to offset these two
than one third of total solar generation in 2016, half of which is from residential
generation (EIA, 2016). In Germany, residential generation accounts for 35% of total
solar PV generation (ILSR, 2013). In Australia, 15% of households have installed
solar panels, and the household penetration rate are around 25% in some states such
as Queensland and South Australia by the end of 2015 (AEC, 2016). The penetration
rates in Australia and the above two states increased rapidly to around 18.5% and
30% respectively by June 2016 (APVI, 2016). Japan is likely to embrace distributed
rather than utility-scale due to the shortage of land. In 2015, some poor develop-
ing countries such as Bangladesh are also rapidly expanding small-scale renewable
systems to provide electricity for people living far from the grid (REN21, 2015).
6 We presume that small-scale commercial roof-top renewable electricity generation
also share these aspects of residential generation to some degree.
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distortions is presumed to be a combination of emissions pricing and
price controls (see e.g., De Meza, 1979; Brander and Spencer, 1984
for price controls). Analogous to emissions pricing, price controls are
hard to enforce and they also face many other constraints, such as im-
perfect information. Thus, a second-best import tariff is much more
attractive in practice despite creating extra policy distortions (Pom-
fret, 1992). Due to the aforementioned practical reasons, we focus our
interest on the more pragmatic second-best policies to address the
above externalities. Nevertheless, our model can implicitly address
the effects of an exogenous emissions pricing, since we explicitly ex-
amine the effects of the fossil-fuel-based electricity price, which is
increasing in the emissions pricing. For analytical convenience, we
assume that the Northern and Southern markets are segmented and
the Southern government does not intervene in the markets at all. The
Northern government potentially has two policy instruments: a sup-
ply subsidy in the form of a FIT premium above the conventional elec-
tricity price to encourage domestic households to sell excess renew-
able electricity and a specific import tariff on RE equipment imports.
However, the Northern government only has flexibility in choosing
one of the instruments, with the other policy instrument set exogen-
ously. Besides being a first attempt to analyse this complex issue,
this assumption is also consistent with the fact that countries and re-
gions may face constraints in adopting a policy mix in practice. For
example, members of the EU have to adopt common trade policies
towards imports, so individual country cannot freely adjust the im-
port tariff to tailor to its own welfare-maximisation. It is notable that
because the exogenous import tariff is positive rather than zero in
this context, our model is more relevant than the existing literature
on strategic environmental policies, which assumes that trade policy
instruments are not available. Alternatively, once countries or regions
commit to promote RE after signing international agreements on cli-
mate change or introducing FITs, they risk damaging their credibility
if they renege on their existing obligations.7 Analogously, because the
exogenous FIT premiums are positive in these scenarios, our model is
more consistent with these scenarios compared with the international
trade literature which does not model environmental policies.
In this setting, we conduct a standard comparative statics analysis
to show that, under some general assumptions, the import tariff on
RE equipment and the FIT premium are complementary, i.e. they
move in the same direction: an exogenous rise in an import tariff al-
ways results in a more generous optimal FIT premium, and vice versa.
The main economic intuition can be briefly explained as follows: (i) a
higher Northern FIT premium boosts domestic demand for Southern
7 Phasing out FITs normally only affects the new RE generators, rather than the exist-
ing generators who are entitled to enjoy the FITs at the set rates for a long period,
e.g., 20 years.
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RE equipment imports and thereby increases the Northern tariff rev-
enue for any given level of a Northern import tariff; consequently, an
exogenous increase in the Northern import tariff strengthens the abil-
ity of the Northern FIT premium to raise domestic welfare through
increasing the Northern tariff revenue and extracting more rents from
the Southern equipment producer; conversely, (ii) a higher Northern
import tariff captures rents from the Southern equipment producer
and dampens the imports of Southern equipment and thereby re-
duces the total cost of the Northern FIT scheme for any given level
of a Northern FIT premium; as a result, an exogenous increase in
the Northern FIT premium enhances the capability of the Northern
import tariff to improve domestic welfare via cutting the Northern
FIT cost and preventing the shift of part of the FIT subsidies towards
the Southern equipment producer. Furthermore, this policy comple-
mentarity is reinforced by higher pollution externality, but it does not
need the existence of pollution externality to hold. This is because the
policy complementarity also depends on the conventional electricity
price, which measures the economic value of renewable electricity.
To better understand the policy complementarity, we also under-
take comparative statics analysis when specifying the functional form
of renewable electricity generation. This approach generates more
clear-cut sufficient conditions and allows us to compare the strengths
of various driving forces for the policy complementarity. The policy
complementarity implies that if the North is subject to exogenous
pressure from a lobby group to increase its import tariff on RE equip-
ment, then it may strategically increase its optimal FIT premium. If
we reverse the policy endogeneity, e.g. if the North is committed to
fade out its FIT premium due to some unmodelled factors, then it will
optimally respond by reducing its trade barriers against the South-
ern equipment firm. These policy implications contradict the current
policy trend in the developed world such as the EU, which is continu-
ously slashing its previously generous FIT subsidies for households
but, in the meantime, keeps trying to impose higher trade barriers
against Chinese solar panels.
Furthermore, we demonstrate another important finding: if an im-
port tariff is the only endogenous policy instrument, then the ultimate
environmental effect of an exogenous change in the FIT premium de-
pends on the market structure of the Northern equipment market.
For example, fading out the FIT premium has a direct negative effect
and an indirect positive effect on the domestic equipment installa-
tion level and thereby the environment. The indirect effect arises
from the aforementioned policy complementarity, i.e. a lower FIT
premium leads to a lower optimal import tariff, which reduces the
domestic equipment price and promotes domestic installation. The
relative strength of the direct effect versus the indirect effect depends
on the market structure of the Northern equipment market. Under a
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Southern monopoly, counter-intuitively, the indirect effect outweighs
the direct effect. Consequently, fading out the FIT premium even-
tually benefits the environment. By contrast, under an international
Cournot duopoly, we have a less surprising result: a marginal reduc-
tion in FIT premium ultimately harms the environment because the
direct effect outweighs the indirect effect.
If the North can only choose a FIT premium, then an exogenous re-
duction in the import tariff has a direct positive effect and an indirect
negative effect through the policy complementarity of the domestic
equipment installation and the environment. In both the Southern
monopoly and international duopoly cases, as expected, a reduction
in the import tariff ultimately benefits the environment as its direct
effect outweighs its indirect effect.
We also carry out some sensitivity analysis to analyse the policy
and environmental effects of some key parameters in the Southern
monopoly case. We find that countries that are better endowed with
good generating times (e.g. more sunshine) always have higher im-
port tariffs and subsequent RE equipment installation, but may or
may not have higher FIT premiums and subsequent installation and
environmental quality. Countries with a higher conventional electri-
city price generally have lower FIT premium but higher import tariffs.
They always ultimately enjoy higher environmental quality under an
optimal FIT premium, but generally have lower net environmental
quality under an optimal import tariff if the exogenous FIT premium
is not excessively high. This ultimate reduction in installation and
environmental quality induced by possibly a rise in an emissions
tax may be surprising too. The intuition is similar to that of a FIT
premium, as a higher conventional electricity price also induces a
higher optimal import tariff. Therefore, we caution that the ultimate
environmental effect of carbon pricing can even be negative in the
presence of an endogenous upstream import tariff on RE equipment.
Countries that put more weight on environmental harm always have
higher FIT premiums and equipment installation levels, but lower
import tariffs.
The economic literature provides little analysis of the effect of trade
liberalisation of EG. Furthermore, to my knowledge, there is virtually
no economic analysis of North–South trade in RE equipment, despite
the extensive media coverage and growing interest in RE in the policy
and empirical literature, see, e.g., Bahar et al. (2013); Flues et al.
(2014); Grafton et al. (2012); Jenner et al. (2013); Jha (2009, 2013); Ma
et al. (2015); Meckling and Hughes (2015); Steenblik (2006a, 2006b);
Stokes (2013); UNCTAD (2009); Wilke (2011).
This chapter is mainly based on three strands of economic literat-
ure. The first strand analyses strategic trade policies to switch rent
from foreign firms to domestic firms pioneered by Brander and Spen-
cer (1981, 1983, 1985); Dixit (1984); Eaton and Grossman (1986); Tower
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(1983). In particular, Brander and Spencer (1984) highlights the de-
pendence of optimal choice of strategic trade policies on the nature
of demand and cost. One of the key findings in Cheng (1988) is
that if an import tariff and an output subsidy are the available instru-
ments, then under an international Cournot duopoly producing a ho-
mogeneous good with different constant marginal costs, the optimal
policy consists of a domestic production tax and an import tariff. This
policy combination can offset the market power of both the domestic
and foreign producers. Since we are interested in the most common
trade and environmental policies in the RE sector, unlike the above
two studies, we choose an import tariff as the single trade policy in-
strument in this chapter. Among other things, Ishikawa and Spencer
(1999) show that the presence of foreign intermediate-good suppliers
reduces the incentive for export subsidies to domestic final-good pro-
ducers, since the former shares benefits from the subsidies. We focus
on the strategic use of either an upstream import tariff or a down-
stream FIT subsidy, and more importantly, the interaction between
trade and environmental policies. Moreover, the key final good – elec-
tricity in our model is non-tradable: entirely consumed domestically
and not exported. Overall, as Fischer (2016) also points out, very little
strategic trade literature has been written that addressed distortions
in the market for green goods such as renewable energy. They tend
to focus on export subsidies instead of production and consumption
subsidies which are more relevant for EG markets.
The second strand is the environmental literature concerning op-
timal pollution policies. Since the seminal work of Buchanan (1969),
a series of extensions has been undertaken, e.g., Barnett (1980); Lee
(1975); Levin (1985); Simpson (1995). The main message is that the op-
timal pollution tax should deviate from the Pigouvian rule in the pres-
ence of an imperfectly competitive polluting sector. Simpson (1995)
points out that the pollution tax can shift profit from less to more effi-
cient polluting firms which compete à la Cournot. We show that the
downstream FIT premium shifts profits in the opposite way between
the equipment firms. A more relevant literature in this strand is the
growing focus on the imperfectly competitive eco-industry which
produces EG. David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) are the first to
explicitly examine the implication of the market power of the eco-
industry on optimal environmental policies, and they also argue for
the aforementioned main message. Canton et al. (2008); David et al.
(2011); David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2010); Nimubona and Sinclair-
Desgagné (2011, 2013) and others provide extensions. Unlike this
study, they generally consider pollution taxes and conventional EG.
There are a few theoretical studies on FIT incentives for renewable
energy. Reichenbach and Requate (2012) examine how learning-by-
doing, learning spill-overs and imperfect competition affect the en-
vironmental policies in the presence of imperfectly competitive con-
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ventional electricity and a perfectly competitive renewable electricity
sector. The latter purchases equipment from a perfectly competitive
upstream equipment sector engaged in learning by doing.8 It is an
autarky model without international trade. Consequently, there is
no interaction between trade and environmental policies. Moreover,
we do not model learning by doing in this thesis, and we assume a
perfectly competitive conventional electricity sector, which allows us
to focus on the policy interaction and the consequent environmental
effects.
The third strand is the trade and environment literature, which di-
vides into two general lines. The first line is mainly aimed to study
how international trade per se affects the environment. Copeland
and Taylor (2003) decompose the environmental effect of trade into
a scale effect (if trade raises economic activity and income, then it
may harm the environment), a composition effect (trade can change
the share of dirty goods) and a technique effect (trade may affect the
pollution intensity of production). This chapter treats income and
pollution intensity as fixed. Thus, the environmental consequence
of trade in our model is solely associated with the composition ef-
fect: trade protection in RE equipment ultimately dampens renew-
able electricity generation, which could otherwise perfectly crowd out
fossil-fuel-based electricity and result in a cleaner energy mix. The
second line focuses on strategic environmental policies in an interna-
tional context, see e.g., Barrett (1994); Conrad (1993); Copeland (2000);
Fujiwara (2010); Hamilton and Requate (2004); Kennedy (1994); Lai
(2006); Long and Soubeyran (1999); Markusen (1975); Nimubona and
Sinclair-Desgagné (2011, 2013); Rauscher (1994, 1997); Straume (2006);
Ulph (1996); Walz and Wellisch (1997). They consider trade in pollut-
ing goods, while we consider trade in upstream RE equipment which
helps reduce pollution. This chapter is closer to recent works that
consider environmental taxation in the presence of an international
eco-industry, such as Avery and Boadu (2004); Baumol (1995); Can-
ton (2007); Carpentier et al. (2005); Copeland (2012); Dijkstra and
Mathew (2015); Feess and Muehlheusser (1999, 2002); Greaker (2006);
Greaker and Rosendahl (2008); Nimubona (2012); Simpson (2006);
Fischer (2016); Fischer et al (2014b). In particular, Nimubona (2012)
argues that for the South, which fully relies on Northern EG, exogen-
ous trade liberalisation of EG may reduce optimal Southern pollution
taxes. Although trade liberalisation has a net positive effect on EG
consumption, despite the less stringent pollution taxes, it may still
ultimately harm the environment if the higher polluting final-good
output induced by lower pollution taxes dominates the net increase in
8 This paper has an earlier version: Reichenbach and Requate (2011). The only differ-
ence is that it assumes a duopolistic RE equipment sector as in this chapter. Reichen-
bach and Requate (2012) make the simplification since they point that the market
structure, for wind in particular, is not so obvious at that time. However, the market
concentration has been rising fast since then as pointed out in footnote 3.
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EG consumption. We extend the framework of Nimubona (2012) from
conventional EG to RE equipment by emphasising the uniqueness of
the latter: (1) the trade pattern changes as the South is more efficient
in RE equipment production; (2) we consider time-intermittency and
storage difficulties by explicitly modelling the household equipment
demand in detail; (3) the conventional electricity price plays a key
role in our results as it measures the direct economic value of renew-
able electricity generated by RE equipment; (4) environmental quality
is monotonically increasing in RE equipment installation due to the
perfect crowding-out between conventional and renewable electricity.
More importantly, we also check reverse endogeneity, i.e., how exo-
genous change in FIT premium affects the optimal Northern import
tariff: (i) we find a qualitatively counter-intuitive result which is not
shown by Nimubona (2012), i.e., the net RE equipment installation
is marginally decreasing in the FIT premium, despite the induced
change in the optimal import tariff; (ii) we identify a unique FIT cost
effect of import tariff. Moreover, we also consider a more realistic
case of an international Cournot duopoly.9 If a less efficient domestic
equipment firm exists, the FIT premium can generally shift profit
from the foreign firm too. We also conduct sensitivity analysis and
comparative statics analysis with a specific functional form of renew-
able electricity generation, which are not presented by Nimubona
(2012). Canton (2007) is mainly interested in comparing the Northern
and Southern pollution taxes on the downstream polluting sectors
when trade policies are not available. He also models the upstream
eco-industry under both the foreign monopoly case and the inter-
national Cournot duopoly case in which the domestic firm is less
efficient. Unlike Nimubona (2012) and this chapter, as commented
by Nimubona (2012), Canton (2007) did not explicitly solve the net
effects of pollution tax on EG output and environmental quality.
This study has the following main contributions. First, it fills a
gap in theoretical analysis of North–South trade in RE equipment.
Second, we endogenise trade policy in the RE equipment sector
which has not been addressed as mentioned in the concluding re-
marks in Nimubona (2012). By endogenising Northern import tar-
iff in both the Southern monopoly and international duopoly cases,
we identify the counter-intuitive installation-dampening effect and
thereby the negative environmental consequence of a Northern FIT
premium under a Southern monopoly, and points out that this is
unlikely the case under an international duopoly. Moreover, this ex-
tension facilitates analysis of the optimal policy mix of EG trade and
environmental policies, which is commented on as an interesting con-
9 Nimubona (2012) also considers oligopolistic eco-industry in the supplementary ma-
terial, however, all the oligopolistic firms are from the North, which reflects the
reality for conventional EG. In contrast, in our work, the international duopoly con-
sisting of a Northern firm and a Southern firm reflects the reality for RE equipment.
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tribution to the relevant literature by Nimubona (2012).10 Third, it
provides some theoretical explanation for Jha (2013) who uses com-
putable general equilibrium model and quantitatively argues that
trade reform is the low-hanging fruit for regulators to promote RE
equipment installation and address climate change. FITs can be harm-
ful if designed in a protectionist manner. Countries could consider re-
taining FITs except for the solar energy, where there is a good case for
phasing out FITs. We show that the net environmental consequence
of a trade barrier is indeed generally negative. However, surprisingly,
whether a FIT premium has an ultimate positive or negative environ-
mental effect depends on the market structure of the equipment sec-
tor. Fourth, based on the unintentional indirect policy effect arising
from the policy complementarity identified in this study, we caution
the WTO and OECD’s expectation for RE to create a “win-win-win”
situation –“benefiting trade, the environment and the development”.
Fifth, by demonstrating a compelling case for policy complementarity,
we cast doubt on the recent Northern “policy substitution” trend of
higher trade barriers for RE equipment and lower FIT premiums for
RE generators. Sixth, we provide policy recommendation for coun-
tries and regions with different fossil-fuel-based electricity prices and
climate conditions.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 and Section
1.3 consider the Northern policy interactions and their welfare and
environmental effects under the Southern monopoly case and the in-
ternational Cournot duopoly case respectively. Section 1.4 concludes
this study.
1.2 northern fit subsidies and import tariff in the
presence of a southern monopoly
1.2.1 Model setup
There are two countries: a developed country denoted by the North
and a newly-industrialised country denoted by the South.11 Both
countries are endowed with L units of labour or households.12 La-
bour is mobile within each country but immobile across countries.
Households are homogeneous and a representative household de-
mands two goods: electricity and a numeraire good labelled good 0.
The representative household can choose to buy fossil-fuel-generated
electricity E or can generate renewable electricity itself by installing
RE equipment R. Fossil-fuel-generated and renewable electricity are
perfect substitutes in consumption.
10 We will generate a policy mix in the next chapter using numerical simulation.
11 Superscripts N and S are used to distinguish variables that are associated with both
the North and South.
12 Labour is equivalent to ‘consumers’ and ‘households’ in this model.
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The marginal productivity of RE equipment in generating renew-
able electricity for a household is diminishing in the quantity of
equipment installed and the productivity of every unit of installed
capacity is proportionately higher in good times than in bad times:
this captures the fact that RE generation productivity depends on en-
vironmental conditions.
The South produces electricity, the numeraire good and RE equip-
ment. The North produces electricity and the numeraire good, and
imports RE equipment from the South without any transportation
cost. Both countries have two sources which generate homogen-
eous electricity: the fossil-fuel power sector and domestic households
which sell excess renewable electricity. The numeraire good sectors
and fossil-fuel electricity sectors in both countries are perfectly com-
petitive and exhibit a constant returns-to-scale technology in labour
and fossil fuels alone respectively. Thus, the numeraire goods sector
determines the domestic wage rate wc.13 Furthermore, electricity is
non-tradable, while the numeraire good is tradable, which ensures a
trade balance between the two countries. Fossil-fuel electricity pro-
duction generates pollution at a constant rate which causes envir-
onmental harm. The South only has one monopolistic RE equipment
firm, exhibiting a constant returns-to-scale technology in labour alone
too. Both governments potentially have two policy instruments: a de-
mand subsidy in the form of a FIT premium sc ≥ 0 to encourage
domestic households to sell excess renewable electricity and a specific
import tariff τc on RE equipment imports, where the superscript de-
notes the country: c = N, S.
This study contributes to both trade and environmental literature
by theoretically examining the effects of trade and environmental
policies in the RE equipment sector, which is not adequately ad-
dressed yet. We stress on the idiosyncrasies of renewable electricity
generation, especially residential generation, which makes some key
parameters (such as the incidence of good generating times) more
relevant, relative to utility-scale generation.
The game consists of three stages. In the first stage, the Southern
government commits to a FIT scheme without a premium. The North-
ern government either commits to a non-negative equipment import
tariff and optimally chooses a FIT premium, or reverse endogeneity
by committing to a non-negative FIT premium and optimally chooses
an equipment import tariff. In the second stage, taking households’
demand as given, the Southern RE equipment firm chooses produc-
tion quantity and price. The numeraire good sectors and fossil-fuel
electricity sectors in the North and South also start producing. In the
third stage, the Northern and Southern households make purchase
13 The numeraire good is defined as having a price of one. Together with the zero
profit condition, wage is the inverse of the unit labour requirement of the numeraire
good. We assume that output of the numeraire good is always strictly positive in
both countries.
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decisions for RE equipment, fossil-fuel-generated electricity and the
numeraire good. Production of renewable electricity as well as con-
sumption of electricity and the numeraire good are determined. We
solve this game by backwards induction.
1.2.2 The representative household’s decision
1.2.2.1 Demand for electricity and the numeraire good
We assume that both the South and the North are endowed with units
of labour or households which all inelastically supply a unit of labour.
All households in both countries have the same tastes14 and, as noted,
consume two goods, electricity and the numeraire good 0.
Similar to Copeland and Taylor (2003), a representative household
takes pollution (not internalising any pollution externality), prices
and income as given, and maximises a quasi-linear utility function:
U = u (qE, q0)− h = f (qE) + q0 − h,
subject to a household budget constraint
pEqE + q0 = Y,
where f ′ (qE) > 0, f ′′ (qE) < 0, qE and q0 are the consumed quantities
of electricity and the numeraire good 0, z is the amount of pollution
and Y is household income. The utility derived from consumption
of electricity u (qE, q0) is assumed to be increasing and concave in
(qE, q0) . Following the relevant literature, we assume that environ-
mental harm (welfare loss from pollution) h is environmental harm
to each household which is not internalised by households. We also
suppose that households always demand positive amounts of both
electricity and good 0. Thus, the optimal quantities of electricity and
good 0 demanded by a representative household are:
qE (pE) =
(
f ′
)−1
(pE) ,
q0 = Y− pEqE (pE) .
The demand for electricity is independent of income, and depends
solely on its own price. Total differentiation yields f ′′ (qE) dqE = dpE,
thus, dqEdpE =
1
f ′′(qE)
< 0, i.e. the demand curve for electricity is down-
ward sloping.
1.2.2.2 Renewable electricity generation pattern
Households can choose to generate renewable electricity by installing
renewable energy (RE) equipment, which has time-varying productiv-
ities during the period. We suppose that all households face µ ∈ (0, 1]
14 Since the Northern and Southern markets are segmented and we focus on North-
ern market in this chapter, our main results are robust to this simplification. This
assumption is partially relaxed in Chapter 2 as we distinguish between a Southern
marginal environmental damage and a Northern marginal environmental damage.
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of good generating times (denoted by H for high-efficiency gener-
ation) and (1− µ) of bad generating times (denoted by L for low-
efficiency generation) in which the RE equipment productivity is dif-
ferent. This assumption is made due to the reality that RE generation
is intermittent across time. For example, solar panels are more pro-
ductive during sunny daytime (‘good’ generating times), but less pro-
ductive during cloudy or rainy days (‘bad’ generating times); wind
turbines are more productive on windy days or seasons. This as-
sumption implies that there are bound to be some bad times for RE
generation and there is always demand for fossil-fuel electricity, so
that fossil-fuel electricity sectors in both countries still exist. This as-
sumption is consistent with the reality that the world is still highly
dependent on fossil-fuel electricity. To keep the problem tractable, we
suppose that if there is any excess supply of renewable electricity that
is not absorbed by households in good times at any specific point of
time, then this is absorbed by an unmodelled industrial sector which
demands a constant large quantity of electricity.
There are diminishing marginal returns to RE equipment in renew-
able electricity generation for a household. This is because all house-
holds face space constraints in installing RE equipment. To maximise
electricity generation given this constraint, households initially install
RE equipment in places where electricity generation is most product-
ive. As they install more, they have no choice but to install in less
productive places. The instantaneous renewable electricity supply –
that is, within a good or bad period – is increasing and strictly con-
cave in the quantity of RE equipment in both good and bad times.
We assume that the instantaneous marginal productivity of RE equip-
ment in a good generating time is simply some proportion higher
than that in a bad time. Thus, denoting the instantaneous supply of
renewable electricity in a time j = H, L by qjRE = ε
j (qR) we have:
εj (0) = 0, εj
′
(qR) > 0, εj
′′
(qR) < 0, εj
′′′
(qR) = 0,
εH
′
(qR) = (1+ χ) εL
′
(qR) ∀qR,
where εj ′ (qR) is the marginal productivity of renewable electricity
generation in a time j = H, L. εj ′′ (qR) < 0 implies decreasing re-
turns to renewable electricity generation, while εj ′′′ (qR) = 0 implies
that the rate at which the marginal productivity of renewable electri-
city generation decreases is constant.15 It is immediate that for any
15 The assumptions of the renewable electricity generation technology are similar to
that of end-of-pipe pollution abatement technology in Nimubona (2012). We specify
generation technology first before deriving the cost function of renewable electri-
city generation instead of the other way around, so as to compare our analytical
results with that in the existing literature more easily. Analogous to footnote 13 in
Nimubona (2012), εj
′′′
(qR) = 0 implies a linear demand for RE equipment. This
assumption facilitates generating more clear-cut analytical results and ensures the
existence of an interior solution for the RE equipment sector. Our main results are
robust as long as the demand for RE equipment is not too convex.
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installation level, the instantaneous amount of renewable electricity
generation in a good generating time is also 1 + χ times higher than
that in a bad generating time:
εH (qR) = (1+ χ) εL (qR) = (1+ χ)
qR∫
0
εL
′
(qR) dqR ∀qR.
The (time-and-productivity weighted) average of marginal productiv-
ities of RE equipment over the entire period is:
ε¯′ (qR) = µεH
′
(qR) + (1− µ) εL ′ (qR) = (1+ µχ) εL ′ (qR) ,
and the average amount of renewable electricity generation over the
period is:
q¯RE = ε¯ (qR) =
qR∫
0
ε¯′ (qR) dqR.
For simplicity, we assume a zero discount rate and no installation or
maintenance costs of RE equipment. So the total cost of generating
amount qjRE of renewable electricity in generating times j = H, L
is just the upfront purchasing cost of RE equipment PR · εj −1
(
qjRE
)
.
The instantaneous supply curve of renewable electricity equals the
additional upfront purchasing cost of RE equipment to generate qjRE
amount of renewable electricity in a time j = H, L:
pRE
(
qjRE
)
= PR · d
dqjRE
[
εj −1
(
qjRE
)]
, j = H, L,
which is upward sloping since PR · d2(
dqjRE
)2 [εj −1 (qjRE)] > 0.
1.2.2.3 Optimal renewable electricity generation
This section explores households’ derived demand for RE equipment
or equivalently, the average renewable electricity generation over the
period. Let qcFE be the instantaneous demand for fossil-fuel-generated
electricity in bad generating times in country c = N, S. Households
can sell excess renewable electricity to the grid at pFE + sc, so it is
as if they face a perfectly elastic demand for renewable electricity at
pFE + sc. Since in a good generating time households are assumed
to be net sellers of renewable electricity, they fulfil all their demand
for electricity from renewable electricity. However, households can-
not buy cheaper fossil-fuel-generated electricity and sell renewable
electricity to the grid at a higher price with a premium simultan-
eously, i.e. they can only sell the excess renewable electricity to the
grid. The main implication of this assumption to our model is that
besides the difference in generation efficiency and thereby generation
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costs between good and bad generating times, we add difference in
terms of marginal benefit. In a good generating time, the marginal
benefit of renewable electricity generation is the market price plus the
FIT premium pFE + sc, while in a bad generating time, it is just the
market price pFE.16 When they consume renewable electricity them-
selves, they face an opportunity cost of pFE + s
c at which they could
sell to the grid otherwise, so the instantaneous renewable electricity
consumption in good generating times is dHcRE = ( f
′)−1 (pFE + s
c) . We
make the following assumption to reflect the time-varying competit-
iveness of renewable electricity relative to conventional electricity in
the real world at present and in the near future.
Assumption 1. Given that households choose RE equipment optimally, (i)
they are always net sellers of renewable electricity in a good generating time;
(ii) they are always net buyers of fossil-fuel-generated electricity but still
generate positive amount of renewable electricity in a bad generating time
under any FIT schemes: 0 < qLcRE (s
c, τc) < dLE < q
Hc
RE (s
c, τc) ∀ sc ≥
0, τc ≥ 0.
In the presence of a FIT scheme in country c = N, S, the represent-
ative household chooses the equipment installation qcR, the instantan-
eous dirty electricity demand qcFE and numeraire good consumption
qc0 to maximise its utility:
Uc = µ f
(
( f ′)−1 (pFE + s
c)
)
+ (1− µ) f
(
εL (qcR) + q
c
FE
)
+ qc0 − hc,
subject to
pFE (1− µ) qcFE + qc0 + PcRqcR =
w + µ (pFE + s
c)
[
(1+ χ) εL (qcR)− ( f ′)−1 (pFE + sc)
]
.
Note that households demand RE equipment because it increases
their utility levels: (i) directly through providing electricity; (ii) in-
directly through consuming more of the numeraire good using the
profit from selling excess renewable electricity. First-order conditions
for the representative household’s utility maximisation problem are:
f ′
(
εL (qcR) + q
c
FE
)
= pFE,
(1− µ) f ′
(
εL (qcR) + q
c
FE
)
εL
′
(qcR) = P
c
R − µ (pFE + sc) (1+ χ) εL ′ (qcR) ,
which yield the demand for RE equipment and the fossil-fuel-based
electricity under a FIT scheme as:
qcR = (ε
L ′)−1
(
PcR
pFE (1+ µχ) + µsc (1+ χ)
)
,
(1− µ) qcFE = (1− µ)
[
f ′−1 (pFE)− εL (qcR)
]
.
16 It is assumed that is not allowed by government FIT regulations.
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Substituting the first first-order condition into the second yields the
combined first-order condition, or the inverse demand function for
RE equipment:
β (sc) εL
′
(qcR) = P
c
R, (1.1)
where β (sc) = (1+ µχ) pFE + µ (1+ χ) sc is the (time-productivity-
weighted) constant per-unit benefit of renewable electricity genera-
tion over the period. Thus, the left-hand side is the marginal benefit
of equipment installation. The right-hand side is the marginal cost
of installing equipment – the equipment price. By our assumption of
decreasing marginal productivity of renewable electricity generation,
the FIT premium has two effects on the inverse equipment demand
curve. First, it has a shift effect since it always increases households’
willingness to pay for equipment ( ∂P
N
R
∂sN > 0). Second, it also has a ro-
tation effect which indicates that a higher FIT premium decreases the
price-elasticity of equipment demand in the North ( ∂
∂sN
(
dPNR
dqNR
)
< 0).17
One important implication of this study is that a higher feed-in tar-
iff alleviates the installation-dampening effect of any policy or para-
meters (e.g., higher import tariffs, higher unit cost of equipment pro-
duction,and so forth) which leads to a higher equipment price:
∂
∂sN
[
∂qNR
(
PNR , s
N)
∂PNR
]
> 0.
Furthermore, by Young’s theorem, any policy or parameter (e.g.,
higher Northern import tariff τN) which leads to a higher equipment
price reinforces the installation-promoting effect of a FIT premium:
∂
∂PNR
[
∂qcR
(
PNR , s
N)
∂sN
]
> 0.
However, as we will see later, the alleviation of the import tariff’s
installation-dampening effect due to a higher FIT premium and the
reinforcement of the FIT premium’s quantity-promoting effect due to
a higher import tariff may become the driving forces for or against
the policy complementarity.
An alternative way to consider a household’s optimal decision is
to check the optimal choice of total renewable electricity generation
over the period q¯cRE. This way is more helpful to understand the time-
intermittency nature of renewable electricity generation. q¯cRE can be
derived by equating the average marginal revenue and average mar-
ginal cost of average renewable electricity generation over the period:
MRcRE (s
c) = MC
c
RE (q¯
c
RE) ,
17 Both the shift effect and rotation effect are similar to their counterparts of a pol-
lution tax pointed out by David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005), Requate (2005) and
Nimubona (2012).
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where
MRcRE (s
c) =
dTRcRE
dq¯cRE
=
d
[
β (sc) · qLRE
]
d
[
(1+ µχ) qLRE
] = pFE + µ (1+ χ)1+ µχ sc,
MCcRE (q¯
c
RE) =
dTCcRE
dq¯cRE
= PcR ·
d
[
ε¯ −1 (q¯cRE)
]
d
[
(1+ µχ) qLRE
] .
As a result, we get an equivalency between the optimal average RE
generation during the period and the quantity generated from the
optimal level of equipment installation:
q¯c∗RE = ε¯ (q
c∗
R ) = (1− µ) εL (qc∗R ) + µεH (qc∗R ) .
This equivalency is derived because we assume that the cost of
renewable electricity generation entirely comes from households’ up-
front equipment purchasing cost,18 and the renewable electricity gen-
eration in both good and bad generating times are monotonically in-
creasing in equipment installation.
Figure 1.1 (a) shows the representative Northern household’s in-
stantaneous electricity consumption and production. The curves la-
belled as SLcRE and S
Hc
RE in Figure 1.1 (a) correspond to the represent-
ative household’s RE electricity supply curves in bad and good gen-
erating times respectively. The downward-sloping curve labelled as
DE in Figure 1.1 (a) refers to its instantaneous electricity demand in
both times. The horizontal dotted and solid lines in Figure 1.1 (a) are
the fossil-fuel-based electricity price and the premium-inclusive fossil-
fuel-based electricity price respectively. Figure 1.1 (b) shows the rep-
resentative Northern household’s average electricity consumption and
production. The horizontal axis measures average quantity of electri-
city over the period, so it is essentially a scaling up of the base unit of
measure for electricity used in Figure 1.1 (a), i.e., qE = (1 + µχ)qE.
19
The curves labelled as ScRE and DE in Figure 1.1 (b) are the represent-
ative household’s average renewable electricity supply and average
electricity demand curves respectively. The horizontal dotted and
dashed lines in Figure 1.1 (b) are the fossil-fuel-based electricity price
(average marginal revenue without any FIT premium) and the average
premium-inclusive fossil-fuel-based electricity price respectively.
18 This is a reasonably realistic assumption because the ongoing maintenance cost of
renewable electricity generation contribute a small proportion of the total genera-
tion cost. Requate (2015) also points out that there is no direct costs of operation for
renewable electricity generation. The increasing MC of renewable electricity genera-
tion can be due to rising maintenance cost, but more important contributing factor is
the installation space constraint. Therefore, by removing maintenance cost, we can
simplify the analysis without loss of generality.
19 This scaling up is due to our usage of renewable electricity in a bad generating time
as a basis of comparing generation efficiency. Suppose that there is no good gener-
ating time, then the scaling-up factor µχ becomes zero. If there are good generating
times, then we need to account for both the ratio of good generating times over the
period µ and the productivity premium χ when considering the average generation
efficiency over the period.
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(a) Instantaneous electricity consumption and production
(b) Time-productivity weighted average electricity consumption and production
Figure 1.1: The representative Northern household’s instantaneous and
time-productivity weighted average electricity consumption and
production
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In the presence of a positive (zero) FIT premium, the representat-
ive household optimally supplies renewable electricity of an amount
associated with point a1 (a0) in Figure 1.1 (b), which is the time-
weighted average of the instantaneous optimal quantity supplied in
good and bad times,indicated by points l3 (l2) and h2 (h1) in Figure 1.1
(a) respectively. Consequently, Figure 1.1 reflects the unique feature
of renewable electricity generation. Once the representative house-
hold installed the optimal level of equipment, even when there is no
FIT premium, we observe instantaneous over-supply relative to the
fossil-fuel-based electricity price in a bad time, shown by the quantity
difference between point l2 and l1, but instantaneous under-supply in
a good time, shown by the quantity difference between point h1 and
h3. This insight implies that we need to be cautious when evaluat-
ing the efficiency of RE installation. Observing the oversupply under
good generating conditions does not necessarily mean that the install-
ation is suboptimal since optimal installation decision is based on the
entire period, not just good generating times.
For a representative household as an electricity “prosumer”, one
intuitive way of analysing economic surplus is to think of the repres-
entative household as if it would always sell the self-generated renew-
able electricity to itself for self-consumption first in any times. Then,
it would sell excess renewable electricity to the grid at the premium-
inclusive electricity price in a good generating time while it would
buy fossil-fuel-based electricity to fulfil its demand in a bad time.
Thus, the representative household’s consumer surplus from consum-
ing renewable and fossil-fuel-based electricity is the time-weighted
average of that in good and bad times. The representative house-
hold’s consumer surplus from electricity consumption without and
with a positive FIT premium are respectively given by:20
CScE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc=0
= area(d2d0 p0),
CScE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc>0
= µ · area(d2d1 p3) + (1− µ) · area(d2d0 p0).
The representative household’s producer surplus from renewable
electricity generation without and with a positive FIT premium are
respectively given by:
PScRE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc=0
= µ · area(p0h3h0) + (1− µ) · area(p0l1l0),
PScRE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc>0
= µ · area(p3h4h0) + (1− µ) · area(p0l1l0).
Let FITCN be the government’s revenue cost of the FIT scheme in
country c = N, S, which is the product of its FIT premium and the
20 Points in each pair d1 and p1, h4 and p2, a1 and p4, d3 and p5 are vertically aligned.
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excess amount of renewable electricity generated by all households in
good generating times. Thus, the FIT cost per household is FITC
N
L =
µ · area(d1h4 p2 p1). We firstly check that the instantaneous deadweight
losses of a FIT premium only exists in a good generating time, as
households are not allowed to enjoy the premium in a bad generating
time. Consequently, a FIT premium creates economic deadweight
losses because:
CScE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc>0
−CS
c
E
L
∣∣∣∣
sc=0
+
PScRE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc>0
−PS
c
RE
L
∣∣∣∣
sc=0
−FITC
N
L
= −µ · area(h4h3 p2)− µ · area(d1d0 p1) < 0,
where the first and second terms on the right-hand-side corres-
pond to the deadweight losses associated with average over-supply
and under-demand respectively, which can also be illustrated by
area(a1a0 p4) and area(d3d0 p5) respectively in Figure 1.1 (b). The fol-
lowing lemma summarises the above analysis:
Lemma 1.1. A FIT premium generates marginal deadweight losses asso-
ciated with average over-supply and average under-demand of renewable
electricity over the period.
The deadweight losses associated with average over-supply and
under-demand refer to the loss of economic efficiency relative to the
market price of electricity. However, an installation-promoting effect
of a FIT premium reduces the deadweight loss associated pollution
externality by crowding out dirty electricity generation. Therefore,
the optimal FIT premium is determined by a trade-off between these
deadweight losses and other welfare effects of a FIT premium, such
as this positive direct environmental effect. We provide an algebraic
illustration of the above points in Section 1.2.7.1.
1.2.3 Supply of good 0
The numeraire good sector is perfectly competitive. Good 0 is gener-
ated with a constant returns-to-scale technology in labour alone. The
production function for good 0 is:
qc0 (L0) =
L0
lc0
, c = N, S,
where L0 is the labour employed in good 0 and lc0 is the amount of
labour required to produce each unit of good 0 in country c = N, S.
The zero-profit condition implies pc0 = l
c
0w
c. As good 0 is assumed
to be our numeraire, so pc0 = l
c
0w
c = 1 and the wage rate in country
c = N, S is pinned down by lc0:
wc =
1
lc0
.
The assumption that the South has the lower wage, then, is equivalent
to assuming that lS0 > l
N
0 .
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1.2.4 Supply of fossil-fuel-generated electricity and the associated pollution
The fossil-fuel electricity sector is perfectly competitive, generating
electricity under a constant returns-to-scale technology using fossil
fuels alone. Letting z be the amount of pollution produced during
the process of fossil-fuel electricity generation, we assume that it is
proportional to the output of fossil-fuel-generated electricity:
zc (QcFE) = eQ
c
FE,
where e is the constant emission coefficient. We assume that pol-
lution is non-transboundary and environmental harm or damage of
pollution is increasing proportionally to the amount of local pollu-
tion, with a constant marginal social damage of pollution ν.21 Thus,
the aggregate harm of pollution to households in country c = N, S
is:
Hc (QcFE) = Lh
c (QcFE) = νz
c (QcFE) = νeQ
c
FE,
where QcFE is the industry supply of fossil-fuel-generated electricity
in country c = N, S respectively. We assume that there is an unmod-
elled sector which demands a constant large amount of electricity Q˜cE
in country c = N, S,22 so that the fossil-fuel electricity sectors in both
countries always exist even when facing competition from renewable
electricity: QcFE > 0. Thus the conventional electricity generation is
the sum of the industry and domestic household electricity demand
net of total renewable electricity generated by domestic households.
We can rewrite the domestic environmental harm as:
Hc (qcR) = νe
[
Q˜cE + L (1− µ) dLE − Lε¯ (qcR)
]
.
Note that the environmental quality is monotonically increasing in
domestic installation in our model. This relationship is different from
Nimubona (2012), in which the relationship between the environment
and the domestic consumption of EG are ambiguous since the en-
vironment also depends on the polluting final good output. In our
21 We make the non-transboundary simplification because this chapter is the first at-
tempt to construct the basic model which focuses on the Northern market. Neverthe-
less, this simplification should help us compare the non-cooperative and cooperative
outcomes if we study the more realistic transboundary pollution later. We may also
relax the assumption of a linear environmental damage/harm function in future
models. However, we presume that our main results would still go through accord-
ing to the extension of Nimubona (2012), in which he demonstrated that his main
results are robust under a convex environmental damage/harm function: 12νe
2.
22 This assumption assures that all excess renewable electricity sold by households in
good generating times is fully absorbed; thus any increase in renewable electricity
supply reduces conventional electricity demand from this unmodelled sector. This
assumption also assures that the conventional electricity sectors always exist in both
countries, without worrying about the scenario in which the total demand of con-
ventional electricity of households in bad times is entirely met by the renewable
electricity sold by households in good times at the same point in time.
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model, the polluting conventional electricity and the renewable elec-
tricity are perfect substitutes, so there is perfect crowding out between
them.
1.2.5 Supply of RE equipment
The Southern RE equipment firm adopts a common constant returns-
to-scale production technology:
R (LR) =
LR
lR
,
where LR is the quantity of labour and lR is the amounts of labour
required to produce each unit of RE equipment. The marginal cost of
R is:
cSR = w
SlSR.
Let QSR and Q
N
R be the total equipment installation in the South and
the North respectively. Given the Northern households’ demand as
shown by (1.1), the Southern equipment firm chooses QSR and Q
N
R to
maximise its total profit given by:
ΠSR
(
QSR, Q
N
R
)
=
[
PSR
(
QSR, s
S
)
− cSR
]
QSR
+
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR − τN
]
QNR .
The first-order conditions for profit maximisation of the Southern
equipment firm are:
ΠSRQNR =
∂PNR (QNR ,sN)
∂QNR
QNR + P
N
R
(
QNR , s
N)− τN − cSR = 0,
ΠSRQSR =
∂PSR(QSR,sS)
∂QSR
QSR + P
S
R
(
QSR, s
S)− cSR = 0, (1.2)
which solve for the optimal output levels in the South and the North
respectively: QS∗R = Q
S∗
R
(
sS
)
and QN∗R = Q
N∗
R
(
sN , τN
)
. So its output
in the Northern market depends on both the Northern FIT premium
and import tariff.
1.2.6 Northern and Southern welfare
The Northern government optimally chooses either an equipment im-
port tariff or a FIT premium to maximise domestic welfare, which is
the sum of consumer surplus in consuming the numeraire good (con-
sists of the wage and the profit from selling renewable electricity),
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consumer surplus in consuming electricity and government surplus
(tariff revenue net of FIT revenue cost) net of environmental harm:23
WN = CSNE + CS
N
0 + GS
N − HN
= L
{
µ
dHNE (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + (1− µ)
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
− pFE
[
µdHNE
(
sN
)
+ (1− µ) dLE
]
+ w + pFEε
(
QNR
L
)
− PNR
(
QNR , s
N
) QNR
L
}
+ τNQNR − νe
[
Q˜NE + Ld
L
E − Lε
(
QNR
L
)]
.
(1.3)
Based on the analysis of economic surplus in Section 1.2.2.3, to de-
rive the Northern welfare, we simply add the Northern tariff revenue
τNQNR to Northern government surplus GS
N as well as environmental
harm to households. Note that the FIT subsidies µsN LεH
(
QNR
L
)
are
transferred from the Northern government to domestic households,
i.e. government’s FIT cost and household’s FIT revenue are cancelled
out. The environmental harm is a product of the marginal damage of
23 If we analytically examine the policy mix scenario, the main results would still go
through because when governments can only choose one endogenous policy, the
other exogenous policy is kept constant. Thus, the total derivative indicating the
marginal welfare effects of each policy simply change to the corresponding partial
derivative, e.g., dW
N
dsN changes to
∂WN
∂sN . We choose to model the single endogenous
policy scenario as a first step because in practice, governments may not be able to
choose a policy mix, despite that the policy mix is a weakly dominant policy choice.
Nevertheless, we will simulate the policy mix in the next Chapter and compare the
optimal welfare under a policy mix with other policy scenarios.
CSNE = µL
 d
HN
E (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE − pFEdHNE
(
sN
)
+ (1− µ) L
 d
L
E∫
0
pE (qE) dqE − pFEdLE

= µL
dHNE (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + (1− µ) L
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
− pFEL
[
µdHNE
(
sN
)
+ (1− µ) dLE
]
,
CSN0 = wL + µL
(pFE + sN) qHNRE −
qHNRE (sN)∫
0
PcR ·
d
dqHNRE
[
εH −1
(
qHNRE
)]
dqE

+ (1− µ) L
pFEqLNRE −
qLNRE∫
0
PcR ·
d
dqLNRE
[
εL −1
(
qLNRE
)]
dqE

= wL + pFELε
(
QNR
L
)
+ µsN LεH
(
QNR
L
)
− PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
QNR .
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pollution, the emission coefficient, and total fossil-fuel-based electri-
city. The fossil-fuel-based electricity is a sum of the demand from the
unmodelled sector and households.
Similarly, Southern welfare without a Southern FIT premium is:
WS = PSSR +
(
CSSE + CS
S
0
)
− HS
=
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR − τN
]
QSNR
(
sN , τN
)
+
[
PSR
(
QSR
)
− cSR
]
QSSR
+ L
{ dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + w
+ pFE
[
ε
(
QSR
L
)
− dLE
]
− PSR
(
QSR
) QSR
L
}
− νe
[
Q˜SE + Ld
L
E − Lε
(
QSR
L
)]
.
Although Southern welfare does not affect our main results in this
Chapter due to the segmented Northern and Southern markets, we
still include it because it shows the surplus of households when there
is no government intervention. Southern households supply optimal
amount of renewable electricity solely by equating the average mar-
ginal generation cost and the fossil-fuel-based electricity price pFE,
without any FIT-induced over-supply or under-demand. Moreover,
Southern welfare function also reminds that the Northern import tar-
iff unambiguously hurts the South, so any terms-of-trade gain en-
joyed by the North comes at the expense of Southern welfare.
1.2.7 Optimal Northern FIT premium given an exogenous Northern im-
port tariff
1.2.7.1 Optimal Northern FIT premium
The welfare maximisation condition for an optimal Northern FIT
premium given an exogenous Northern equipment import tariff is:
sN∗ =
−QNR dP
N
R
dsN + τ
N dQNR
dsN + νeε¯
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
µεH
′ (QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN − µL
ddHNE
dsN
. (1.4)
The first and second terms of the denominator on the right-hand
side are the deadweight losses associated with over-supply and
under-demand of renewable electricity induced by the FIT premium
respectively. They are both positive, so whichever becomes larger,
it puts downward pressure on the optimal FIT premium. The nu-
merator on the right-hand side consists of three terms which have
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different signs. The first term of the numerator is a negative price ef-
fect, since a higher FIT premium increases domestic equipment price,
i.e. dP
N
R
dsN > 0 (see (A.3)), and therefore allows the Southern equipment
firm to enjoy higher marginal rent from Northern households. The
second term of the numerator corresponds to a positive (import) tariff
revenue effect, since a higher FIT premium increases domestic equip-
ment installation or equivalently the import quantity, i.e. dQ
N
R
dsN > 0
(see (A.2)), and thereby increases domestic tariff revenue. The third
term of the numerator is a positive environmental effect as higher
installation rates induced by more generous FIT subsidies generates
more renewable electricity, which crowds out conventional electricity
and benefits the environment.
The big picture illustrated by (1.4) is that a more generous Northern
FIT scheme enlarges domestic equipment market, and raises domestic
tariff revenue given any positive domestic import tariff. When the
Northern import tariff rises exogenously, the Northern FIT premium
is more capable of improving domestic welfare because its aforemen-
tioned tariff-revenue promoting effect implies that more rents are
snatched from the Southern equipment producer.
1.2.7.2 The impact of the Northern trade barrier
To assess the net impact of the Northern trade barrier, we have to take
into account the endogenous variables’ policy-induced changes. In
this section, we explicitly solve for the marginal effect of a Northern
import tariff on the optimal Northern FIT premium, the equilibrium
RE equipment installation and thereby the domestic environmental
quality. Using standard comparative statics, i.e. total differentiation
of the first-order condition for Southern equipment firm’s profit max-
imisation and Northern welfare maximisation with respect to (w.r.t.)
the Northern import tariff, and the usage of Cramer’s rule yield the
following proposition:
Proposition 1.1. If the North imports all of its renewable energy equip-
ment from a monopolistic Southern firm, then (i) a higher import tariff
always leads to a more generous feed-in tariff premium, i.e. if sN∗ ≤
(1+µχ)(3pFE+4νe)
2µ(1+χ) , then
dsN∗
dτN > 0; (ii) a higher import tariff always increase
the equilibrium price of RE equipment if sN∗ ≤ (1+µχ)(3pFE+4νe)2µ(1+χ) . Con-
sequently, if sN∗ ≤ (1+µχ)νe
µ(1+χ) , a higher import tariff ultimately reduces the
Northern equipment installation and increases the Northern environmental
harm, i.e. dQ
N
R
dτN < 0 and
dHN
dτN > 0, although it induces a more generous FIT
premium.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
1.2 southern monopoly 31
Proposition 1.1 (i) shows that the optimal Northern FIT premium is
increasing in the domestic import tariff.24 The main intuition is that
a higher Northern FIT premium boosts domestic demand for South-
ern RE equipment imports and thereby increases the Northern tariff
revenue for any given level of a Northern import tariff. Consequently,
an exogenous increase in the Northern import tariff strengthens the
ability of the Northern FIT premium to improve domestic welfare
through increasing the Northern tariff revenue and extracting more
rents from the Southern equipment producer. Note that the sufficient
condition indicates that this policy interaction holds even if there is
no pollution externality (νe = 0), as long as the FIT premium is suffi-
ciently low relative to the fossil-fuel-based electricity price pFE. This
sufficient condition for the policy complementarity contrasts with
that in Nimubona (2012), in which the pollution tax is only upper-
bounded by the marginal damage of pollution. In this study, in addi-
tion to the damage of pollution, a higher conventional electricity price
pFE also increases the likelihood of the policy complementarity This is
due to the unique characteristics of renewable equipment mentioned
in the introduction: RE equipment generates electricity, and thereby
directly provide economic value as well as indirectly improving wel-
fare by crowding out dirty electricity. In contrast, conventional EG
has little alternative usage, so it can only indirectly improve welfare
by abating an end-of-pipe pollution.
Presumably, a higher Northern import tariff directly dampens do-
mestic equipment installation, but more generous Northern FIT sub-
sidies induced by a higher Northern import tariff directly benefits
domestic installation. Thus, it is necessary to check the relative mag-
nitude of the direct negative effect versus the indirect positive effect.
Proposition 1.1 (ii) shows that the direct effect indeed outweighs the
indirect effect, so the trade barrier ultimately hurts domestic equip-
ment installation as expected. The reason behind this result is that a
higher Northern import tariff always makes RE equipment more ex-
pensive for domestic households. Since higher equipment installation
generates more renewable electricity which crowds out fossil-fuel-
generated electricity, the domestic environmental quality improves.
Section 1.2.10 provides further discussion of the driving forces be-
hind the policy response.
Note that all of the results in Proposition 1.1 are subject to suffi-
cient but not necessary conditions. As in Nimubona (2012), since it
is analytically difficult to know the robustness of these results when
the sufficient conditions do not hold, we need to rely on numerical
simulations.
24 This proposition is somewhat in line with Nimubona (2012), which also shows that
optimal emission tax is increasing in the exogenous import tariff in the presence of
a foreign monopolistic EG firm.
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1.2.8 Optimal Northern import tariff given an exogenous Northern FIT
premium
1.2.8.1 Optimal Northern import tariff
The welfare maximisation condition for an optimal Northern import
tariff given an exogenous Northern FIT premium is:25
τN∗ =
QNR
(
1− dPNRdτN
)
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN + νeε¯
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
− dQNRdτN
. (1.5)
The denominator on the right-hand side is positive, which corres-
ponds to the conventional marginal deadweight loss of an import
tariff as it reduces import quantity. So larger deadweight loss adds
a negative incentive in the choice of an optimal import tariff. The
numerator on the right-hand side consists of three terms which have
different signs. The first term of the numerator is a positive terms-
of-trade effect since a higher import tariff forces the Southern equip-
ment firm to absorb part of the import tariff, so that the Northern
equipment price rises by an amount which is less than the import
tariff ( dP
N
R
dτN =
1
2 , see (A.8)). The second term of the numerator cor-
responds to a unique positive FIT cost effect: a higher import tariff
decreases domestic equipment installation, i.e. dQ
N
R
dτN < 0 (see (A.7)),
which decreases the renewable electricity generation that needs to be
subsidised. Consequently, the increased trade barrier reduces the FIT
revenue cost of the Northern government and improves social wel-
fare. The third term of the numerator is a negative environmental
effect, since lower installation induced by a trade barrier hurts the
environment.
In essence, (1.5) indicates that a higher Northern trade barrier
dampens domestic equipment market, and results in lower expendit-
ure on the Northern FIT scheme given any positive Northern FIT
premium. When the Northern FIT premium rises exogenously, the
Northern trade barrier is more capable of raising domestic welfare
because its aforementioned FIT cost (saving) effect implies that less
Northern FIT subsidies are shifted towards the Southern equipment
producer.
(1.5) can be further simplified to:
τN∗ =
QNR
(
1− dPNRdτN
)
− dQNRdτN
+
[
µ (1+χ) sN − νe (1+µχ)
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
.
It is even more clear that, ceteris paribus, the optimal Northern im-
port tariff is increasing in the domestic FIT premium sN but decreas-
25 Although dQ
N
R
dτN in the second and third terms of the numerator can be cancelled out
with that in the denominator, we choose to preserve them first so that it is easier to
compare them with the corresponding terms in the existing literature.
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ing in the product of a marginal damage of pollution and an emission
coefficient νe. Thus, the relative size of the FIT premium and envir-
onmental parameters matters. If the environmental parameters are
sufficiently small, a positive Northern import tariff is guaranteed.
1.2.8.2 The impact of Northern FIT premium
To assess the net impact of a Northern FIT premium, we have to
take into account the endogenous variables’ policy-induced changes
as well. In this section, we explicitly solve for the marginal effects
of Northern FIT premium on the optimal Northern import tariff, the
equilibrium RE equipment installation and thereby the domestic en-
vironment. Using standard comparative statics, i.e. total differen-
tiation of the first-order conditions for the Southern equipment firm
and Northern welfare maximisation w.r.t. the Northern FIT premium,
and the usage of Cramer’s rule yield the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2. If the North imports all of its renewable energy equipment
from a monopolistic Southern firm, then (i) a higher Northern feed-in tariff
increases the optimal domestic import tariff, i.e. dτ
N∗
dsN > 0; (ii) a higher
Northern feed-in tariff increases the equilibrium price of RE equipment.
Therefore, as long as the Southern equipment firm makes positive profit
without any Northern policy interventions, i.e. (1+ µχ) pFEεL
′ (QNR
L
)
>
cSR, a higher Northern feed-in tariff ultimately decreases the Northern
equipment installation and increases the Northern environmental harm, i.e.
dQNR
dsN < 0 and
dHN
dsN > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
Proposition 1.2 (i) shows that reverse endogeneity of Proposi-
tion 1.1 (i) always holds, i.e. the optimal Northern import tariff is
increasing in the domestic FIT premium. The main intuition is that a
higher Northern import tariff captures rents from the Southern equip-
ment producer and dampens the Southern equipment imports and
thereby reduces the total cost of the Northern FIT scheme for any
given level of a Northern FIT premium. As a result, an exogenous
increase in the Northern FIT premium enhances the capability of the
Northern import tariff to improve domestic welfare via cutting the
Northern FIT cost and preventing the shift of part of the FIT subsidies
towards the Southern equipment producer. Presumably, a higher
Northern FIT premium directly promotes domestic equipment install-
ation, but a higher Northern import tariff induced by a higher North-
ern FIT premium directly dampens domestic installation. Hence, to
explore the ultimate net impact of the Northern FIT premium on do-
mestic installation, it is necessary to compare the sizes of its direct
positive effect and indirect negative effect. Proposition 1.2 (ii) shows
that, counter-intuitively, the direct effect is outweighed by the indir-
ect effect, so an exogenous increase in the Northern FIT premium ul-
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timately dampens domestic equipment installation and worsens the
domestic environment. The driving force is again because a higher
FIT premium ultimately makes RE equipment more expensive for do-
mestic households.
In sum, Proposition 1.2 (i) and Proposition 1.1 (i) imply that the
Northern import tariff and FIT premium are complementary in im-
proving domestic welfare. This policy complementarity provides the
basis for analysing the ultimate welfare and environmental effects
of policies. Surprisingly, we identify an ultimate negative environ-
mental effect of a Northern FIT premium if the North fully relies on
Southern RE equipment imports.
1.2.9 Effects of some key parameters
In this section, we check how optimal Northern policies and environ-
mental quality are affected by changes in some key parameters, and
summarise the main results as follows:
Corollary 1.1. Suppose the North imports all of its renewable energy equip-
ment from a monopolistic Southern firm, then (i) a higher incidence of
good generating times µ ambiguously affects the optimal Northern feed-
in tariff premium and the consequent installation and environmental qual-
ity but always increases the optimal Northern import tariff and the con-
sequent installation and environmental quality; (ii) a higher fossil-fuel-
generated electricity price pFE reduces the optimal feed-in tariff premium
if sN ≤ 1+µχ2µ(1+χ) (pFE + 2νe) but increases the optimal Northern import
tariff if sN ≤ (1+µχ)νe
µ(1+χ) ; pFE always ultimately promotes the consequent
Northern equipment installation and environmental quality under an op-
timal FIT premium but dampens installation and environmental quality if
sN ≤ (1+µχ)(νe−pFE)2µ(1+χ) under an optimal import tariff; (iii) under both policy
regimes, a higher emission coefficient e and a higher marginal damage of pol-
lution ν always increase sN but reduce τN ; both e and ν marginally increase
the associated equilibrium installation which offset their direct negative en-
vironmental effect and result in ambiguous net environmental effect.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3 – Appendix A.2.5.
The intuition for Corollary 1.1 (i) and (ii) is as follows. (1.1) shows
that as a Northern FIT premium, both the incidence of good gener-
ating times µ and the fossil-fuel-based electricity price pFE increase
the per-unit benefit of renewable electricity generation β
(
sN
)
. Thus,
they exert upward pressure on the Northern import tariff in a sim-
ilar way to that of a Northern FIT premium. The net effect of µ
on the premium is ambiguous as it also directly affects other policy
effects in the model. They are likely to reduce the Northern FIT
premium mostly due to the decreasing marginal efficiency of renew-
able electricity generation: a marginal increase in any of them in-
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creases β
(
sN
)
and results in outwards rotation of the Northern equip-
ment demand and thereby a less elastic demand. This steeper equip-
ment demand reduces the installation-promoting effect of the North-
ern FIT premium for any price levels (see Section 1.2.2.3). Under an
optimal import tariff, a higher fossil-fuel-based electricity price pFE
may ultimately hurt the environment through its indirect environ-
mental effect via raising the optimal import tariff, which is similar
to that of a FIT premium. Under an optimal FIT premium, a higher
pFE eventually improves the environmental quality mainly because it
directly makes RE relatively more competitive. Corollary 1.1 (i) im-
plies that if a country is endowed with more sunshine and fully relies
on foreign RE equipment imports, then its government may not in-
crease the FIT premium. Consequently, it is ambiguous whether the
country has higher equipment installation and environmental qual-
ity or not. However, if the country can optimally adjust the import
tariff, then higher insolation leads to more trade protection, but it
still installs more equipment and enjoys higher environmental qual-
ity. Furthermore, Corollary 1.1 (ii) implies that if the conventional
electricity price rises due to factors such as a higher exogenous emis-
sions price or rising fossil-fuel-generated electricity price, the gov-
ernment should generally reduce the FIT subsidies but increase the
trade barrier. The country always enjoys a better environment under
an optimal FIT premium, but surprisingly, it may have lower envir-
onmental quality under an optimal import tariff.
Corollary 1.1 (iii) holds because higher environmental harm scales
up the installation-promoting effect of a Northern FIT premium
and the installation-dampening effect of a Northern import tariff.
Since more equipment installation crowds out dirty electricity genera-
tion and thereby reduces welfare loss associated with environmental
harm, we expect the two environmental parameters to raise the FIT
premium but reduces the import tariff. The positive installation ef-
fect of environmental harm follows from its effect on the endogenous
policy. One implication of Corollary 1.1 (iii) is that if the emission
coefficient falls due to some exogenous factors such as an improved
abatement technology, then the government should always reduce
the FIT subsidies but always raise the trade barrier. We expect to
see the opposite policy responses when the marginal damage of pol-
lution rises due to factors such as a higher level of environmental
awareness.
1.2.10 Comparative statics analysis for policy complementarity with a spe-
cific functional form
In this section, we specify the functional form of renewable electricity
generation. This approach offers more general and clear-cut condi-
tions for the policy complementarity, and more importantly, it allows
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us to examine the magnitudes of driving forces for the policy com-
plementarity. Nevertheless, this approach can only identify the direc-
tion of policy interaction but is incapable of knowing and therefore
comparing the magnitude of direct and indirect effects of policies on
equilibrium equipment installation and the environment, as we did
previously using the standard comparative statics approach. From
this perspective, the two approaches are complementary. The fol-
lowing lemma shows that the policy complementarity always holds26
under the monopoly case and the specific generation function:
Lemma 1.2. In the presence of a Southern monopolistic firm in the RE
equipment sector, suppose εL (qR) = aqR − b2 qR2, then even if the marginal
damage of pollution v is zero, the Northern policy complementarity between
an import tariff and a FIT premium always holds: ds
N∗
dτN > 0 and
dτN∗
dsN > 0. A
positive marginal damage of pollution reinforces the policy complementarity.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.3.
To understand the driving forces for the marginal effects of τN on
the welfare effect of sN∗, i.e. WNsN∗τN , we decompose it as follows: (i) a
higher τN reduces imports, which alleviates the negative price effect
of sN∗; (ii) a higher τN reinforces the positive tariff revenue effect of
sN∗ as it directly increases per-unit tariff revenue; (iii) a higher τN
reinforce the installation-promoting effect of sN∗; consequently, (iv) it
exacerbates the deadweight loss of FIT premium associated with over-
supply; and (v) it reinforces the positive environmental effect of sN∗.
We check that the negative impact in (iii) is outweighed by the sum of
positive impacts in (i) and (ii). Therefore, even if the marginal damage
of pollution is zero, ds
N∗
dτN > 0 is guaranteed. A positive environmental
harm reinforces ds
N∗
dτN > 0.
The decomposed marginal effects of sN on the welfare effect of
τN∗, i.e. WN
τN∗sN , are as follows: (i) a higher s
N increases the South-
ern imports and thereby reinforce the positive terms-of-trade effect
of τN∗; (ii) a higher sN alleviates the import-dampening effect of τN∗
on Southern imports. Consequently, (iii) it alleviates the (marginal)
deadweight loss of τN∗; (iv) a higher sN alleviates the installation-
dampening effect of τN∗, which weakens the positive FIT cost effect
of τN∗. However, it directly increases the per-unit FIT cost, which
reinforces the positive FIT cost effect. Therefore, it has an ambigu-
ous effect on the positive FIT cost effect, which can become posit-
ive if and only if sN is small enough; (v) a higher sN alleviates the
installation-dampening effect of τN∗ and thereby alleviates the envir-
onmental harm of τN∗. We check that the ambiguous impact in (iii) is
outweighed by the sum of positive impacts (i) and (ii). So even if the
marginal damage of pollution is zero, dτ
N∗
dsN > 0 is guaranteed. Higher
environmental harm reinforces dτ
N∗
dsN > 0.
26 The only implicit condition is WNsN∗sN∗ < 0, which is required for welfare maximisa-
tion.
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1.3 northern fit subsidies and trade barrier under an
asymmetric international cournot duopoly
This section extends the previous model to a more realistic oligopoly
setting – an asymmetric Cournot duopoly in the RE equipment sector
consisting of one Northern firm and one Southern firm. Everything
else is the same except for the market structure of the RE equipment
sector.
1.3.1 Supply of RE equipment
Both the Northern and Southern RE equipment firms produce a ho-
mogeneous product. Each firm adopts a common constant returns-
to-scale production technology:
R (LR) =
LR
lR
,
where LR is the quantity of labour and lR is the amounts of labour
required to produce each unit of RE equipment. The marginal cost of
R is:
ccR = w
clcR.
The Northern firm has higher MC than the Southern firm:
cNR = w
N lNR > c
S
R = w
SlSR.
Both equipment firms engage in Cournot competition in both coun-
tries. Let QiiR and Q
ij
R be the output of the equipment firm in country
i sold in country i and j’s markets respectively. An equipment firm
from country i chooses QiiR and Q
ij
R to maximise its profit given by:
piiR
(
QiiR, Q
ij
R
)
=
[
piR
(
QiR, s
i
)
− ciR
]
QiiR +
[
pjR
(
QjR, s
j
)
− ciR − τ j
]
QijR,
where QiR = Q
ii
R + Q
ji
R and Q
j
R = Q
jj
R + Q
ij
R are the total output in
markets i and j respectively. The first-order conditions for profit max-
imisation of the equipment firm from country i are:
piiRQiiR
= piR
(
QiR, s
i
)
+
∂piR
(
QiR, s
i)
∂QiiR
QiiR − ciR = 0,
piiRQijR
= pjR
(
QjR, s
j
)
+
∂pjR
(
QjR, s
j
)
∂QijR
QijR − ciR − τ j = 0,
(1.6)
which solve for the optimal output levels in markets i and j respect-
ively: Qii∗R = Q
ii
R
(
si
)
and Qij∗R = Q
ij
R
(
sj, τ j
)
. So the output in the
foreign market depends on both the foreign FIT premium and im-
port tariff.
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Lemma 1.3. In the presence of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly in the RE
equipment sector consisting of one Northern firm and one Southern firm,
an exogenous Northern FIT premium sN increases both the Northern and
Southern RE equipment firms’ output in the North if their import-tariff-
inclusive cost difference is moderate such that c
N
R
2 < c
S
R + τ
N < 2cNR ; it
decreases Northern (Southern) RE equipment firm’s output in the North if
and only if its import-tariff-inclusive cost disadvantage is sufficiently large
(small) such that cSR + τ
N > 2cNR ( c
S
R + τ
N <
cNR
2 ). However, s
N always
increases both the Northern RE equipment price and total output.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
To understand Lemma 1.3, total differentiation of the first-order
condition of firm i w.r.t. sN yields:
Sign
(
dQiNR
dsN
)
= Sign
[
∂PNR
∂sN
+
∂
∂sN
(
dPNR
dQiNR
)
QiNR
]
,
where ∂P
N
R
∂sN > 0 is the aforementioned shift effect and
d
dsN
(
dPNR
dQiNR
)
< 0
is from the rotation effect discussed in Section 1.2.2.3. So dQ
iN
R
dsN < 0
is more likely if the initial output level or market share, i.e. QiNR ,
is excessively high. Consequently, on the one hand, a higher FIT
premium has equally positive impact on both firms’ output in the
North through its shift effect. On the other hand, a higher FIT
premium exacerbates the price-dampening effect of increasing output
for both firms through its rotation effect. Put another way, the rota-
tion effect induces profit-maximising equipment firms to strategically
contract output to take advantage of the price-inelasticity of Northern
households induced by a higher domestic FIT premium. However,
the magnitude of exacerbation depends on the initial output level of
each firm. For the less-efficient Northern firm with relatively lower
initial output, the price-dampening effect affects less initial output.
So the net impact is that it always increases its output to meet the
higher demand. However, for the more-efficient Southern firm, the
net effect is ambiguous. If its import-tariff-inclusive cost advantage
is moderate, then its output in the North is increasing in the FIT
premium, but if the cost advantage is excessively high, surprisingly,
its output in the North is decreasing in the FIT premium. These res-
ults are similar to that of the emission tax on EG derived in Canton
(2007), who points out that the environmental policy (emission tax in
his paper) may switch profit from the more efficient firm to the less
efficient firm.
1.3.2 Northern and Southern welfare
The Northern government optimally chooses either an import tariff
or a FIT premium to maximise domestic welfare. We denote those
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terms under this Cournot case that need to be distinguished from the
monopoly case by |C . There is an additional term of domestic equip-
ment firm’s producer surplus compared to the Southern monopoly
case:
WN |C = PSNR +
(
CSNE + CS
N
0
)
+ GSN − HN
=
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cNR
]
QNNR +
(
PSR
(
QSR, s
S
)
− cNR
)
QNSR
= +L
{
µ
dHNE (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + (1− µ)
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
+ w + pFE
[
ε
(
QNR
L
)
− µdHNE
(
sN
)
− (1− µ) dLE
]
− PNR
(
QNR , s
N
) QNR
L
}
+ τNQSNR − νe
[
Q˜NE + Ld
L
E − Lε
(
QNR
L
)]
.
(1.7)
The Southern welfare has the same expression as that in the South-
ern monopoly case, but the expression of total output in the Southern
equipment market QSR now includes the Northern equipment produ-
cer’s sales in the South QNSR .
1.3.3 Optimal Northern FIT premium given an exogenous Northern im-
port tariff
1.3.3.1 Optimal Northern FIT premium
The welfare maximisation condition for an optimal Northern FIT
premium given an exogenous Northern equipment import tariff in
the presence of an equipment duopoly is:
sN∗ |C =
sN∗ |C (num)
L
[
εH
′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
∣∣
C−
ddHNE
dsN
] , (1.8)
where
sN∗ |C (num) = −QSNR
dPNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
+τN
dQSNR
dsN
+
[
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dsN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
.
Comparing (1.8) with (1.4), the denominator as well as the third
and fourth terms of the numerator on the right-hand side are sim-
ilar, since both the equilibrium equipment price and installation in-
crease with the FIT premium: dP
N
R
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 and
dQNR
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 (see (A.20)
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and (A.19)). However, the magnitude would change mainly because
dQSNR
dsN T
dQNR
dsN <
dQNR
dsN
∣∣
C< 0 and 0 <
dPNR
dsN
∣∣∣C < dPNRdsN , and the change
also depends on the efficiency of the Northern equipment firm. The
second term of the numerator on the right-hand side is again the
tariff revenue effect. However, the sign of this effect becomes ambigu-
ous albeit likely positive, due to the duopolistic market structure (see
Lemma 1.3). The third term of the numerator on the right-hand side
is a new term, which is a likely positive efficiency effect: a higher FIT
premium is likely to increase the domestic equipment firm’s output
in the domestic market, but it may decrease the latter in special cases.
Note that the likely positive import tariff revenue effect and effi-
ciency effect cannot be both negative, and the sum of them are pos-
itive, which implies a net positive incentive towards a positive FIT
premium. Furthermore, the deadweight losses are of the second
order of the FIT premium, so they are quite small for a small FIT
premium. Since a higher Northern import tariff reduces the import
quantity and thereby the magnitude of the negative price effect of the
FIT premium, an optimal FIT premium is likely to arise if the North-
ern import tariff is high enough. This finding highlights one of the
driving forces for the policy complementarity in this duopoly setting.
We will discuss the driving forces again when specifying a functional
form in Section 1.3.5.
The generation intuition for the difference between different mar-
ket structures is that under a Cournot duopoly, the enlarged Northern
equipment market by the Northern FIT is now shared by the North-
ern equipment firm. The introduction of a domestic firm reduces the
Southern equipment firm’s market power and appropriable rents for
any given level of increase in the exogenous Northern import tariff.
Thus, although the policy interaction is still present, the magnitude is
expected to change. We will explore this change in magnitude further
in the next Chapter.
1.3.3.2 The impact of a Northern import tariff
As usual, adopting standard comparative statics we have the follow-
ing corollary:
Corollary 1.2. In the presence of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly in the RE
equipment sector consisting of one Northern firm and one Southern firm, (i)
a higher import tariff always leads to a more generous feed-in tariff premium,
i.e. ds
N∗
dτN
∣∣
C> 0 under Condition 1; (ii) if Condition 2 holds, a higher import
tariff ultimately reduces the Northern equipment installation and increases
the Northern environmental harm, i.e. dQ
N
R
dτN
∣∣
C< 0 and
dHN
dτN
∣∣
C> 0, although
it induces a more generous FIT premium.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.1.
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Corollary 1.2 implies that both the optimal policy response and
the net environmental consequences of a higher trade barrier are ro-
bust to the change of market structure to a duopoly under revised
sufficient conditions, which consist of a more lenient sufficient con-
dition for the FIT premium (a higher upper-bound) and additional
sufficient conditions for the unit costs of RE equipment production.
We will discuss the driving forces for the policy response in detail in
Section 1.3.5.
1.3.4 Optimal Northern import tariff given an exogenous Northern FIT
premium
1.3.4.1 Optimal Northern import tariff
The welfare maximisation condition for an optimal Northern import
tariff given an exogenous Northern FIT premium in the presence of
an equipment duopoly is:
τN∗ |C =
τN∗ |C (num)
− dQSNRdτN
, (1.9)
where
τN∗ |C (num) = QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
)
+
[
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dτN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
+νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
.
Comparing (1.9) with (1.5), we find that the main difference lies
in the second term of the numerator, which represents a positive ef-
ficiency effect since an import tariff always increases the domestic
equipment firm’s output and alleviates the sub-optimal output con-
traction associated with imperfect competition. For all other terms,
the magnitude changes mainly because the installation-dampening
effect and price-raising effect of τN are weaker but the import-
dampening effect is stronger in the duopoly case.27 The magnitude
change also depends on the efficiency of the Northern equipment
firm.
1.3.4.2 The impact of Northern FIT premium
The following corollary shows that the reverse endogeneity version
of Corollary 1.2 also holds:
Corollary 1.3. Under the same conditions as in Corollary 1.2, (i) a higher
feed-in tariff increases the optimal domestic import tariff, i.e. dτ
N∗
dsN
∣∣
C> 0;
27 dQ
SN
R
dτN <
dQNR
dτN <
dQNR
dτN
∣∣
C< 0 and 0 <
dPNR
dτN
∣∣
C<
dPNR
dτN .
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(ii) a higher feed-in tariff always increases the equilibrium price of RE equip-
ment. Nevertheless, it ultimately increases the Northern equipment install-
ation and reduces the Northern environmental harm, i.e. dQ
N
R
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 and
dHN
dsN
∣∣
C< 0, if and only if Condition 3 holds, although a higher FIT premium
induces a higher import tariff.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.2.
Corollary 1.3 implies that although the optimal policy response to
a more generous FIT premium is robust to the change of market struc-
ture to a duopoly, the net environmental consequence is not: a lower
FIT premium adversely benefits the environment under the mono-
poly case, but worsens the environment as expected under an inter-
national duopoly. We will discuss the driving forces for the policy
response in detail in Section 1.3.5.
1.3.5 Comparative statics analysis for policy complementarity with a spe-
cific functional form
The following lemma shows the sufficient condition for policy com-
plementarity under the monopoly case and the specific generation
function:
Lemma 1.4. In the presence of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly in the RE
equipment sector consisting of a Northern firm and a Southern firm, suppose
εL (qR) = aqR− b2 qR2, a > 0, b > 0, then if QNN∗R > 0,even if the marginal
damage of pollution v is zero, the Northern policy complementarity between
an import tariff and a FIT premium holds: ds
N∗
dτN
∣∣
C> 0 and
dτN∗
dsN
∣∣
C> 0. A
positive marginal damage of pollution reinforces the policy complementarity.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.3.1.
Similar to the explanation for Lemma 1.2, we conduct the following
decomposition analysis for Lemma 1.4. The decomposed marginal ef-
fects of τN on the welfare effect of sN∗, i.e. WτNsN∗ |C , are as follows.
First, Section 1.2.10 provides a similar explanation for the impacts of
τN on the negative price effect, the deadweight loss and the environ-
mental effect of sN∗. Second, a higher τN has an ambiguous impact
on the likely positive tariff revenue effect of sN∗. On the one hand,
it directly increases per-unit tariff revenue; on the other hand, its ef-
fect on the likely import-promoting effect of sN∗ may be negative if
the domestic unit cost is excessively high. Third, a higher τN has
an ambiguous impact on the likely positive efficiency effect of sN∗.
On the one hand, it increases the domestic equipment price; on the
other hand, its effect on the likely quantity-promoting effect of sN∗
on the domestic firm’s output may be negative if the domestic unit
cost is high enough. Note that a higher sN always increases the total
Northern equipment installation (if sN dampens one firm’s output
1.4 conclusion 43
in a special case, this must be outweighed by its quantity-promoting
effect on the other firm’s output). Consequently, the sum of τN ’s
positive impacts on the price effect, the likely positive impact on the
tariff revenue effect and the efficiency effect of sN∗ are always posit-
ive. Furthermore, as long as the Northern equipment firm’s domestic
output is positive, i.e. QNNR > 0,
28 even if the marginal damage of
pollution is zero, the total impact of τN on all effects except the en-
vironmental effect of sN∗ is also positive. Thus, if QNNR > 0, even if
the marginal damage of pollution is zero, ds
N∗
dτN
∣∣
C> 0 is guaranteed. A
positive environmental harm reinforces ds
N∗
dτN
∣∣
C> 0.
The decomposed marginal effects of sN on the welfare effect of τN∗,
i.e. WsNτN∗ |C , are as follows. First, Section 1.2.10 provides a similar
explanation for the impacts of sN on the deadweight loss, the FIT
cost effect and the environmental effect of τN∗. Second, a higher sN
is likely to increase the Southern imports and thereby reinforce the
positive terms-of-trade effect of τN∗. Third, a higher sN ambiguously
impacts on the positive efficiency effect of τN∗ because: on the one
hand it weakens the strategic quantity-promoting effect of τN∗ on
Northern equipment firm’s domestic output; on the other hand, it in-
creases the Northern equilibrium price and consequently the markup
of the Northern equipment firm. Nevertheless, the net impact on
the efficiency effect is likely to be positive if the Northern equipment
firm’s domestic output increases with sN . Because a higher sN always
promotes domestic installation, the total impact of sN on the terms-
of-trade effect and the efficiency effect of τN∗ is positive. Thus, the
only possible negative impact of sN is on the FIT cost effect of τN∗,
which may become positive too for a small enough sN . However, if
QNNR > 0,
dτN∗
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 is also guaranteed.
1.4 conclusion
This chapter examines how a downstream feed-in tariff (FIT)
premium and an upstream specific import tariff in North–South trade
in renewable energy (RE) equipment affect economic welfare as well
as the environment. Under some general assumptions, we find that
an endogenous Northern import tariff is increasing in a domestic
feed-in tariff premium, and vice versa. The Northern import tariff
directly worsens the environment while the Northern FIT premium
directly improves the environment. However, to analyse the net envir-
onmental effect, we have to account for their indirect environmental
effects through the aforementioned policy complementarity. We find
that an exogenous policy is likely to have a stronger direct effect than
its indirect effect on the environmental quality under both market
28 This is implied by the assumption of Cournot competition, and essentially imposes
a more general sufficient condition on sN∗.
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structures for RE equipment: a Southern monopoly and a Cournot
duopoly consisting of a Northern firm and a Southern firm. One
exception is that the environmental quality is generally decreasing
in the Northern FIT premium in the Southern monopoly case. This
surprising result implies that the trade and environmental policy in-
teraction that are mainly driven by the imperfect competition in the
RE equipment sector may lead to adverse net environmental effects
of environmental policies.
We also conduct sensitivity analysis for some key parameters and
derive some interesting implications. For example, in the presence
of a Southern monopoly, a Northern country that is better endowed
with good generating conditions such as more sunshine should al-
ways raise the trade barrier but may not do so for the FIT premium.
The optimal FIT premium and import tariff are decreasing and in-
creasing in the fossil-fuel-generated electricity price respectively as
long as the FIT premium is not too high. Surprisingly, a higher fossil-
fuel-generated electricity price, possibly due to a higher exogenous
emissions tax, may ultimately hurt the environment under an optimal
import tariff. By contrast, it always benefits the environment under
an optimal FIT premium as expected. Higher marginal damage of
pollution and emission coefficient induce the North to strategically
raise the optimal FIT premium but reduce the optimal import tar-
iff. They ultimately promote RE equipment installation, which offsets
their direct negative environmental effects.
This chapter highlights the unique features of renewable electricity
generation: (i) time-intermittency; (ii) difficulty in adjustment of elec-
tricity generation level in any times once the equipment is installed
upfront mainly due to storage difficulty; and (iii) the conventional
decreasing marginal productivity of renewable electricity generation.
There are two market distortions that justify policy intervention: im-
perfect competition in the RE equipment markets which is critical for
our major findings; and pollution externality in the fossil-fuel-based
electricity sector. As we focus on more pragmatic second-best policies,
there are also policy-induced distortions.
This study contributes to both the trade and environmental literat-
ure, by analytically examining the effects of trade and environmental
policies in the RE equipment sector. We focus on the idiosyncrasies
of RE generation, in particular, residential generation. On top of the
importance of residential generation per se, another reason for this fo-
cus is that residential generation offers richer analytical results since
it is more responsive than utility-scale generation to some key para-
meters, such as the incidence of good generating times. We hope
to offer some preliminary policy suggestions for national and global
regulators and assist sounder decision-making for private parties in
the RE sector.
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This chapter provides only a first step to better understanding the
question. For example, we do not consider free entry or dynamic
interactions between firms. We also assume a perfectly competitive
fossil-fuel-based electricity sector characterised by constant returns
to scale, which is not realistic enough. There are many avenues for
possible extensions to be pursued. The first is to endogenise environ-
mental policies and allow governments to choose an optimal policy
mix, which is presumed to arise due to the policy complementarity
and the fact that both policies are welfare-improving for small enough
values. The second is to introduce endogenous technological change
in the RE equipment sector. The third is to conduct some illustrative
numerical solutions to shed light on the sensitivity of these policies
to different marginal damages of pollution or weights on environ-
mental factors in policy maker’s objective functions. Fourth, we shall
calibrate the model to data in order to get more precise quantitative
predictions of policy implications. Chapter 2 conducts numerical sim-
ulations to illustrate Chapter 1 and address issues not solvable ana-
lytically. Last but not least, we plan to address the aforementioned
limitations by adopting more realistic assumptions.
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A B S T R A C T
This chapter conducts numerical simulations to illustrate Chapter 1
and address issues not solvable analytically. We study both market
structures of a Southern monopoly and an international duopoly in
the RE equipment sector. We generate a Northern policy mix and
we also allow the South to choose a lump-sum R&D subsidy for its
domestic equipment firm in the duopoly case. We illustrate how an
exogenous policy instrument and parameter values affect the optimal
Northern policies, national and global welfare as well as the environ-
ment. For example, we find that the counter-intuitive net installation-
dampening effect of the Northern FIT premium under the monopoly
case is driven by its strong indirect price-raising effect via its induce-
ment of a higher optimal domestic import tariff. We also compare the
equilibrium levels of policies, welfare, environmental harm and other
terms under a cooperative constrained global optimum as well as
non-cooperative policy Nash equilibrium, Northern policy mix and
Northern single policy scenarios. The Northern welfare is lowest
under the constrained global optimum mainly because its domestic
equipment firm loses trade protection. Nevertheless, its equipment
installation and thereby the environmental quality are at the highest
levels. Interestingly, Southern welfare follows the same ranking or-
der as the Northern equipment installation and thereby the Northern
environmental quality.
50
2.1 introduction 51
2.1 introduction
The previous chapter lays some theoretical foundations as the first
step in answeringthe central research question of this thesis: how
would subsidies and trade policies in North-South trade in RE equip-
ment affect the economic welfare and the environmental quality.
The stylised theoretical model provides insights into the interaction
between trade and environmental policies and the ultimate environ-
mental consequences of policies and exogenous parameters. Never-
theless, the qualitative results are not sufficient to help us ultimately
understand the actual policy and parameter effects in the real world.
As a second step, in this chapter, we conduct a numerical simulation
to quantitatively illustrate Chapter 1 and address issues not solvable
analytically. By doing so, we expect to get an empirical sense of the
relative magnitude of various policy and parameter effects, so as to
provide a better understanding of and further insights into the issue.
In particular, given a set of parameter values which reflect real world
measures, first, we are able to show and compare the magnitudes of
the direct and indirect effects of policies on the environmental qual-
ity explained in Chapter 1; second, we generate a Northern policy
mix consisting of an import tariff and a FIT premium in the presence
of an international duopoly in the renewable energy (RE) equipment
sector; third, we allow the South to freely choose a lump-sum R&D
subsidy provided to its domestic RE equipment producer; fourth, we
illustrate how an exogenous policy instrument and parameter val-
ues affect the endogenous policy, national and global welfare as well
as the environment; fifth, we also compare the equilibrium levels
of policies, welfare, environmental harm and other terms under a
cooperative constrained global optimum as well as non-cooperative
policy Nash equilibrium, Northern policy mix and Northern single
policy scenarios.
First, we find that the net equipment-installation effect of a single
Northern policy depends on the relative strengths of its direct and
indirect price effects. For example, under the Southern monopoly
case, the surprising net installation-dampening effect of the North-
ern FIT premium found in Chapter 1 is driven by the significantly
strong indirect price-raising effect of itself via its inducement of a
higher optimal domestic import tariff.1 By contrast, if the market
structure changes to the duopoly case, we observe the unsurprising
net installation-promoting effect because its indirect price-raising ef-
fect is much weaker.
Second, sensitivity analysis shows that our numerical results are
stable to parameter variations. For example, relative to the case
without any government intervention, a higher Southern unit cost of
producing RE equipment weakly improves the welfare performance
1 In algebraic term: ∂P
N∗
R
∂τN∗
dτN∗
dsN > 0.
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of both Northern policies whereas a higher conventional electricity
price weakly worsens the latter. An increased incidence of good gen-
erating times weakly improves the welfare performance of the North-
ern FIT premium, but generally weakly worsens that of the Northern
import tariff.
Third, those parameters that superficially benefit renewable elec-
tricity generation such as the incidence and productivity premium
of good generating times and fossil-fuel-generated electricity price
indeed ultimately promote equipment installation, except that the
fossil-fuel-generated electricity price adversely reduces installation
under an optimal import tariff, even if the sufficient condition in Co-
rollary 1.1 (ii) is not satisfied. They positively affect the Northern
import tariff but negatively affect the Northern FIT premium. The
incidence of good generating times improve welfare in both coun-
tries. The conventional electricity price always benefits the South but
may hurt the North, which depends on market structures and policy
scenarios. The Northern marginal damage of pollution also raises
Southern welfare, but always hurts the North.
Fourth, a higher Southern unit cost generally increases the North-
ern FIT premium but reduces the Northern import tariff under both
market structures, whereas the Northern unit cost has a hump-
shaped effect on the domestic FIT premium and an surprising neg-
ative effect on import tariff under an optimal import tariff in an in-
ternational duopoly case (hump-shaped in other scenarios). The unit
costs in both countries always reduce domestic welfare, but may be-
nefit the foreign country.
Fifth, the Southern lump-sum R&D subsidy and the degree of its
cost reduction generally improve Northern welfare, but the former
has a hump-shaped effect on Southern welfare while the latter always
improves Southern welfare.
Fifth, the Southern lump-sum R&D subsidy and the degree of its
cost reduction have similar effects on the Northern policies as a reduc-
tion in the Southern unit cost. They both improve Northern welfare,
but the former has a hump-shaped effect on domestic welfare while
the latter always improves domestic welfare.
Sixth, we provide a full comparison of equilibrium levels of terms
of interest across different policy scenarios, and under both mono-
poly and duopoly cases. We examine terms such as optimal policy
levels, national and global welfare, the welfare of subgroups (house-
holds and the equipment firms), the equipment firm’s relative market
shares in the North as well as equipment prices and environmental
qualities in both countries.
Last but not least, the constrained global optimum consists of zero
Northern import tariff, a positive Northern FIT premium and a pos-
itive Southern R&D subsidy. The Northern welfare is lowest under
the constrained global optimum mainly because the domestic equip-
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ment firm is worse off due to the loss of trade protection, given that
the difference in policy impacts on households in both countries are
much smaller. Nevertheless, Northern equipment installation ulti-
mately rises to the highest level, which indirectly improves the en-
vironmental quality to the highest level in all cases we compare. In-
terestingly, Southern welfare follows the same ranking order as the
Northern equipment installation and thereby the Northern environ-
mental quality.
Simulation is commonly used in the relevant strand of literature
which examines strategic environmental policies in an international
context. Nimubona (2012) illustrates his analytical results with a
numerical example, to check the robustness of the main analytical
results to their sufficient conditions. The numerical example mainly
aims to show that even if the sufficient conditions for main analytical
results are not satisfied, trade liberalisation still has similar impacts
on the optimal environmental policy, the EG price and consumption,
and polluting final-good output as well as emission levels. Possibly
due to this aim as well as his focus on analytical examination within
one paper, Nimubona (2012) simplifies his simulation by arbitrarily
assigning parameter values, without reflection of the real world val-
ues. By contrast, our simulation in this chapter assigns parameter
values based on real world measures wherever possible, and we also
provide a detailed explanation for the assignment. As a result, we
are able to not only show the robustness and nature of our analyt-
ical results over the empirically relevant parameter ranges, but also
reveal more realistic and interesting results such as the magnitude of
equilibrium variables, relative strengths of the direct and indirect en-
vironmental effects and the difference in welfare levels between the
two countries.
An R&D subsidy is one of the important policy tools to promote
RE equipment deployment and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions,
as it directly corrects R&D market failures (Fischer et al., 2016). It
is also related to the recent anti-dumping and countervailing duties
imposed by the developed countries against NICs (see e.g. Richard-
son, 2009 for discussions of practical issues). Analogous to Chapter
1, examining an R&D subsidy in the RE sector in an international
trade context weaves together the trade and environmental literat-
ure. Dijkstra and Mathew (2015) studied the effect of trade liberal-
isation in environmental goods and services in the presence of a do-
mestic downstream polluting sector and an international duopolistic
eco-industry. The downstream firm purchases abatement technology
(which reduces emission coefficient instead of an end-of-pipe abate-
ment) from the upstream firms at a flat fee. After R&D is committed,
the domestic emission tax is set. They show that free trade gener-
ally leads to more abatement and higher welfare, but this is accom-
panied by a backfire effect on the environment because the govern-
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ment allows more production of polluting downstream goods once
higher R&D is committed. They also find that free trade ambigu-
ously affects the R&D incentive of the domestic eco-industry. Fischer
et al. (2014a) compare upstream and downstream subsidies for end-
of-pipe abatement technology. The downstream sector is tradable
which purchases abatement technology from the imperfectly com-
petitive upstream eco-industry. The downstream subsidy promotes
investments in abatement technology. The authors prefer upstream
subsidies to downstream subsidies. Downstream subsidies increase
global abatement technology prices, reduce foreign pollution abate-
ment abroad and increase emission leakage. By contrast, upstream
subsidies reduce the prices and emissions leakage, as well as a stra-
tegic advantage to domestic eco-industry. One notable difference is
that emissions leakage is central in their paper, but it is not present in
our model as we assume non-transboundary pollution.2 Fischer and
Newell (2008) and Fischer et al. (2014b) evaluated an R&D subsidy
as one of the main policy instruments for climate mitigation. In par-
ticular, Fischer and Newell (2008) consider both learning by do and
R&D and they rank various existing policies by calibrating the model
to the U.S. electricity sector. Although an R&D subsidy is ranked at
the bottom of the list which consists of tools such as emissions price,
RE share requirement and renewables subsidies, they argue that an
optimal policy mix is the most efficient way to reduce emissions. Fisc-
her et al. (2014b) extend Fischer and Newell (2008) by distinguishing
between (i) conventional RE sources such as wind and biomass, and
advanced RE such as solar, which differ mainly in costs and learning
potential; (ii) short and long run energy efficiency investments. One
critical conclusion is that emissions pricing is still the most efficient
way to mitigate emissions, despite the existence of multiple market
failures. It confirms the finding in Fischer and Newell (2008) by point-
ing out that a policy mix is even more efficient. Specifically, an R&D
subsidy set at the R&D spillover rate (the rate measures the degree
of firms to appropriate returns from R&D expenditure of other firms)
offers both short and long run welfare improvement. The setting of
our simulation is similar to the numerical applications in the two pa-
pers since all three studies look at the incremental improvement of
production technology, instead of sudden cost reduction brought by
breakthrough technologies due to R&D. Moreover, we are all inter-
ested in electricity sector consisting of both polluting conventional
electricity and renewable electricity. However, we do not consider
market failures associated with R&D spillovers, learning spillovers or
energy efficiency as they do. Furthermore, we focus on the interac-
tion between the Southern upstream R&D subsidy and the Northern
downstream FIT subsidies and upstream trade policy, which is not
presented in their autarky models without international trade. Last
2 We will provide further review of the R&D literature in Section 3.1.
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but not least, we assume a lump-sum R&D subsidy, rather than a
share of R&D expenditure as they do.
The major contribution of this work is that we add some empir-
ical elements or taste to our previous theoretical study, which sheds
light on the magnitude of different driving forces behind the main
analytical results. The simulation also helps us understand the differ-
ent policy levels across different market structures and how different
the selfish national policies are from the constrained global optimum.
We also demonstrate that our model is stable given the set of paramet-
ers we have. All in all, this work serves as a bridge that connects our
analytical work to future empirical testing or practical policy designs.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2
describes research design and methodology, Section 2.3 and Section
2.4 show our main results for the Southern monopoly and interna-
tional duopoly scenarios respectively. Section 2.5 examines a South-
ern R&D subsidy and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 research design and methodology
We conduct this analysis mainly by using Mathematica, which allows
us to not only numerically solve for optimal policies and their ef-
fects but also to illustrate the key results graphically. This section
mainly describes the assignment of parameter values, as displayed in
Table 2.1. When assigning values, we make sure that, where possible,
values are based on some of the most reliable and latest sources. If
the direct information is not available, we gather relevant information
to calculate the necessary values. Since we narrow our focus to the
residential renewable electricity generation in Chapter 1, and the real
world counterpart is dominated by the solar photovoltaic system, the
assigned parameter values are all based on the recent residential solar
PV renewable electricity generation information.
Since the trade disputes are mainly EU–China and USA–China,
and we focus on analysing Northern policies, we are more interested
in the EU and USA data. Because the latest data for the two regions
are mainly for 2013–14, we conduct currency conversion by using the
average Euro to US-dollar exchange rate of 1.3283 during 2013–14
(ECB, 2016). The $ sign refers to US dollars throughout this chapter.
The following table describes the meaning of parameters and their
assigned values:
Unit costs of equipment production
According to the latest global analysies, the installed capital costs
among technologies and regions are significantly different, – due
to structural factors, the competitiveness of the local market, or the
policy difference, – but many driving forces are still unexplained. For
example, the average installed costs for residential solar PV systems
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Parameter Meaning Value
cSR Unit cost of Southern RE
equipment
(including installation cost, and so
forth.)
$200, $550
cNR Unit cost of Northern RE
equipment
(including installation cost, and so
forth.)
$600
pFE Fossil-fuel-generated retail
electricity price
$0.2/kWh
µ Incidence of good generating
times over 20 years
0.2
χ Productivity premium associated
with a good generating time
0.5
a Renewable-electricity-intercept of
marginal product curve of RE
equipment
5000 kWh
b Slope of marginal product curve of
RE equipment
50 kWh/unit
m Price-intercept of household
demand curve over 20 years
$0.4/kWh
n Slope of household demand curve
over 20 years
$1.2×
10−6/kWh
Q˜E Electricity demand of unmodelled
sectors
4× 1011kWh
L Number of households 106
w Household total wage over 20
years
$2× 105
e Emission coefficient in fossil-fuel
electricity generation
0.75 kg/kWh
νc Marginal damage of pollution in
country c = N, S
$0/kg, $0.05/kg,
$0.1/kg
r Degree of cost reduction from
R&D
0.2
Table 2.1: Parameter description and value assignment (in US dollars)
2.2 research design and methodology 57
in the second quarter of 2012 in Germany and the US are $2.20/W
and $5.50/W respectively. For OECD countries, the average level-
ised cost of electricity by small-scale solar PV system is slightly above
$0.3/kWh, which is around three times of that of fossil-fuel-fired elec-
tricity (IRENA, 2014a). However, the installed costs of solar PV sys-
tems have been constantly and rapidly dropping. For example, in
2013, the typical residential PV system prices in Germany, Italy, the
UK and the USA are $2.4, $2.8, $2.8 and $4.9 respectively (IEA, 2014).
In 2014, based on the quarterly average installed costs of residential
rooftop PV system in the USA (SEIA, 2014), we calculate its 2014
average annual installed cost as $3.6625/W. In 2015, the benchmark
installed prices of US solar PV systems built in the first quarter was
$3.09/W (Chung et al., 2015). Thus, we presume that for a typical
solar panel (normally 200–250W), the reasonable installed price range
is around $600–900. Since we do not model non-module costs, such
as installation cost and operation and maintenance costs, we assume
that the equilibrium equipment prices in our model also include these
costs. We then back out the unit production costs under different
market structures which generate an equilibrium price inclusive of
import tariff so that they approximately lie within the conjectured
price range. Specifically, under the Southern monopoly case, we as-
sign the Southern unit cost of equipment production as $200. In the
presence of an international duopoly consisting one Northern firm
and one Southern firm, we assign the Northern and Southern unit
costs of producing equipment as $600 and $550 respectively. This
assigned cost difference of 8.3% is smaller than the estimate of 19%
(excluding government interventions) between China and the USA in
2012 (Goodrich et al., 2013).3 The main reason is that we assume that
the equipment cost in our model also includes other aforementioned
non-module costs.
Fossil-fuel-generated electricity price
According to Eurostat, 2016a, the average retail electricity price in the
EU-28 is about €0.1997/kWh and €0.2033 kWh (both are equivalent
to $0.27/kWh) in 2013 and 2014 respectively. The average electricity
price in the USA is $0.1252 in 2014 (EIA, 2015). Based on these data,
we calculate the recent average electricity price in the EU and the USA
combined as $0.2/kWh. Thus, we assume the fossil-fuel-generated
electricity prices in the North to be $0.2/kWh (to follow the analyt-
ical model’s symmetric assumption in Chapter 1, we assume that the
Southern conventional retail electricity price is also $0.2/kWh).
3 The original 23% cost difference in the paper includes $0.05 cost advantage due to
the regional incentives such as provincial subsidies (Goodrich et al., 2013).
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Incidence and productivity premium associated with good generating times
By assuming a peak intensity of solar insolation of 960 W/m2, the
average ratio of its average intensity to its peak intensity in Europe
is about 18% (EC, 2016). Furthermore, Assumption 1 implies that
the productivity premium should be low enough so that households
are still net buyers of conventional electricity in a bad generating
time. Thus, we assume that the incidence and productivity premium
associated with good generating times are 0.2 and 0.5 respectively.
Renewable electricity generation function
CEC (2011) provides one of the few open-access and reliable estim-
ates of the electricity generation potential of residential solar PV sys-
tems. Based on their projection, we calculate that the average daily
production of a 200 W solar panel can generate at least around 0.7
kWh per day in the least sunny Australian capital cities – Melbourne
(Victoria) and Hobart (Tasmania), and an average of 0.83kWh per day
across all Australian capital cities.4 However, solar insolation widely
differs across countries; for example, the average energy received in
the EU is about 1200 kWh/m2 per year (IEA, 2014). Melbourne and
Hobart generally have similar solar resources as the EU and large
parts of the U.S. based on the graphical results in Breyer and Schmid
(2010). Thus, it is safe to presume that the first panel installed can
generate 5000 kWh over the entire period based on the following
calculation: 0.7 kWh/day× 365 days× 20 years = 5110 kWh. The
supply of renewable electricity in a bad generating time is assumed
to be εL (qR) = aqR − b2 qR2 = 5000qR − 25qR2, so we have linearly
decreasing marginal productivity in renewable electricity generation:
εL
′
(qR) = a− bqR = 5000− 50qR, which implies a linear equipment
demand β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(qR) =
(
0.22+ 0.3sN
)
(5000− 50qR) .
The assignment for the rate of marginal productivity reduction im-
plies that the maximum capacity of installation is 100 units. The 100th
unit installed cannot generate any renewable electricity due to the res-
idential space constraints.
Household electricity demand function
The private household number in EU-28 is 214.135 million in 2013
(Eurostat, 2016b). The annual total household electricity consump-
tion in EU-28 is 71.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent which is equival-
ent to 833,871 million kWh (Eurostat, 2015a). Thus, we calculate the
average annual household electricity consumption in EU-28 in 2013
as 3,893.76 kWh/yr. The private household number in the USA in
2014 is 123.23 million (USCB, 2014). The annual average household
electricity consumption in the USA is 10,932 kWh, which is 2.8 times
4 The CEC firstly achieves output in perfect laboratory conditions and then uses
design summary software to de-rate into account when predicting average.
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higher than that in the EU (EIA, 2015). Based on these numbers, we
calculate the recent average annual household electricity consump-
tion in the EU and the USA combined as 6464.87 kWh/yr (around
17.7 kWh per day).5 Assuming that the consumption pattern in both
countries is constant, we have the long-run (20-year) average house-
hold electricity consumption in the EU and the USA as 129,297.4 kWh.
Hence, we assume that the household electricity demand functions in
both countries are pE = m− nqE = 0.4− 1.2× 10−6qE, which implies
a maximum of 1.66667 × 105 kWh of total electricity consumption
over the 20-year period at the assumed conventional electricity price
– $0.2/kWh, when the FIT premium is zero.6
Household number and wage
The number and wage of households do not affect optimal policy
levels and most of our results. So we arbitrarily assume the number
of households to be 10 million. The average net wealth of all euro
area households are €230,800 ($306,964). The total US household net
worth in 2014 is $82,912 billion (Fed, 2014), so we calculate the aver-
age US household net worth in 2014 as $6,722,823. Furthermore, we
calculate the average household net wealth to be $439,870 for the EU
and USA combined. Since the main results do not very much rely
on the household wage in Chapter 1, we assign the household wage
over 20 years in both countries as $2× 105.
Electricity demand of the un-modelled sector
The total electricity generation in Europe is 3.10 million GWh in 2013
(Eurostat, 2015b). Based on this, we calculate the share of total EU
electricity use by the residential sector in 2013 to be 26.9%. The share
of total US electricity use by the residential sector in 2014 is 36% (EIA,
2015). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the exogenous electri-
city demand from all other un-modelled sectors in both countries as
4× 1011 kWh, so that the minimum share of residential electricity con-
sumption in our model is 29.4%.7 This share has to be large enough
that the excess renewable electricity supply is always absorbed by
those un-modelled sectors.
5 833, 871 million kWh/yr+10,932 kWh/yr×123.23 million214.135 million+123.23 million = 6, 464.87 kWh/yr.
6 Chapter 1 shows that the electricity demand is independent of both policies in a bad
generating time, but is decreasing in the FIT premium in a good generating time
due to the higher opportunity cost of consuming renewable electricity. For stability
concerns, we check that the electricity demand just reduces to 1.5× 105 kWh, even
under a relatively high FIT premium of $0.1.
7 L·DE
L·DE+Q˜E =
106×1.66667×105 kWh
106×1.66667×105 kWh+4×1011 kWh = 29.4.
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Marginal damage of pollution and emission coefficient
The social cost of CO2 is estimated to be $36/ton and $56/ton with 3%
and 2.5% average discount rate in 2015 respectively (US-Government,
2015). $43/ton is used by Reichenbach and Requate (2012) follow-
ing Tol (2005). Thus, we assign $0.05/kg as the medium-level mar-
ginal damage of pollution. We also assign $0/kg and a high-level
of $0.1/kg for a detailed comparison of the key results. There are
two main alternative explanations for this variation: the government
may have subjective weight on environmental harm when optimally
choosing policies, or there exists an un-modelled emissions tax which
reduces marginal damage of pollution. The main analytical purpose
of assigning $0 is to highlight the fact that our main results are robust
to the case in which the Northern government does not internalise
any environmental harm or pollution externality is already addressed
by other policies. In addition, we distinguish between Northern and
Southern marginal damages of pollution to check their specific im-
pacts.
The OECD carbon emission factors from electricity generation (kg
CO2/ kWh) for major sources are as follows (IEA, 2015a):
Table 2.2: OECD carbon emission factors from electricity generation
Sources Carbon emission factors
(kg CO2/ kWh)
Other bituminous coal 0.875
Sub-bituminous coal 0.945
Lignite 1.035
Natural gas 0.40
fuel oil 0.675
Furthermore, the share of coal, gas, and oil in the OECD electri-
city generation mix are 32%, 24% and 3% respectively (IEA, 2015b).
Based on these data, we calculate the OECD fossil-fuel carbon emis-
sion factor to be 0.713.8 Thus, we assign 0.75 kg / kWh for the emis-
sion coefficient for our analysis.
Degree of cost reduction from R&D
Following the relevant literature, we assume diminishing returns to
R&D cost reduction, due to the scarcity of inputs, employees, and
equipment (Fischer et al., 2014b). As mentioned by Fischer et al.
8 13 (0.875+ 0.945+ 1.035)
(
32
32+24+3
)
+ 0.40
(
24
32+24+3
)
+ 0.675
(
3
32+24+3
)
= 0.713.
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(2014b, p.18), estimation of public and private R&D expenditure is
extremely difficult. Therefore, we arbitrarily choose a degree of cost
reduction from R&D equal to 0.2 which is less than one.
2.3 southern monopoly
2.3.1 Numerical results
This section summarises the key findings based on the numerical res-
ults in Appendix B.1. We do not examine the policy mix under a
Southern monopoly because there is no interior solution given the
set of parameters.
Case 1. No externalities
This case refers to the scenario when all distortions in our model are
removed: no environmental harm, no dead-weight losses of policies
due to policy interventions, and no output contraction due to the mar-
ket power of Southern equipment firm. All households in both coun-
tries install 82 units of equipment and generate renewable electricity
by an equal amount to their conventional electricity consumption.
Case 2. No policy interventions
If there are no policy interventions and no environmental harm, the
only difference is that the South enjoys higher welfare from the do-
mestic equipment firm’s profit, which accounts for 14% of Southern
welfare. Each household installs equipment of only a half of that
in Case 1 at a price of $650 which implies a markup of 225%. The
ratio of conventional electricity consumption to the renewable electri-
city generation rises to 75%. When the marginal damage of pollution
rises, increased environmental harm reduces both countries’ welfare
by $0.13288× 1011. Consequently, the welfare difference is amplified
from −14.02% to −14.76%.
Case 3. Optimal non-cooperative Northern FIT premium
As shown by (1.5), when the import tariff and the marginal damage
of pollution are both zero, all terms become non-positive, so there are
no positive driving forces towards positive FIT premium. Our simu-
lations confirm that the optimal Northern FIT premium is more likely
to arise when the import tariff and marginal damage of pollution are
high enough. Given that the marginal damage of pollution is below
$0.1/kg, our model needs a positive Northern import tariff to induce
the existence of the optimal FIT premium; for example, when the
marginal damage of pollution is $0.1/kg and the Northern import
tariff is $340, we have a positive optimal FIT premium of $0.00889,
which is about 4.45% of the conventional electricity price. Due to the
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higher FIT premium and more importantly, a high import tariff, the
Northern equipment price rises to around $720 and consequently the
Northern equipment installation falls to just a quarter of that in Case
1. Northern welfare falls as the increased tariff revenue is dominated
by the reduction in “prosumer” surplus (0.65% lower than that in
Case 2) and higher damage of pollution (145% higher than that in
Case 2) due to lower installation as well as higher marginal damage
of pollution. A higher import tariff reduces the Southern firm’s profit
– together with a higher marginal damage of pollution, the Southern
welfare is lower than that in Case 2 too. Nevertheless, an import tariff
shifts profit from the Southern firm, so the welfare difference shrinks.
Case 4. Optimal non-cooperative Northern import tariff
An optimal Northern import tariff exists even if the FIT premium and
the marginal damage of pollution are zero, since the terms-of-trade
effect is of the first order, so it dominates the dead-weight loss of the
import tariff which is of the second order of smalls, for a small import
tariff. The optimal import tariff is decreasing in the marginal damage
of pollution, as demonstrated in Chapter 1. It is $300 when there is no
environmental harm, but reduces to $205.88 and $122.22 respectively
when the marginal damage of pollution rises to $0.05/kg and $0.1/kg,
resulting in cheaper Northern equipment and higher equipment in-
stallation. Northern welfare ultimately falls as the reduction in tar-
iff revenue together with the higher environmental harm due to the
higher marginal damage of pollution outweighs the slightly higher
“prosumer” surplus due to cheaper equipment. Southern welfare ul-
timately falls too. The higher environmental harm due to the higher
marginal damage of pollution dominates the benefit to the South-
ern firm resulting from the lower Northern trade barrier. Neverthe-
less, if we compare the sub-cases associated with zero and medium-
level marginal damage of pollution of $0.05/kg to Case 2, the North
is moderately better off from the profit shifting of the import tariff
(Southern firm’s profit reduces by 27.78% and 20.26% respectively).
However, the benefit is largely offset by the environmental harm due
to a high-level marginal damage of pollution.
Overall, if the North fully relies on Southern equipment produced
by a monopoly, (i) it needs significantly high domestic import tariff
and marginal damage of pollution to justify a positive optimal North-
ern FIT premium (this is also the reason why our simulation context
does not generate a policy mix under the Southern monopoly case);
(ii) the optimal Northern import tariff is very sensitive to the mar-
ginal damage of pollution; (iii) the Northern equilibrium equipment
price and thereby the domestic equilibrium installation are more sig-
nificantly affected by the market power of the Southern monopoly,
compared to the effect of the Northern policy regimes and the mar-
ginal damage of pollution; (vi) the difference in households’ total
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surplus is not very sensitive to the Northern policy regimes and the
marginal damage of pollution; (v) the optimal Northern import tariff
can shift about one-fifth of Southern equipment firm’s profit when
the marginal damage of pollution is $0.05/kg; (vii) global welfare
is the lowest under the optimal Northern FIT premium which arise
given a high import tariff and a high marginal damage of pollution,
which constitute a 18% reduction with respect to (w.r.t.) the first-
best. If there is no environmental harm, then the optimal Northern
import tariff moderately reduces the global welfare by 5%, given that
there is no domestic FIT premium. However, only 1.47% reduction is
associated with the deadweight loss of the import tariff, while the re-
maining is due to the Southern firm’s output contraction that occurs
with its market power.
2.3.2 Graphical results under a Southern monopoly
2.3.2.1 Policy complementarity
This section presents graphical illustrations of Proposition 1.1, Pro-
position 1.2, and Lemma 1.2.
Figure 2.1: Policy complementarity in the presence of a Southern monopoly
Figure 2.1 (a) and (b) illustrate the policy interaction for Case 3 and
Case 4.1 in Section 2.3.1 respectively. Figure 2.1 (a) shows that an
increase in the exogenous Northern import tariff always increases the
optimal domestic FIT premium. The slope indicates that a $100 in-
crease in the import tariff raises the optimal FIT premium by $0.038,
which is around 20% of the conventional electricity price. Further-
more, a high import tariff at a level exceeding $300 is needed to
generate an optimal FIT premium. Figure 2.1 (b) shows that an in-
crease in the exogenous Northern FIT premium always increases the
optimal domestic import tariff. The slope indicates that a $0.01 in-
crease in the FIT premium (5% of the conventional electricity price)
raises the optimal import tariff by around $12.5.
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2.3.2.2 Effect of Northern trade protection on Northern equilibrium equip-
ment price and installation
Under a Southern monopoly, given the set of parameters, a positive
optimal FIT exists when the marginal damage of pollution is suffi-
ciently large. It does not arise if the marginal damage of pollution
is $0/kg or $0.05/kg, but exists when the latter is $0.1/kg. So we
assume that the marginal damage of pollution is $0.1/kg in this sub-
section. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the Northern trade protection even-
tually affects the domestic equilibrium equipment price and installa-
tion as stated in Proposition 1.1. The dashed lines and the dotted
lines in Figure 2.2 (a) and (c) refer to the direct effect and net ef-
fect of the Northern import tariff respectively. Figure 2.2 (b) and (d)
show how the relative magnitude of the indirect effect (the difference
between the direct and net effects) w.r.t. the direct effect changes in
the Northern import tariff. Importantly, Figure 2.2 (a) shows that
the import tariff always has a net negative effect on the equilibrium
installation. The direct negative effect of the import tariff on the equi-
librium installation is partially offset or alleviated by a higher FIT
premium induced by the import tariff. Figure 2.2 (b) shows that the
alleviation via the indirect effect is increasing in the import tariff. The
reason is shown by Figure 2.2 (c) and (d). Figure 2.2 (c) shows that
the Northern import tariff always has a direct positive effect on do-
mestic equilibrium price, and this effect is weakly amplified through
a higher FIT premium induced by the import tariff. Figure 2.2 (d)
confirms that the amplification via the indirect effect is increasing in
the import tariff, but it is relatively weak (below 1%) in the relevant
range.
We summarise the above findings as follows:
Summary 1. A positive FIT premium arises only at a high marginal dam-
age of pollution under a Southern monopoly. dQ
N∗
R
dτN < 0 holds because the
indirect price-raising effect of the import tariff ( ∂P
N∗
R
∂sN∗
dsN∗
dτN > 0) is relatively
weak.
2.3.2.3 Effect of Northern FIT premium on domestic equilibrium equip-
ment price and installation
Figure 2.3 illustrates how the Northern FIT premium eventually af-
fects the domestic equilibrium equipment price and installation. The
dotted lines and the dashed lines in Figure 2.3 (a) and (c) refer to
the direct effect and net effect of the Northern FIT premium respect-
ively. The explanation for Figure 2.3 (b) and (d) is similar to that for
Figure 2.2 (b) and (d). Importantly and surprisingly, Figure 2.3 (a)
shows that the FIT premium has a net negative effect on the equilib-
rium installation, as predicted by Chapter 1. The direct negative effect
of the FIT premium on the equilibrium installation is more than offset
by a higher import tariff induced by the FIT premium. This result is
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Figure 2.2: Effects of exogenous change in Northern import tariff on domes-
tic equilibrium equipment price and installation
consistent with our finding in Proposition 1.2. Figure 2.3 (b) shows
that the installation-dampening via the indirect effect is increasing
in the FIT premium itself. The reason behind this counter-intuitive
result is shown by Figure 2.3 (c) and (d). Figure 2.3 (c) shows that
the Northern FIT premium always has a direct positive effect on do-
mestic equilibrium price, and this effect is strongly amplified through
a higher import tariff induced by itself. As the equipment is much
more expensive due to a higher optimal import tariff, we observe the
counter-intuitive net installation-dampening effect of a FIT premium
in Figure 2.3 (a). Figure 2.3 (d) confirms that the amplification via the
indirect effect is increasing in the FIT premium, and it is significantly
strong (above 22%) in the relevant range.
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Figure 2.3: Effects of an exogenous change in Northern FIT premium on
domestic equilibrium equipment price and installation
Summary 2. dQ
N∗
R
dsN < 0 still holds even if ν = 0. This is because the indir-
ect price-raising effect of the FIT premium ( ∂P
N∗
R
∂τN∗
dτN∗
dsN > 0) is significantly
strong.
2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
2.3.3.1 Effects of key parameters on relative performance of Northern policy
regimes
We conduct a sensitivity analysis on key parameters to test the stabil-
ity of our numerical results. Table B.2 and Table B.3 summarise the
effects of key parameter value variations on the welfare and installa-
tion differences between Case 1 (no policy intervention) and all other
policy scenarios. The first lines in both tables refer to the baseline
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case associated with initial parameter settings. Based on Appendix
B.2 the main findings are as follows:
Summary 3. The numerical results are stable to parameter variations: (i)
a higher Southern unit production cost (cSR) weakly improves the welfare
performance of both Northern policies; (ii) by contrast, a higher conven-
tional electricity price (pFE) weakly worsens the welfare performance of both
Northern policies; (iii) a higher good-time incidence (µ) weakly improves the
welfare performance of the Northern FIT premium, but generally weakly wor-
sens the welfare performance of the Northern import tariff, with the exception
of a minor improvement given a high-level marginal damage of pollution of
$0.1/kg.
2.3.3.2 Effects of key parameters on policies, welfare and environment
This section explores how some key parameters in our model ulti-
mately affect the equilibrium Northern unilateral policies and the
subsequent welfare and environmental quality. We introduce a con-
strained global optimum on top of the cases in Section 2.3.1. It is con-
strained because the government can only choose the two second-best
trade and environmental policies. However, this optimum is cooper-
ative because the North aims to maximise global welfare which is the
sum of Northern and Southern welfare. Under this global optimum,
the optimal policy mix consists of a zero Northern import tariff and
a positive Northern FIT premium of $0.04525. A zero import tariff
is as expected since the import tariff ultimately dampens equipment
installation and exacerbates the imperfect competition and pollution
externalities from a global point of view (rent shifting is no longer
justified as a rationale for intervention as it is just a transfer from
the South to the North). Given a zero import tariff at the global
optimum, a FIT premium only has a direct installation-promoting ef-
fect which offsets both externalities above.9 We denote the Northern
FIT premium under a single optimal FIT premium, a policy mix and
a global optimum as sN , sN
∣∣M and sN ∣∣GO respectively. Similarly we
denote the Northern import tariff under a single optimal import tariff,
a policy mix and a global optimum asτN , τN
∣∣M and τN ∣∣GO respect-
ively. For the above reason, we always have τN∗
∣∣GO = 0. Given the
set of parameters, we also have sN∗
∣∣M =0, thus, τN∗= τN∗ ∣∣M .
For all the subsequent graphs which examine associated effects
with these cases, we adopt the following common description or le-
gend to distinguish between the curves associated with the corres-
ponding policy scenarios. As shown by the common description or
legend of curves analysed throughout this chapter, we evaluate the
single optimal policies when fixing the other policy instrument at
zero under both market structures, except for the case of the optimal
9 We will provide analytical analysis about the constrained global optimum when
we examine a Southern R&D subsidy in Chapter 3. For brevity and our focus on
simulation results, we do not present analytical analysis here.
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Northern FIT premium under a Southern monopoly, in which we fix
the import tariff at $340. This is because we need a sufficiently high
domestic import tariff to generate a positive optimal Northern FIT
premium. For the same reason, we assume that the marginal damage
of pollution is $0.1/kg for all the subsequent analysis of the South-
ern monopoly case ($0.05/kg is still not high enough to generate a
positive optimal FIT premium given that the import tariff is $340).
Table B.4 provides a complete and compact summary. We also
demonstrate some graphical examples in Appendix B to support the
findings in Table B.4. For brevity, we only present a few key findings
in this section.
Incidence of good generating times
Figure 2.4 (e) and (f) show that when there are more good generat-
ing times or a higher fossil-fuel-based electricity price in the period,
the optimal Northern FIT premium falls while the optimal Northern
import tariff rises in the relevant range. In particular , Figure 2.4 (e)
indicates that if µ rises from the initial value of 0.2 to around 0.3, the
optimal FIT premium falls to zero. The global optimal FIT premium
is always higher than that under an optimal FIT premium for any
level of µ. By observing Figure 2.4 (f), we notice that if µ increases by
0.1, the optimal import tariff rises by around $10. Example B.9 and
Example B.17 show that the ultimate installation effect of a higher
incidence of good generating times µ always promotes equipment
installation and improves the environment under both market struc-
tures. This reveals that the direct positive installation-promoting ef-
fect of µ outweighs its indirect negative installation-dampening effect
through the induced change in the optimal policy. Moreover, under
a Southern monopoly, µ is slightly more efficient in promoting in-
stallation when the Northern government optimally chooses a FIT
premium than the case of choosing an import tariff over the relev-
ant range. For example, an increase in µ from 0.2 to 0.3 increases
the Northern equipment installation by 3.15% under an optimal FIT
premium, relative to the increase by 0.67% under an optimal import
tariff. Example B.4 shows the positive welfare improving effects of µ
for both countries under a Southern monopoly as expected.
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Figure 2.4: Parameter effects on Northern policies under Southern mono-
poly
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Fossil-fuel-generated electricity price
Figure 2.4 (c) and (d) shows that the optimal Northern FIT premium
and the optimal Northern import tariff are respectively decreasing
and increasing in the conventional electricity price pFE in the rel-
evant range. The intuition is provided in Section 1.2.9. Based on
Figure 2.4 (c), the optimal FIT premium is relatively more sensit-
ive to the conventional electricity price under the non-cooperative
case than that under a global optimum: an approximately 5% rise in
pFE leads the small FIT premium induced by the high import tariff
to zero. Example B.9 illustrates that a higher conventional electri-
city price increases the Northern installation level under an optimal
FIT premium but decreases the latter under an optimal import tariff.
Note that this installation-dampening occurs even if the correspond-
ing sufficient condition in Corollary 1.1 (ii) is not satisfied. This is
because pFE enlarges the equipment market and thereby induces a
sufficiently high rise in the optimal import tariff to extract the ex-
tra Southern monopoly’s rents created by the enlarged market, even
given a zero FIT premium. Last but not least, Example B.11 indic-
ates that the Northern and Southern equilibrium welfare levels are
decreasing and increasing in the conventional electricity price under
a Southern monopoly respectively, except that the Northern welfare
is increasing in the price under an optimal FIT premium, despite be-
ing lower than the no intervention and optimal import tariff scenarios.
As a result, the global welfare is increasing in the conventional electri-
city price, except that it is decreasing over the low price range under
an optimal import tariff.
Unit production cost of the Southern equipment firm
Figure 2.4 (a) and (b) illustrate that the optimal FIT premium is
always increasing in the Southern equipment firm’s unit produc-
tion cost in the relevant range under both market structures (Ex-
ample B.1 (a) provides the 3D version). Based on Appendix B.6.1.1,
the main driving forces are as follows: (i) according to (1.4) and Ap-
pendix A.4.2.1 , when the unit cost rises, it reinforces the installation-
promoting effect of the FIT premium, and thereby reinforces the pos-
itive tariff revenue effect and environmental effect but exacerbates
the deadweight loss associated with over-supply; (ii) a higher unit
cost reduces import quantity, which alleviates the negative price ef-
fect of the FIT premium; (iii) a higher unit cost installation increases
the marginal productivity of equipment, which reinforces the positive
environmental effect and exacerbates the over-supply. But the former
dominates the latter as the former is associated with the entire period
while the latter is only associated with good generating times. Our
graphical results imply that even if we ignore the reinforced envir-
onmental effect due to zero marginal damage of pollution, the rein-
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forced price effect and tariff revenue effect outweigh the exacerbated
over-supply. Example B.1 (b) shows that the optimal import tariff
is always decreasing in the Southern equipment firm’s unit produc-
tion cost in the relevant range. According to (1.5) and Appendix
B.6.1.2, the main driving forces are as follows: (i) a higher unit cost
reduces import quantity, which weakens the positive terms-of-trade
effect of the import tariff; (ii) a higher unit cost installation increases
the marginal productivity of equipment, which reinforces the posit-
ive FIT cost effect but exacerbates the negative environmental effect.
Nevertheless, even given zero marginal damage of pollution, the op-
timal import tariff always falls when the foreign firm becomes less
efficient. Example B.9 displays that when the Southern equipment
firm becomes more efficient, as expected, it has a net positive effect
on the Northern equipment installation. According to Example B.3,
both countries non-surprisingly enjoy higher welfare levels from a
more efficient Southern equipment firm.
Northern marginal damage of pollution
Figure 2.4 (g) and (h) indicate that the Northern marginal damage
of pollution increases the Northern FIT premium but reduces the
Northern import tariff as pointed by Corollary 1.1. Figure 2.4 (g)
indicates that for a sufficiently high Northern marginal damage of
pollution, the non-cooperative FIT premium outweighs the cooper-
ative one. This is mainly because we assume non-transboundary
pollution, so while the North has higher incentive to address the
environmental externality by using the premium to promote more
installation,10 there is less marginal benefit to the global economy.
However, for a sufficiently low Northern marginal damage of pol-
lution, the above environmental-friendly nature are outweighed by
the rent-shifting nature of the FIT premium which leads to under-
subsidy in the North relative to the global optimum. Figure 2.4 (h)
highlights that if the marginal damage rises from zero to $0.05/kg,
the North strategically reduces the optimal import tariff from approx-
imately $300 to $200. Furthermore, as shown by Table B.4, it ulti-
mately worsens the Northern environmental quality, which implies
that its direct negative environmental effect dominates its indirect
positive environmental effect through promoting equipment install-
ation.11 Consequently, its installation promoting effect enlarges the
Northern equipment market and boosts the Southern equipment pro-
ducer’s profit. However, due to the non-transboundary pollution, it
ultimately exacerbates the pollution externality in the North but not
the South. Overall, we observe the positive Southern welfare effect
10 Under a non-cooperative optimal FIT premium, the import tariff is fixed, so there is
no adverse indirect environmental effect of the premium.
11 The emission coefficient shares similar patterns, so we do not present the associated
graphs for brevity.
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but negative Northern welfare effect of a Northern marginal damage
of pollution, as demonstrated by Example B.7.
Summary 4. Key parameter effects on the Northern policies, welfare and
environment under a Southern monopoly are:12
dτN∗
dccR
> (<) 0 f or low cNR (i f otherwise) ,
dWN∗
dccR
< 0,
dsN∗
dccR
< (>) 0 f or high cNR (i f otherwise) ,
dWG∗
dccR
< 0,
dWS∗
dccR
> (<) 0 f or high cNR (i f otherwise) ,
dτN∗
dα
> 0,
dQN∗R
dccR
,
d
(−HN∗)
dccR
< 0,
dsN∗
dα
< 0,
dWN∗
d pFE
> (<) 0 under sN∗
(
under τN∗
)
,
dWN∗
dµ
> 0,
dWG∗
d pFE
< (>) 0 f or low pFE under τN∗ (i f otherwise) ,
dWG∗
dµ
> 0,
dQN∗R
dα
,
d
(−HN∗)
dα
> 0,
dWS∗
dα
> 0,
dτN∗
dνN
< 0,
dsN∗
dνN
> 0,
d
(−HN∗)
dνN
< 0,
dQN∗R
dνN
> 0,
c = N, S; α = µ, pFE.
2.4 international duopoly
2.4.1 Single endogenous policy
Case 1. No policy interventions
If there are no policy interventions and no environmental harm, the
only distortion is the equipment firms’ output contractions due to
their market power. The duopoly price in each country is $750, im-
plying a markup of 36.36% and 25% for the Southern and Northern
equipment firms respectively. The Northern firm’s output is three-
quarters of that of its competitor in both markets and, as a result,
its total profit is 43.75% lower than its Southern counterpart. Each
household installs about 32 units of equipment and the ratio of con-
ventional electricity consumption w.r.t. the renewable electricity gen-
eration is 0.9 in both countries. Since the cost difference is assumed
to be at a relatively moderate level of 10%, the welfare difference is
12 “If otherwise” refers to all other cases for all subsequent analysis, e.g., dτ
N∗
dccR
< 0 for
high values of cNR and all values of c
S
R.
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much smaller than that in the Southern monopoly case: the North is
worse off by only 1.39%.
Case 2. Optimal Northern FIT premium
As shown by (1.8) and Appendix A.4.3.1, compared to the Southern
monopoly case, there is an additional likely positive efficiency effect
of the Northern FIT premium. The intuition is that under the general
case in which the FIT premium promotes domestic firm’s output, it
partially offsets its output contraction that occurs with market power.
Given our assumptions of a moderate cost difference, and given a
zero Northern import tariff, we always have an additional positive
efficiency effect in the context of this chapter. Although the quantity-
promoting effect of a FIT premium is weaker in the duopoly case than
under the monopoly case, we still expect that the optimal Northern
FIT premium is more likely to arise in our simulation. The result
confirms our expectation and shows that even when the import tariff
is zero, and the marginal damage of pollution is moderate, we gen-
erate a positive optimal Northern FIT premium. However, it is at a
relatively low level, which results in only 0.44% increase in equilib-
rium equipment price in the North. So all other results are similar to
that in Case 1. Both Northern and Southern equilibrium welfare are
weakly higher than Case 1, but the South benefits slightly more from
the higher domestic firm’s profit induced by the subsidised Northern
renewable electricity market.
Case 3. Optimal Northern import tariff
As in the monopoly case, an optimal Northern import tariff exists
even if the FIT premium and the marginal damage of pollution is
zero. This is as expected, mainly because we also have an additional
positive efficiency effect as the import tariff promotes domestic firm’s
output in the North, compared to the monopoly case. A higher trade
barrier increases domestic equipment price by less than 10% w.r.t.
Case 1. Installation falls by 17.46% and 12.73% respectively when
the marginal damage of pollution is zero and $0.05/kg (Case 3.1 and
Case 3.2 respectively). As a result, environmental harm is about 4%
higher in the North in Case 3.2. Northern households are worse off
than their Southern counterparts by less than 1% as a result of more
expensive equipment. Under trade protection, the Northern firm’s
output jumps up significantly to 2.71 and 1.76 times of that of its
competitor in the domestic market, resulting in a 45.64% and 15.41%
higher total profit than the Southern firm in Case 3.1 and 3.2 respect-
ively.13 By freely choosing an import tariff, the North enjoys slightly
higher welfare of 0.63% if there is no environmental harm, but this
13 The ratio for the Southern market is still threequarters as the two markets are seg-
mented.
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difference is almost entirely offset to only 0.078% given a moderate
marginal damage of pollution of $0.05/kg.
Overall, if the North can also produce the RE equipment, albeit
with a moderate cost disadvantage, (i) a positive optimal Northern
FIT premium arises even when the domestic import tariff is zero, and
the marginal damage of pollution is moderate (this is also the reason
why our simulation context can generate a policy mix under the inter-
national duopoly case); (ii) the optimal Northern import tariff is sens-
itive to the marginal damage of pollution: it reduces by 27% when
the marginal damage of pollution rises from zero to a moderate level
of $0.05/kg; (iii) the Northern installation is reduced significantly un-
der the optimal import tariff given a zero FIT premium, by contrast,
it only rises slightly under the optimal FIT premium, when there is
zero import tariff; (v) the optimal Northern import tariff can shift
about 42% and 35% of Southern equipment firm’s profit when the
marginal damage of pollution is zero and $0.05/kg respectively; (vii)
global welfare is more negatively affected by a moderate damage of
pollution compared to the deadweight losses of Northern policies. It
only reduces by 0.342% in Case 3.1, while it reduces by 6.35% in Case
1.2, relative to the level in Case 1.
2.4.2 Northern optimal policy mix
In this section, we allow the Northern government to choose a policy
mix consisting of an import tariff on Southern RE equipment and a
FIT premium for the excess household renewable electricity genera-
tion. The timing of the game is similar to that in Chapter 1. So the
policy mix is committed in Stage 1. We still assume that the Southern
government does not intervene. We expect the existence of a policy
mix if the North can choose both policy instruments. This is because
the partial effect of each policy instrument in the policy mix is derived
by treating the other policy instrument as fixed. Therefore, it is sim-
ilar to its welfare effect when it is the single endogenous policy given
the other exogenous policy. Since we find the policy complementar-
ity under the single endogenous policy scenarios, we conjecture that
a policy mix is likely to arise. In this simulation setting, we indeed
generate an optimal Northern policy mix consisting of a positive FIT
premium and a positive import tariff. Northern welfare is maximised
at $2.27983× 1011 when the import tariff equals $215.013 (30.03% of
the equilibrium equipment price at $715.892) and the FIT premium
$0.03668 (18.34% of the electricity market price at $0.2).
As shown in Figure 2.5, Northern welfare is maximised at when
the import tariff equals $215.013 (28.67% of the equilibrium equip-
ment price without any interventions at $750) and the FIT premium
0.03668 (18.34% of the electricity market price at $0.2), given zero mar-
ginal damage of pollution. They are both reasonable values in the
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context of this model. The Northern equipment firm’s output is 3.2
times and 2.2 times higher than that of its Southern competitor when
the marginal damage of pollution is zero and $0.05/kg respectively.
By Lemma 1.3, the import tariff is in the moderate range such that
the FIT premium increases both producers’ Northern output. Never-
theless, given a relatively high import tariff, the Southern equipment
firm which had a moderate cost advantage now only has 23.8% and
29.9% of Northern market share given a zero and moderate marginal
damage of pollution respectively.
Figure 2.5: Northern welfare maximisation under optimal policy mix and
zero marginal damage of pollution
2.4.3 Graphical results under an international duopoly
This section presents the graphical illustration of Corollary 1.2, Corol-
lary 1.3 and Lemma 1.4.
2.4.3.1 Policy complementarity
Figure 2.6 (a) and (b) illustrate the policy interaction in Case 2 and
Case 3.1 in Section 2.4.1 respectively. We still observe the policy com-
plementarity. An international duopoly is different from a Southern
monopoly mainly because that a much lower import tariff of $85 is
needed for an optimal FIT premium to arise as shown in Figure 2.1
(a).
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Figure 2.6: Policy complementarity in the presence of an international
duopoly and zero marginal pollution damage
2.4.3.2 Effect of Northern trade protection on domestic equilibrium equip-
ment price and installation
This section provides similar results to the monopoly case. However,
the relative size of the indirect installation-promoting effect to the
direct installation-dampening effect of the Northern import tariff is
much stronger in this duopoly case, as shown in Figure 2.7.
Summary 5. dQ
N∗
R |C
dτN < 0 holds even if ν = 0. This is because the indirect
price-raising effect of the import tariff ( ∂P
N∗
R |C
∂sN∗|C
dsN∗|C
dτN > 0) is extremely weak.
2.4.3.3 Effects of Northern FIT premium on domestic equilibrium equip-
ment price and installation
We obtain important and contrasting results to the monopoly case
in Section 2.3.2.3. Although the FIT premium still has a net positive
effect on the equipment price, its indirect price-rising effect through
a higher optimal import tariff is weaker than that in the monopoly
case, as shown in Figure 2.8. Consequently, the indirect installation-
dampening effect of the FIT premium is weaker, and is dominated
by its direct installation-promoting effect. As a result, we observe an
unsurprising net installation-promoting effect of the FIT premium, in
contrast to its adverse net installation-dampening effect in the mono-
poly case.
Summary 6. dQ
N∗
R |C
dsN > 0 holds even if ν = 0. This is because the indir-
ect price-raising effect of the FIT premium ( ∂P
N∗
R |C
∂τN∗|C
dτN∗|C
dsN > 0) is relatively
weak.
2.4.3.4 Effects of FIT premium and import tariff on the Cournot competi-
tion in the Northern RE equipment market
Figure 2.9 shows how Northern policies affect the Cournot compet-
ition between the Northern and Southern equipment firms in the
North. The horizontal axis and vertical axis measure the output of
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Figure 2.7: Effects of Northern trade protection on domestic equilibrium
equipment price and installation under an international duopoly
and zero marginal pollution damage
Northern and Southern firms sold in the Northern equipment mar-
ket respectively. The Northern and Southern firms’ reaction curves
are labelled as RN and RS respectively. Their intersection determines
the Cournot equilibrium labelled as C. The subscripts 0 and 1 indicate
the scenarios before and after policy changes respectively. A higher
FIT premium enlarges the Northern RE equipment market by rotat-
ing out the household demand curve, making households less price
sensitive. Cournot competition implies that it has different impacts
on firms’ output in the North. Figure 2.9 (a) illustrates the general
case of Lemma 1.3, in which the import-tariff-inclusive cost differ-
ence is moderate, so a higher FIT premium shifts out both equipment
firms’ reaction curves by a similar distance such that both producers
sell more in the Northern market. Figure 2.9 (b) illustrates the special
case in which the Southern firm is excessively less efficient than its
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Figure 2.8: Effects of Northern FIT premium on domestic equilibrium equip-
ment price and installation under an international duopoly and
zero marginal pollution damage
competitor. Its reaction curve is shifted out much more than that of
its competitor, such that its equilibrium output expands while the ex-
cessively competitive Northern firm’s output contracts. Figure 2.9 (c)
illustrates the opposite special case to that shown by Figure 2.9 (b), in
which the excessively efficient Southern firm reduces output. This is
the case if the cost difference in our simulation widens to an excess-
ive level. Figure 2.9 (d) shows the conventional effect of import tariffs
on Northern Cournot competition: it shifts in the foreign firm’s re-
action curve and thereby switches profit from the foreign firm to the
domestic firm.
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Figure 2.9: Effects of Northern FIT premium and import tariff on Cournot
competition in Northern RE equipment market
2.4.4 Effects of key parameters on policies, welfare and environment
This section examines the parameter effects on Northern unilateral
optimal policies, welfare and the environmental quality. As shown
by the aforementioned common description of curves, we evaluate
the single optimal policies when fixing the other policy instrument at
zero under an international duopoly. We assume that the marginal
damage of pollution is $0.05/kg for all the subsequent analysis of
the international duopoly case to offer the most empirically relevant
predictions in this context.
Table B.4 in Appendix B provides a complete and compact sum-
mary for the duopoly case too. Based on Table B.4, the parameter
effects are analogous to the monopoly case. We also provide some
graphical examples to support the findings in Table B.4. In the fol-
lowing Summary, we only present the main qualitative differences,
which lie in the effect of unit costs of Northern and Southern equip-
ment firms, as well as the net installation effect of the conventional
electricity price:
Summary 7. The key parameter effects on Northern policies, welfare and
environment under an international duopoly are different from that under a
Southern monopoly mainly because:
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(i) dτ
N∗|C
dcNR
< (>) 0 under a single optimal import tariff and
for high cNR for all other scenarios (if otherwise)
(ii) ds
N∗|C
dcSR
< 0 for high cSR under global optimum
(iii) dW
N∗|C
dcSR
> 0 for high cSR under all scenarios
(iv) dW
N∗|C
dpFE
< (>) 0 for low pFE under no intervention, a single
optimal FIT premium, global optimum (if otherwise ), c = N, S.
(i) Surprisingly, the optimal Northern trade protection falls if the
domestic equipment firm becomes less efficient. Based on the com-
parative statics analysis with a specific functional form, Appendix
B.6.2.2 provides the intuition for this result: under a single optimal
import tariff, the net welfare effects of a Northern unit cost cNR can
be simplified to a sum of this non-negative impact on FIT cost and
a non-positive impact on the environmental quality. A higher cNR
dampens installation and increase the marginal productivity of re-
newable electricity generation. Consequently, first, it marginally in-
creases the quantity of excess renewable electricity to be subsidised,
which reinforces the positive FIT cost effect of a Northern import tar-
iff. However, this indirect effect exists only if the FIT premium is
positive and it is increasing in the FIT premium; second, it margin-
ally increases the amount of renewable electricity to be reduced due
to any given amount of installation dampened by an import tariff.
Thus, it exacerbates the negative welfare effect of an import tariff on
the installation and the environment, as long as the pollution para-
meters ν, e are positive. Overall, given a zero FIT premium under
an optimal FIT premium and positive environmental parameters in
this context, the net impact of cNR on the import tariff is always neg-
ative; (ii) the optimal Northern FIT premium is decreasing over a
high range of the Southern unit cost of equipment production (see
Appendix B.6.2.1 for analytical illustration); (iii) the Northern wel-
fare is increasing in the Southern unit cost under an international
duopoly if the unit cost is sufficiently high. This is because when
the Southern equipment firm is excessively inefficient, the Northern
equipment firm becomes more relatively competitive and it can en-
joy more profits from both markets. This welfare-improving effect
does not exist under a Southern monopoly as there is no domestic
firm; (iv) the conventional electricity price pFE is generally more wel-
fare improving under an international duopoly mainly because the
enlarged equipment markets are shared by a Northern equipment
firm. Example B.17 shows the positive installation-promoting effect
of pFE under an international duopoly. This is because the enlarged
RE equipment market due to more expensive conventional electricity
is partly enjoyed by the domestic equipment firm, resulting in less for-
eign rents to be extracted by an import tariff. Thus, pFE has a weaker
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effect on the optimal import tariff relative to that in the Southern
monopoly case.
Furthermore, we also examine another duopoly case in which we
evaluate the above results by fixing the exogenous policy instrument
at the initial policy mix level rather than zero. The signs of results
are robust to this alternation, except for the following two scenarios:
(i) dτ
N∗|C
dcNR
> 0 for a sufficiently high sN |C (see Appendix B.6.2.2 for
demonstration by analytical results); (ii)
dsN∗|MC
dpFE
> 0 for a high τN
∣∣M
C .
Under a policy mix, fossil-fuel-based electricity price has a positive in-
direct effect on the optimal FIT premium because it induces a higher
import tariff which also increases the optimal FIT premium. In this
setting, this indirect effect outweighs the negative direct effect of the
price on the premium.
2.5 southern research-and-development subsidy
In this section, we allow the Southern government to intervene by op-
timally choosing an up-front and lump-sum R&D subsidy. This is not
modelled in Chapter 1 and it will be analytically analysed in Chapter
3 in more details, so we briefly introduce as follows.14 We assume
that the Southern R&D subsidy reduces the Southern equipment
firm’s unit production cost according to the following power function:
cSR −
(
sSR
)r where sSR ≥ 0 and r > 0 are the amount of subsidy and its
degree of cost reduction respectively. There are various unmodelled
incentives to subsidise R&D, such as knowledge spillovers. As a first
step, we simplifies our analysis by modelling a process R&D subsidy
without introducing extra market failures.15 The analysis is more re-
lated to the strategic trade policy motive of R&D subsidies. Despite
its simplicity, it still highlights the policy interaction, which is consist-
ent with the main theme of this thesis. Given that both countries have
the same marginal damage of pollution of $0.05/kg,16 we generate a
policy Nash equilibrium: a positive non-cooperative Northern policy
mix consisting of a FIT premium of $0.04978 and an import tariff of
$197.13, and a Southern R&D subsidy of $6.97271× 108.
14 We choose to put all simulation results together in one chapter as one way to organ-
ise the thesis.
15 We will incorporate more realistic R&D modelling as our next step.
16 The main results are robust even when the marginal damage of pollution is zero.
We make this assumption because we want to include Case 2, in which the optimal
Northern FIT premium (single policy) arises even if the domestic import tariff is zero
under this assumption.
82 simulation
Figure 2.10: Parameter effects on Northern policies under international duo-
poly
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2.5.1 Effects of the degree of Southern R&D cost reduction and Southern
R&D subsidy on Northern policies
Since for any given subsidy level, a higher degree of R&D efficiency
monotonically reduces the Southern unit cost, the intuition for its ef-
fects are the same as that of a lower Southern unit cost as follows.
As shown in Table B.4, (i) the optimal Northern FIT premium is de-
creasing in the degree of R&D efficiency According to (1.8), and the
intuition provided in Section 2.3.3.2, we see that higher efficiency of
R&D reduces Southern unit cost, which reduces the Northern equip-
ment price and thereby weakens the efficiency effect of the Northern
FIT premium; (ii) a higher degree of R&D cost reduction always in-
creases the optimal import tariff in the relevant range. According to
(1.9), there is an additional negative effect of higher efficiency of R&D
on the optimal Northern import tariff, as it also weakens its efficiency
effect. Nevertheless, its reinforcement of the terms-of-trade effect of
the import tariff through increasing import quantity dominates. The
same argument applies to the effects of the Southern R&D subsidy
on Northern policies. Based on Table B.4 we summarise as follows:
dτN∗|C
dr > 0,
dτN∗|C
dsSR
> 0, ds
N∗|C
dr < 0,
dsN∗|C
dsSR
< 0,
dWc∗|C
dr > 0,
dWS∗|C
dsSR
> (<) 0 f or low (high) sSR,
dWN∗|C
dsSR
> 0, dQ
N∗
R |C
dr > 0,
dQN∗R |C
dsSR
> 0; c = N, S.
2.5.2 Constrained global optimum
We consider the case in which the North can choose both policies,
and the South can choose an R&D subsidy. The constrained global
optimum consists of a zero Northern import tariff, a positive North-
ern FIT premium of $0.0632 and a positive Southern R&D subsidy of
$2.60821× 108, indicating that the North under-subsidises domestic
renewable electricity generation by 21.234% whereas the South over-
subsidises its domestic equipment firm by 167.34% under the policy
Nash equilibrium. Environmental policies, specifically, the upstream
Southern R&D subsidy and the downstream Northern FIT premium
can both improve global welfare. The reason is that the former pro-
motes the equilibrium installation in both countries and the latter pro-
motes domestic installation. Therefore, they both alleviate the output
contraction in the imperfectly competitive equipment sector and the
pollution externality. By contrast, as expected, the Northern import
tariff always worsens global welfare because it dampens domestic
equipment installation and exacerbates the above negative externalit-
ies. The Northern under-subsidisation is mainly because the North-
ern FIT premium promotes domestic equipment demand, so part of
this benefit of enlarged market shifts to the Southern firm, whose
output and profit are not internalised by the North. The reason for
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the Southern over-subsidisation is because it strategically provides a
competitive advantage to its domestic equipment firm in both mar-
kets.
2.5.3 Policy and welfare comparison across different policy regimes
Denoting the superscripts GO, NE, M, s, τ and NI for the con-
strained global optimum, policy Nash equilibrium between the two
countries (the North chooses a policy mix while the South chooses
an R&D subsidy), unilateral (i.e. the South does not intervene)
Northern policy mix, unilateral Northern optimal FIT premium, uni-
lateral Northern import tariff as well as non-intervention scenarios
in both countries. Only the global optimum is cooperative under
which countries optimally choose policies to maximise global wel-
fare WG = WN + WS. All other cases are non-cooperative in which
countries aims to maximise national welfare. The South is allowed to
choose an R&D subsidy only in the first two regimes. Based on Ap-
pendix B.1 and Appendix B.4, by comparing Case 1.2, Case 2, Case
3.2, Case 4.2, NE and GO scenarios, we have the following results:17
Summary 8. Given that both countries have the same marginal damage of
pollution of $0.05/kg, then:
sN
∣∣GO
C > s
N
∣∣M> sN∣∣NE> sN > 0, τN∣∣NE> τN∣∣M> τN > τN∣∣GOC ,
sSR
∣∣GO
C > s
S
R
∣∣NE> 0,
WN
∣∣NE> WN∣∣M> WN∣∣τ> WN∣∣s> WN∣∣NI> WN∣∣GOC > 0,
WS
∣∣GO
C > W
S
∣∣s> WS∣∣NI> WS∣∣NE> WS∣∣M> WS∣∣τ> 0,
WG
∣∣GO
C > W
G
∣∣NE> WG∣∣s> WS∣∣NI> WG∣∣M> WG∣∣τ> 0,
QNR
∣∣GO
C > Q
N
R
∣∣s> QNR ∣∣NI> QNR ∣∣NE> QNR ∣∣M> QNR ∣∣τ> 0,
PNR
∣∣M> PNR ∣∣NE> PNR ∣∣τ> PNR ∣∣GOC > PNR ∣∣s> PNR ∣∣NI> 0.
The FIT premium is higher under the policy mix than the single
policy case (sN
∣∣M> sN) due to the policy complementarity: a positive
import tariff in the policy mix increases the optimal FIT premium in
the mix relative to the single FIT premium case in which the import
tariff is zero. The same argument applies for τN
∣∣M> τN . It is notable
that Southern welfare follow the same ranking order as the North-
ern equipment installation and thereby the Northern environmental
quality. The intuition is that since we already know that the policy ef-
fects on household surpluses are much smaller, the Southern welfare
mainly varies with the domestic equipment firm’s profit, which is af-
fected by the Northern and Southern policies in a similar way, e.g. a
higher Northern import tariff dampens the Southern firm’s profit and
17 For simplicity, we remove the asterisk subscript which denotes equilibrium values.
See Appendix B.4 for the magnitude of differences in the welfare levels of subgroups
and equipment prices.
2.6 conclusion 85
dampens domestic installation via ultimately increasing the domestic
equipment price.
Under the policy Nash equilibrium, the Northern, Southern and
global welfare are $21.30793× 1010, $21.46387× 1010 and $42.77180×
1010 respectively, which are 0.045%, 1.08% and 0.56% higher than that
under Northern policy mix when the South does not intervene (Case
4.2) respectively. The representative Northern and Southern house-
hold each installs 30.105 and 33.597 units of equipment respectively,
which are 3.31% and 5.59% higher than that in Case 4.2. Under the
constrained global optimum, the Northern, Southern and global wel-
fare are $21.12542 × 1010, $21.89405 × 1010 and $43.01947 × 1010 re-
spectively, which are −4.65%, 2% and 0.58% relative to that under the
policy Nash equilibrium. The Northern and Southern representative
households install 35.928 and 33.280 units of equipment respectively,
which are 1.93% and −0.94% relative to that under the policy Nash
equilibrium respectively.
The key recommendation for regulators is that in the presence of an
international duopoly in the RE equipment sector,18 both upstream
and downstream environmental subsidies as well as completely re-
moving trade barriers of RE equipment are all necessary to maxim-
ise the global welfare if other policy instruments are not available.
However, caution is advised to avoid over-subsidising the R&D in
the upstream equipment sector and under-subsidising the renewable
electricity generation.
Furthermore, under the constrained global optimum, Northern
welfare is lowest in all policy scenarios mainly because the domestic
equipment firm is worse off due to the loss of trade protection. This is
largely due to a much smaller difference in policy impacts on house-
holds in both countries. Nevertheless, removing the Northern trade
barrier makes Northern equipment cheaper, together with a higher
FIT premium, Northern equipment installation ultimately rises to the
highest level within this simulation, which indirectly improves the en-
vironmental quality to the highest level across all cases we compare.
2.6 conclusion
This chapter constructs a numerical example to illustrate and sup-
plement the analytical results in the previous chapter, by exploring
those issues that are unclear due to the limitations associated with
the analytical analysis. We assign parameter values based on latest
data and then solve for optimal policies as well as their welfare and
environmental effects using Mathematica. We also conduct sensitivity
analysis which shows that our results are stable.
By comparing the magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects of
policies on the equipment installation and thereby the environmental
18 This result is robust to the case without environmental harm.
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quality, we find that the relative strengths of the direct and indirect
price effects of the exogenous policy are crucial. Surprising net en-
vironmental effects of an exogenous policy may occur if its indirect
price effect through its positive effect on the optimal policy is strong
enough. In addition, we generate a Northern policy mix consisting of
an import tariff and a FIT premium in the international duopoly case.
We also study a lump-sum Southern R&D subsidy to its domestic up-
stream equipment sector. We compare the level of policies, welfare
and the environmental quality across constrained global optimum,
policy Nash equilibrium, Northern policy mix without Southern in-
tervention as well as Northern single policy scenarios. In the presence
of an international duopoly in the renewable energy (RE) equipment
sector, cooperative behaviour to maximise global welfare requires a
lower upstream R&D subsidy but a higher downstream FIT subsidy.
In addition, zero import tariff on RE equipment is also needed. Un-
der the constrained global optimum, on the one hand, the Northern
equipment firm’s profit is lowest due to the removal of any trade pro-
tection, which results in lowest Northern welfare across the cases we
compare. On the other hand, Northern environment is at the highest
level due to the highest equipment installation within our compar-
ison. Furthermore, Southern welfare follows the same ranking order
as the Northern equipment installation and thereby the Northern en-
vironmental quality.
By parameterising to the RE equipment sector, our major contri-
bution is that we can show the magnitudes of a variety of driving
forces behind derived main theoretical results. A calibrated exercise
also helps us to understand the different equilibrium policy, RE equip-
ment installation and welfare levels across different market structures,
as well as the degree of policy differences between a national op-
timum and a constrained global optimum. In sum, this work serves
as a building block for us to move ahead from our analytical work to
future empirical testing as well as practical policy designs.
One major limitation of this study is that we assume a simple func-
tional form to measure the R&D cost reduction, without explicitly
modelling the knowledge accumulation and the market failures asso-
ciated with R&D spillovers. We also lack accurate measures to calib-
rate the degree of R&D cost reduction in RE equipment production
due to the difficulty of empirically estimating public and private ex-
penditure. Moreover, modelling international green technology trans-
fer in the RE equipment sector is also an interesting direction (see e.g.
Nimubona and Rus, 2015). Another issue is that most sufficient con-
ditions for our main analytical results in the previous chapter are
generally lenient over the empirically relevant parameter range. To
show the robustness of our analytical results when the sufficient con-
ditions are not satisfied as Nimubona (2012) aims to, it seems that we
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will have to follow Nimubona (2012) to select a more arbitrary set of
parameter values in the future.
One of our next research tasks is to simulate the interactions among
some alternative policy instruments in the RE sector as well as their
welfare and environmental effects, based on the theoretical examina-
tion in the next chapter. We also hope to explicitly model knowledge
spillovers in our future simulations as it provides a rationale for R&D
subsidies in the RE equipment sector.

3
R & D S U B S I D Y, O U T P U T S U B S I D Y A N D
E N V I R O N M E N TA L TA R G E T S I N T R A D E I N
R E N E WA B L E E N E R G Y E Q U I P M E N T
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A B S T R A C T
This chapter theoretically extends Chapter 1 by considering three
main alternative renewable energy policy instruments. First, we ex-
amine how a Southern R&D subsidy interacts with a Northern FIT
premium and a Northern import tariff. We also rank its levels across
a Southern monopoly and an international duopoly as well as non-
cooperative and cooperative strategies. Based on the rank, taking the
Northern policies as given, the environment in both countries is likely
to be under-protected under a Southern monopoly but over-protected
under an international duopoly. Second, we explore how a Northern
output subsidy interacts with a Northern FIT premium and a North-
ern import tariff. Third, we investigate the effect of trade policy in
the presence of a binding emissions target or a binding renewable
energy share target. Emissions are unaffected under a binding emis-
sions target, but interestingly, they are decreasing in the degree of
trade protection under a binding renewable energy share target.
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3.1 introduction
Although a FIT is the most popular policy instrument to promote
RE adoption, regulators in different regions also choose some other
policies, such as an upstream R&D subsidy and an upstream output
subsidy to the RE equipment sector as well as RE share target in
the downstream electricity sector. One key reason for regulators to
choose quantitative targets to address environmental harm is that the
marginal damage of pollution for a single country is generally too
small for optimal environmental policies to stand up to the cost-and-
benefit analysis when the target is the sum of economic welfare and
disutility from environmental harm instead (Requate, 2015, p.217).
Thus, to better understand the ultimate welfare and environmental
impacts of policy interventions in the RE sector, it is interesting and
natural to investigate these alternative policies and their interaction
with the two policy instruments we examined previously – a down-
stream FIT premium and an upstream import tariff on equipment.
This chapter theoretically extends Chapter 1 in three directions
by considering some alternative policy instruments in the RE sector.
First, we also allow the Southern government to intervene by choos-
ing a Southern R&D subsidy for its domestic RE equipment firm. We
not only check its interaction with the Northern FIT premium and
Northern import tariff, but also rank its levels across different mar-
ket structures (a Southern monopoly and an international duopoly)
as well as non-cooperative and cooperative strategies. We find that
in the presence of a Southern monopoly, even if the marginal dam-
age of pollution is zero, the Southern R&D subsidy is increasing in
the Northern FIT premium but decreasing in the Northern import
tariff. Conversely, the Southern R&D subsidy is likely to reduce the
Northern FIT premium but increase the Northern trade protection. A
higher marginal damage of pollution does not affect the impacts of
Northern policies on the Southern optimal R&D subsidy, but it ampli-
fies the impacts of Southern R&D subsidy on the Northern policies. A
higher Northern import tariff reinforces the positive impact of North-
ern FIT premium on the Southern R&D subsidy. A higher North-
ern FIT premium alleviates the negative impact of the Northern im-
port tariff on the Southern R&D subsidy. In the case of international
duopoly, the above patterns of policy interactions generally still hold.
Furthermore, it is likely to observe under-provision of Southern R&D
subsidies in the Southern monopoly case but over-provision of South-
ern R&D subsidies in the international duopoly case. Consequently,
taking Northern policies as given,1 the environment in both coun-
tries is likely to be under-protected under a Southern monopoly but
1 Due to the interaction between the Southern and Northern policies, we need to
undertake standard comparative-statics analysis to examine the ultimate environ-
mental effect, as we did in Chapter 1.
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over-protected under an international duopoly. Moreover, the non-
cooperative Southern R&D subsidy is likely to be higher in the South-
ern monopoly case than that in the international duopoly case.
Second, we study the upstream Northern output subsidy to the
domestic equipment firm, and its interaction with the Northern FIT
premium and import tariff, in the presence of an international duo-
poly. There is an ambiguous relationship between a Northern output
subsidy and a Northern FIT premium. However, the policy substitut-
ability between a Northern output subsidy and a Northern import tar-
iff always holds. In addition, a higher marginal damage of pollution
increases the likelihood of the substitutability between the Northern
output subsidy and FIT premium, but it counteracts the substitutab-
ility between the Northern output subsidy and import tariff.
Third, we explore the quantitative environmental targets – an emis-
sions target and an RE share target (or portfolio standard) – and how
they are affected by domestic trade protection in the presence of a for-
eign monopoly producing RE equipment. Given a binding emissions
target, when an import tariff on RE equipment makes renewable elec-
tricity generation more costly, it thereby increases the optimal shadow
price of pollution as it is more expensive to achieve the emissions tar-
get. A reduction in renewable electricity generation is required to
achieve the emissions target most efficiently. As expected, the con-
ventional electricity generation does not change since the target is
binding. This is because in the presence of a higher import tariff on
RE equipment, conventional electricity becomes relatively more cost
competitive. The conventional electricity sector has the incentive to
expand but cannot do so given a binding emissions target. On the
contrary, trade liberalisation in the RE equipment sector makes re-
newable electricity generation cheaper, resulting in a less binding tar-
get. In an extreme case, if renewable electricity becomes sufficiently
cost competitive after the trade liberalisation, fossil-fuel-based electri-
city generation no longer exists and the emissions target is no longer
necessary. In a decentralised economy, a higher import tariff increases
the optimal emissions tax or the equilibrium price of optimal tradable
permits to ensure that the polluting conventional electricity is still be-
low the target. If the government targets the RE share instead, as
expected, a higher domestic import tariff always dampens renewable
electricity generation and increases the optimal shadow price of pol-
lution. However, interestingly and surprisingly, a higher domestic
trade barrier reduces the fossil-fuel–generated electricity as well. The
intuition is that higher domestic trade protection makes RE equip-
ment more expensive. More costly renewable electricity generation
increases the difficulty of meeting the RE share target, which is reflec-
ted in a higher common factor of marginal abatement cost for both
types of electricity induced by a higher import tariff. To achieve the
target, reducing conventional electricity becomes more efficient relat-
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ive to increasing the renewable electricity generation at the margin. In
a decentralised economy, a higher import tariff increases the second-
best price of tradable green certificates and the second-best emission
tax, budget-balanced FIT premium and budget-balanced FIT.
As introduced in Section 2.1, one relevant paper to our theoret-
ical analysis of Southern R&D subsidy is Dijkstra and Mathew (2015).
Our theoretical attempt differs from their work as we look at marginal
trade protection or liberalisation, whereas they explore the immedi-
ate shift from autarky to free trade. Moreover, we focus on analysing
the two-way policy interactions between Southern R&D subsidy and
Northern trade and environmental policies, as well as the subsequent
welfare and environmental effects. Comparing our work to Fischer et
al. (2014a) mentioned in Section 2.1, on top of the aforementioned dif-
ference in modelling pollution, another main difference is that they
look at abatement technology, which is associated with conventional
EG. The resulting difference in theoretical modelling is, therefore,
similar to that mentioned in Section 1.1. Moreover, they are interested
in the choice between upstream and downstream subsidies, whereas
we restrict our attention to the interaction between policies. An addi-
tional notable difference of theoretical modelling between our study
and their work is that we focus on the long run and we do not expli-
citly model knowledge accumulation, there is only one period in our
setting, in contrast to their two-stage models. Moreover, we also rank
the R&D subsidy levels across different market structures and across
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies, when the subsidised RE
equipment sector exports to a foreign country.
There are two strands of literature that are relevant to our next in-
vestigation of an output subsidy. The first strand combines theories
of international trade and industrial organisation to analyses the op-
timal policies as discussed in Section 1.1. Within this strand, a series
of studies focuses on policy rankings when regulators have particular
targets. The target may either be fixing domestic distortions (e.g., pro-
duction and consumption externalities, factor market distortions, and
so forth.) or protecting domestic import-competing industry (pion-
eered by Corden, 1957; Bhagwati, 1969 and others). Toshimitsu (2002)
presents a partial equilibrium model which is the closest to ours in the
sense that he is also interested in both the import tariff and domestic
output (or production) subsidy in the presence of an asymmetric in-
ternational oligopoly engaging in Cournot competition. He argues
that the optimal choice between the two trade and industrial policies
depend on the relative number of domestic and foreign firms as well
as the international cost difference. Both Toshimitsu (2002) and this
study differ from previous works in this series for two main reasons.
First, we both allow regulators to maximise social welfare without
any constraints or additional targets. Second, instead of adopting
the conventional perfectly competitive assumption in this series, we
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both look at the imperfect competition between firms from different
countries. However, the welfare function in this study also differs
from that in Toshimitsu (2002)as we internalise pollution externality
by treating it as disutilities. More importantly, we restrict attention
to the policy interactions instead of policy rankings between import
tariff and output subsidy within one country. We also analyse the
case of monopoly which is not presented inToshimitsu (2002) as he is
interested in protecting domestic import-competing industry.
The other strand looks at strategic environmental policies in an
international context as introduced in Section 1.1. In particular, Fisc-
her (2016) also analyses strategic upstream production subsidy and
downstream consumption subsidy in green goods or new EG, such
as renewable energy, with positive consumption externality like emis-
sions reduction. Among other things, like we do, Fischer (2016) pays
attention to the strategic environmental policies in the context of inter-
national trade and imperfect Cournot competition in the green goods
sector, by conducting both theoretical examination and numerical cal-
ibration. More specifically, we both assume unconstrained welfare
maximisation which internalises the pollution externality, and then
compare the levels of optimal subsidies between a global optimum
and a Nash equilibrium of a policy game. Nevertheless, the trade
pattern in her model involves a third country which usually refers
to a developing country only consuming the green goods without in-
tervening in any markets. The author also focuses on broader green
goods in general, without specifically modelling the idiosyncrasies of
residential renewable electricity generation as we do. The assump-
tion of multiple firms in Fischer (2016) allows for examination of the
effects of different market structures. Given our different focus, our
model only has up to one firm in each country and we also do not
model the external scale economies as she does. Moreover, the au-
thor does not model trade policy and the case of a foreign monopoly
producing the upstream green good. As a result of similarities in our
research, the author claims that there is strategic under-subsidy in the
presence of multiple externalities of imperfect competition and pollu-
tion, which is analogous to our conclusion in the Southern monopoly
case. However, we arrived at an entirely opposite conclusion under
an international duopoly: there is an over-subsidy in the South when
the Southern equipment firm engages in Cournot competition with
a Northern competitor and faces Northern trade and environmental
policy interventions.
A notable series of studies emerged within this strand which con-
siders optimal biofuel policies in an open economy context. Similar to
the studies on trade in RE equipment, this strand is also in its infancy,
since substantial biofuel trade is a relatively new phenomenon as well.
The analysis of a combination of biofuel import tariff and output sub-
sidy is pioneered by Chapter 2 in Lasco (2010). Among other things,
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she conjectures that the combination of an import tariff on ethanol
and an output subsidy for ethanol cannot achieve the first-best con-
sisting of a Pigovian tax on miles and fuels and an optimal import tar-
iff on ethanol. Although she analytically derived the optimal policies,
she relies on graphical interpretation and numerical simulation to as-
sess welfare effects of policies. In this respect, our work improves on
her model by providing closed-form solutions. Moreover, she does
not focus on policy interaction as we do. Lapan and Moschini (2012)
analytically examine the welfare implications of subsidies and quant-
ity mandates using a general equilibrium model. They show that the
mandates dominate the subsidies, and a policy mix of a fuel tax and
mandate improves welfare. Among other things, Bandyopadhyay et
al. (2013) argue for a policy mix of a crude tax and biofuel subsidy for
the food exporter if the country is large enough to influence the world
price for biofuel by adopting a general equilibrium trade model. They
also demonstrate that if two nations can both choose biofuel subsidies,
a Nash policy equilibrium consists of a positive subsidy in the food
exporting country and a negative subsidy in the food importing coun-
try. The latter result is relevant to our analysis of a Southern R&D
subsidy, when the North and South also engage in strategic policy
interactions. However, we look at asymmetric policy choices unlike
their work. The common difference of the above two papers from
our work is that they do not discuss trade policy and therefore its
interaction with environmental subsidies. More importantly, all three
papers above also indicate the substantial differences between biofuel
and RE equipment, despite the fact that they both belong to the cat-
egory of renewable energy. First, biofuel producers have virtually
no market power and thereby no under-provision of biofuels. Con-
sequently, there are no strategic interactions among producers within
or from different countries. Instead, there are only policy strategic
interactions between different countries, which justifies policies only
from the terms-of-trade effect and the environmental effect. By con-
trast, the imperfect competition in the RE equipment sector is central
to our analysis and there are potential strategic interactions at both
firm-level and government-level (e.g., when we analyse a Southern
R&D subsidy). Second, although biofuel is also an intermediate input
for a final consumption good – energy, it is another final consumption
good per se – food. Therefore, the biofuel output subsidy and import
tariff are both not only upstream but also downstream. However, the
RE-equipment output subsidy and import tariff are both upstream.
Third, all the three papers do not model the vulnerability of “renew-
able” energy to uncontrollable factors such as weather conditions. We
generally explicitly model the time-intermittency nature of renewable
electricity generation.
Our analysis of quantitative environmental targets is based on the
analytical framework in Requate (2015), as mentioned before. He
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demonstrates analytically that if the regulator only targets emissions,
then an overlapping RE share target is not desirable as it only makes
achieving the emissions target more expensive. Conversely, a tighter
emissions target automatically increases RE share target. Another
main finding is that a budget-balanced premium-based FIT and trad-
able green certificates2 are equally efficient in achieving the RE share
target or quota. A difference between his model and our model de-
veloped in Chapter 1 is that the marginal cost of fossil-fuel–based elec-
tricity is upward sloping. As pointed out by Fischer (2016, footnote 9),
this assumption is less relevant for countries with heavily regulated
electricity price, such as China. Nevertheless, this assumption implies
that the electricity price depends on the sum of fossil-fuel–based elec-
tricity and renewable electricity generation. So a lump-sum financed
FIT scheme promotes renewable electricity generation and dampens
electricity price, which results in less energy saving in the economy
and increases the cost of achieving the emissions target. Although the
conventional electricity sectors are perfectly competitive in both mod-
els, we assume that the marginal costs of generating fossil-fuel-based
electricity are constant. Hence, renewable electricity generation does
not affect the electricity price.3 Nimubona (2012) also presents some
analysis of the quantitative abatement standard when the South still
fully relies on EG imports produced by a Northern monopoly. He de-
rives analytically that EG trade liberalisation has an ambiguous effect
on EG consumption and thereby the environmental quality. Since he
examines conventional EG which directly abates pollution, quantitat-
ive abatement standard essentially fixes the EG consumption level. By
contrast, RE equipment indirectly reduces pollution by crowding out
the polluting conventional electricity – an emissions target does not
imply a fixed RE equipment installation level. Instead, as mentioned
previously, trade liberalisation in the RE equipment sector results in
cheaper renewable electricity generation which makes the emissions
target less binding. The environmental quality is non-decreasing in
the RE-equipment trade liberalisation. Fischer et al. (2016) is in-
terested in comparing upstream subsidies for technology firms and
downstream subsidies for polluting firms in a two-country model. As
in this paper, the downstream energy-using good such as electricity
is not tradable. This downstream sector has to comply with renew-
able energy share targets and purchase a renewable energy techno-
logy from imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers. One differ-
ence is that the downstream renewable energy sector in our model
2 In the presence of a tradable green certificates, utilities or private RE equipment
owners with excess renewable electricity to the required RE share is eligible to apply
for the certificates and sell to those who need the certificates to fulfill their required
RE share (Requate, 2015).
3 As mentioned in the conclusion in Chapter 1, we plan to check whether this differ-
ence in modelling technology in the conventional electricity sector alters our main
analytical results qualitatively or not.
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does not generate pollution, but instead indirectly reduces pollution.
They conclude that strategic subsidies chosen non-cooperatively can
be globally optimal if both countries internalise the pollution extern-
ality. Otherwise, reducing upstream subsidies is optimal. By contrast,
we show that the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies are not
equivalent when we study the Southern R&D subsidies.
The main contribution of this chapter lies in its comprehensive at-
tempts to assess some alternative existing policies in the RE equip-
ment sector, with emphasis on their interactions with other domestic
and foreign policies, as they are the building block for understanding
the net welfare and environmental effects.
First, the analysis of an R&D subsidy in this chapter responds to
the demand for exploring interesting but under-studied topics in this
emerging research area. For example, we explicitly address the im-
pact of trade liberalisation of EG on R&D incentives in the EG sector
in the relevant literature, albeit based on a very simple assumption
about the Southern process R&D (Nimubona, 2012, p. 339). We show
that lower levels of trade protection in the North induce a higher
Southern R&D subsidy which spurs more process R&D effort in the
South. Furthermore, the existing literature generally argues for the
under-subsidisation of RE equipment deployment due to pollution
and imperfect competition externalities, which both result in under-
provision of EG. Contrary to their claims, we demonstrate the pos-
sibility of strategic over-subsidisation of R&D in the RE equipment
sector when there is Cournot duopolistic competition with a foreign
firm. Moreover, to our knowledge, ours is among the seminal ana-
lytical examinations of the interaction between trade policy and do-
mestic quantitative environmental targets, such as an emissions target
or RE share quota, despite its simple nature.
Second, we hope to provide some preliminary policy recommend-
ations for national and global regulators who are interested in ad-
opting overlapping policy tools to support the RE equipment sector
when the desired policy instruments are ruled out for various prac-
tical reasons (e.g. political constraints). We also show the rationale
behind the anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations by
developed countries against NICs. The reverse impacts of Northern
trade and environmental policies on the Southern R&D subsidy are
attempted as well. Different sections in this chapter may also as-
sist the industry decision makers in the RE equipment sector and
renewable electricity suppliers (residential, commercial and utility-
scale alike) in various ways to be better informed of the interactions
of multiple environmental and trade policies, so as to make sounder
investment decisions.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 examines
the Southern R&D subsidy, Section 3.3 studies the Northern output
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subsidy, and Section 3.4 investigates the effect of trade protection on
the quantitative environmental targets. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 southern r&d subsidy for domestic equipment firm
In this section, we extend the model in Chapter 1 by allowing the
Southern government to intervene. The Southern government optim-
ally chooses an up-front and lump-sum Research-and-Development
(R&D) subsidy. We assume that the same functional form for the
Southern process R&D subsidy which reduces the Southern equip-
ment firm’s unit production cost according to: cSR −
(
sSR
)r, where
sSR ≥ 0 and r ∈ (0, 1) are the amount of subsidy and its degree of cost
reduction respectively. The assumption of r < 1 implies the existence
of diminishing returns to the R&D subsidy in unit cost reduction.
3.2.1 Southern monopoly
3.2.1.1 Supply of RE equipment
Given the Northern households’ demand as shown in (1.1), the South-
ern equipment firm’s profit maximisation problem is:
max
QSR,Q
N
R
ΠSR =
[
PSR
(
QSR, s
S
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r]
QSR
+
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN]QNR ,
where QSR and Q
N
R are the total equipment installation in the South
and North respectively.
The first-order conditions for profit maximisation of the Southern
equipment firm are:
ΠSRQNR =
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR
QNR + P
N
R
(
QNR , s
N
)
− τN − cSR +
(
sSR
)r
= 0,
ΠSRQSR =
∂PSR
(
QSR, s
S)
∂QSR
QSR + P
S
R
(
QSR, s
S
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r
= 0,
(3.1)
which solve for the optimal output levels in the South and North
respectively: QSR = Q
S
R
(
sS, sSR
)
and QNR = Q
N
R
(
sN , τN , sSR
)
. So its
output in the Northern market depends on both the Northern FIT
premium and import tariff, as well as the Southern R&D subsidy.
3.2.1.2 Non-cooperative Northern and Southern welfare maximisation
The Northern welfare maximisation problem has the same expres-
sion as in (1.3) except that the equilibrium equipment installation
and price depend on the Southern R&D subsidy, i.e. QNR =
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QNR
(
sN , τN , sSR
)
and PNR = P
N
R
(
QNR (.) , s
N). The Southern govern-
ment chooses an R&D subsidy sSR to maximise the domestic welfare
in the presence of a Southern monopoly:
max
sSR
WS = PSSR +
(
CSS0 + CS
S
E
)
− HS
=
[
PNR − cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN]QNR
+ L

dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + w + pFE
[
ε
(
QSR
L
)
− dLE
]
−
[
cSR −
(
sSR
)r]
QSR − νe
[
Q˜SE + Ld
L
E − Lε
(
QSR
L
)]
− sSR.
(3.2)
where QSR = Q
S
R
(
sS, sSR
)
.
3.2.1.3 Non-cooperative Southern R&D subsidy given exogenous North-
ern policies
The non-cooperative optimal Southern R&D subsidy sS∗R
(
sN , τN
)
is
set to maximise the Southern welfare. The first-order condition for
the Southern welfare maximisation under a Southern monopoly is:
dPNR
dsSR
QNR +
[
PNR − cSR +
(
sS∗R
)r − τN] dQNR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sS∗R
)r] dQSR
dsSR
+ r
(
sS∗R
)r−1 (
QNR + Q
S
R
)
+ νeε′
(
QSR
L
)
dQSR
dsSR
= 1.
(3.3)
The first term on the left-hand side is a negative price effect of the
Southern R&D subsidy, since it dampens the foreign price which re-
duces the domestic equipment firm’s profit, i.e. dP
N
R
dsSR
< 0 (see (C.2)).
This term reflects the spill-over of benefit in terms of cheaper equip-
ment to foreign households from domestic R&D investment which
the domestic regulator does not internalise. The second and third
terms on the left-hand side are the positive marginal export profit
effect and domestic efficiency effect of the Southern R&D subsidy re-
spectively. This is because the R&D subsidy promotes both Northern
and Southern installation levels, i.e. dQ
c
R
dsSR
> 0, c = N, S (see (C.1)).
Thus, its Northern profit rises and the under-provision of equipment
resulting from imperfect competition in the domestic market is alle-
viated. The fourth term on the left-hand side refers to its positive
unit-cost effect since it reduces the unit cost of the domestic equip-
ment firm and thereby increases its profits for any given installation
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levels in both markets. The fifth term on the left-hand side is its pos-
itive environmental effect as it promotes domestic installation. The
right-hand side is the marginal cost of the Southern R&D subsidy.
Proposition 3.1. In the presence of a Southern monopolistic firm in the RE
equipment sector, suppose r < 1 and εL (qR) = aqR − b2 qR2, a > 0, b > 0,
even if the marginal damage of pollution v is zero, (i) more generous North-
ern FIT premium increases Southern R&D subsidy, but a higher Southern
R&D subsidy is likely to reduce the Northern FIT premium if the latter is
not too high, i.e. ds
S∗
R
dsN > 0 and
dsN∗
dsSR
< 0 i f sN∗ ≤ (1+µχ)pFE2µ(1+χ) ; (ii) higher
Northern trade protection reduces the Southern R&D subsidy but a higher
Southern R&D subsidy increases Northern trade protection, i.e. ds
S∗
R
dτN < 0
and dτ
N∗
dsSR
> 0; (iii) a higher marginal damage of pollution does not affect
the impacts of Northern policies on the Southern optimal R&D subsidy but
it amplifies the impacts of Southern R&D subsidy on the Northern policies,
i.e. ddv
[
dsS∗R
dsN
]
= ddv
[
dsS∗R
dτN
]
= 0 and ddv
[
dsN∗
dsSR
]
< 0, ddv
[
dτN∗
dsSR
]
> 0; (iv)
the Northern import tariff and Northern FIT premium are complement-
ary towards a higher Southern R&D subsidy, i.e. ddτN
[
dsS∗R
dsN
]
> 0 and
d
dsN
[
dsS∗R
dτN
]
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.1 and Appendix C.2.1.
The intuition for the likely result of ∂s
N∗
∂sSR
< 0 in Proposition 3.1
(i) and ∂τ
N∗
∂sSR
> 0 in Proposition 3.1 (ii) are opposite to the effects of
the unit cost of Southern equipment on Northern policies under a
Southern monopoly, since the Southern unit cost is monotonically
decreasing in domestic R&D subsidy (See intuition in Chapter 2).
The intuition for ds
S∗
R
dsN > 0 in Proposition 3.1 (i) is as follows:
(1) A higher Northern FIT premium increases Northern installation
and exacerbates the negative price effect of the Southern R&D
subsidy.
(2) A higher Northern FIT premium increases Northern equilib-
rium equipment price, but reduces the price sensitivity of the
domestic household’s equipment demand, so it reduces the inst-
allation-promotion effect of the Southern R&D subsidy. That
is, although more generous Southern R&D subsidies result in
cheaper equipment for Northern households, they just respond
by installing more equipment by a less amount than the case
in which the Northern FIT premium is lower. Nevertheless,
overall, a higher Northern FIT premium always reinforces the
Northern marginal profit effect of the Southern R&D subsidy.
(3) A higher Northern FIT premium increases Northern installation
and reinforce the positive unit-cost effect of the Southern R&D
subsidy.
Overall, the net positive impact in point (2) is exactly cancelled out by
its negative impact in point (1), so the net impact of more generous
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Northern FIT subsidies on the welfare performance of Southern R&D
subsidy is positive. Consequently, a higher Northern FIT premium
always increases the optimal Southern R&D subsidy. Furthermore,
as shown in Proposition 3.1 (iv), a higher Northern import tariff rein-
forces this overall positive impact, because the former reinforces the
installation-promoting effect of Northern FIT premium in point (3)
(see Chapter 1 for intuition).
The intuition for ds
S∗
R
dτN < 0 in Proposition 3.1 (ii) is as follows:
(1) A higher Northern import tariff reduces Northern installation
and alleviates the negative price effect of the Southern R&D
subsidy.
(2) A higher Northern import tariff reduces the per-unit North-
ern profit of the Southern equipment firm because it raises the
Northern equilibrium equipment price less than the increase in
itself.
(3) A higher Northern import tariff reduces Northern installation
and reduces the positive unit-cost effect of the Southern R&D
subsidy.
Overall, the positive impact in point (1) is exactly cancelled out by
its negative impact in point (2), so the net impact of higher North-
ern trade protection on the welfare performance of Southern R&D
subsidy is negative. Consequently, a higher Northern import tariff
always reduces the optimal Southern R&D subsidy. However, as
shown in Proposition 3.1 (iv), a higher Northern FIT premium al-
leviates this overall negative impact since the former alleviates the
installation-dampening effect of the Northern import tariff in point
(3) (see Chapter 1 for intuition).
The reason for the null effects in Proposition 3.1 (iii) is that the
southern R&D subsidy only internalises the domestic pollution ex-
ternality. However, since the two markets are segmented, the North-
ern policies do not affect Southern equipment installation and thereby
the Southern environment. The intuition for the amplification ef-
fects in Proposition 3.1 (iii) is straightforward from the discussion
in Chapter 1.
3.2.1.4 Cooperative Southern R&D subsidy under a Southern monopoly
The cooperative Southern R&D subsidy maximises global welfare un-
der a Southern monopoly by choosing sSR:
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max
sSR|GO
(
WS +WN
)
= L
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + 2Lw + LpFE
[
ε
(
QSR
L
)
− dLE
]
+ Lµ
dHNE (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + L (1− µ)
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
+ LpFEε
(
QNR
L
)
− LpFE
[
µdHNE
(
sN
)
+ (1− µ) dLE
]
−
[
cSR −
(
sSR
∣∣∣GO)r]QSR − [cSR − (sSR)r]QNR
− νe[Q˜SE + Q˜NE + 2LdLE − 2Lε
(
QSR
L
)
− sSR
∣∣∣GO .
By summing up welfare in both countries, the cross-border trans-
fers, specifically, the Northern equipment purchasing cost and South-
ern equipment firm’s revenue are cancelled out; the Northern import
tariff revenue and the resulting Southern profit reduction are also can-
celled out. The first-order condition for the globally optimal Southern
R&D subsidy under a Southern monopoly denoted by sS∗R
∣∣GO is:
[
pFEε′
(
QNR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sS∗R
∣∣∣GO)r] dQNR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sS∗R
∣∣∣GO)r] dQSR
dsSR
+ r
(
sS∗R
∣∣∣GO)r−1 (QNR + QSR)
+ νe
[
ε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsSR
+ ε′
(
QSR
L
)
dQSR
dsSR
]
= 1. (3.4)
Comparing (3.4) and (3.3) yields the differences between the cooper-
ative and non-cooperative Southern optimal R&D subsidy as follows:
(1) The price effect under a non-cooperative strategy vanishes un-
der a cooperative strategy, which works towards sS∗R
∣∣GO > sS∗R .
(2) The Northern marginal profit effect under a non-cooperative
strategy changes to the Northern efficiency effect. More spe-
cifically, under a non-cooperative strategy, the South enjoys
the higher Northern equipment price induced by the North-
ern FIT premium without bearing the cost of providing the FIT
subsidies. However, under a cooperative strategy, the South
also internalises the Northern FIT revenue cost. Consequently,
under a cooperative strategy, the Northern equilibrium equip-
ment price falls to the level associated with zero FIT premium,
which works towards sS∗R
∣∣GO < sS∗R . However, the import tar-
iff vanishes under a cooperative strategy, which works towards
sS∗R
∣∣GO > sS∗R .
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(3) Since the South internalises the Northern pollution externality
now, there is a new Northern environmental effect under a co-
operative strategy which works towards sS∗R
∣∣GO > sS∗R .
Overall, as long as the Northern FIT premium is not excessively high,
there is under-provision of the Southern R&D subsidy under a non-
cooperative strategy relative to the cooperative strategy. We summar-
ise as follows:
Corollary 3.1. In the same context as Proposition 3.1, if the Northern FIT
premium is not excessively high such that Condition 4 holds, there is al-
ways under-provision of the Southern R&D subsidy in the non-cooperative
strategy relative to the cooperative strategy, i.e. sS∗R
∣∣GO > sS∗R .
Proof. See Appendix C.3.1.
3.2.2 Cournot duopoly
3.2.2.1 Supply of RE equipment
The profit maximisation problems for the Northern and Southern
equipment firms are respectively given by:
max
QNNR ,Q
NS
R
piNR =
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cNR
]
QNNR +
[
PSR
(
QSR, s
S
)
− cNR
]
QNSR
max
QSNR ,Q
SS
R
piSR =
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN]QSNR
+
[
PSR
(
QSR, s
S
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r]
QSSR .
The first-order conditions for profit maximisation of the Northern
equipment firm are:
piNR QNcR
= PcR (Q
c
R, s
c) +
∂PcR (Q
c
R, s
c)
∂QNcR
QNcR − cNR = 0, c = N, S, (3.5)
which solve for its output in country c: QNcR = Q
Nc
R (s
c). The first-
order conditions for profit maximisation of the Southern equipment
firm are:
piSRQSNR
= PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
+
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QSNR
QSNR − cSR +
(
sSR |C
)r − τN = 0,
piSRQSSR
= PSR
(
QSR, s
S
)
+
∂PSR
(
QSR, s
S)
∂QSSR
QSSR − cSR +
(
sSR |C
)r
= 0,
(3.6)
which solve for its output in the Northern and domestic markets re-
spectively: QSNR = Q
SN
R
(
sN , τN , sSR |C
)
and QSSR = Q
SS
R
(
sS, sSR |C
)
.
104 r&d subsidy, output subsidy and environmental targets
3.2.2.2 Northern and Southern welfare
The Northern welfare maximisation problem has the same expression
as (1.7), except that the equilibrium equipment installation and price
depend on the Southern R&D subsidy, i.e. QNR = Q
N
R
(
sN , τN , sSR
)
and
PNR = P
N
R
(
QNR , s
N) .
The South chooses sSR |C to maximise its welfare:
WS |C =
[
PNR − cSR + sSR |C
r − τN
]
QSNR
−
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r]
QSSR + L
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
+ Lw + LpFE
[
ε
(
QSR
L
)
− dLE
]
− PSRQNSR
− νe
[
Q˜SE + Ld
L
E − Lε
(
QSR
L
)]
− sSR |C .
(3.7)
3.2.2.3 Non-cooperative Southern R&D subsidy given exogenous North-
ern policies
The non-cooperative optimal Southern R&D subsidy sS∗R
(
sN , τN
) |C
is set to maximise Southern welfare. The first-order condition for the
Southern welfare maximisation under an international duopoly is:
dPNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QSNR −
dPSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QNSR
+
[
PNR |C − cSR +
(
sS∗R |C
)r − τN] dQSNR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR |C
L
)
− cSR +
(
sS∗R |C
)r] dQSSR
dsSR
+ r
(
sS∗R |C
)r−1 (
QSNR + Q
SS
R
)
+ νeε′
(
QSR |C
L
)
dQSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
= 1. (3.8)
The first and second terms on the left-hand side are a negative do-
mestic price effect and a positive foreign price effect of the Southern
R&D subsidy respectively since dP
c
R
dsSR
∣∣
C< 0 (see (C.4)). The explana-
tion is analogous to that under a Southern monopoly. The third and
fourth terms on the left-hand side are the positive marginal export
profit effect and domestic efficiency effect of the Southern R&D sub-
sidy respectively. This is because the R&D subsidy promotes both
Northern and Southern firms’ output in the North, i.e. dQ
cN
R
dsSR
∣∣
C> 0
(see (C.3)). All other terms have analogous explanation to that under
a Southern monopoly.
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Corollary 3.2. If the market structure in Proposition 3.1 changes to an
asymmetric Cournot duopoly in the RE equipment sector consisting of a
Northern firm and a Southern firm, then (i) a more generous Northern FIT
premium is likely to increase Southern R&D, but a higher Southern R&D
subsidy is likely to reduce the Northern FIT premium, i.e. ds
S∗
R
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 if and
only if 2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
> cNR and
∂sN∗
∂sSR
∣∣
C< 0 i f c
S
R < c¯
S
R; (ii) the
conclusions in Proposition 3.1 (ii)–(iv) still hold.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.2 and Appendix C.2.2.
Corollary 3.2 indicates that the pattern of policy interactions
between the Southern R&D subsidy and the Northern policies are
generally robust to the change of equipment market structure from
a Southern monopoly to an international duopoly. The major differ-
ence is that the positive impact of the Northern FIT premium on the
Southern R&D subsidy is no longer guaranteed in the duopoly case,
despite still likely to be positive (see intuition in Chapter 1).
Nevertheless, the non-cooperative R&D subsidy levels are likely to
be different across different equipment market structures, as shown
by the following corollary:
Corollary 3.3. In the same context as Corollary 3.2 the non-cooperative
Southern R&D subsidy under an international duopoly is likely to be less
than that under a Southern monopoly, i.e. sS∗R |C < sS∗R .
Proof. See Appendix C.3.2.
Comparing (3.8) and (3.3) yields the differences between the non-
cooperative Southern R&D subsidy under an international duopoly
and a Southern monopoly as follows. Since the Southern equipment
firm no longer dominates both markets:
(1) The negative price effect is partially absorbed by the Northern
competitor, so this effect is less severe, which works towards
sS∗R |C > sS∗R .
(2) The positive marginal Northern profit effect is weaker under a
duopoly which works towards sS∗R |C < sS∗R .
(3) The efficiency effect is weaker under a duopoly which works
towards sS∗R |C < sS∗R .
(4) The positive unit-cost effect is weaker under a duopoly which
also works towards sS∗R |C < sS∗R .
Overall, the South is likely to subsidise less under an international
duopoly.
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3.2.2.4 Cooperative Southern R&D subsidy
In this section, the Southern government chooses a cooperative South-
ern R&D subsidy sSR
∣∣GO
C to maximise global welfare under an inter-
national duopoly:
(
WS |C +WN |C
)
= Lµ
dHNE (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
+ L (1− µ)
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE + 2Lw
+ LpFE
[
ε
(
QNR |C
L
)
− µdHNE
(
sN
)
− (1− µ) dLE
]
+ L
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
+ LpFE
[
ε
(
QSR |C
L
)
− dLE
]
− νe
[(
Q˜NE |C + Q˜SE |C
)
+ 2LdLE
− L
(
ε
(
QNR |C
L
)
+ ε
(
QSR |C
L
))]
− cNR
(
QNNR + Q
NS
R
)
−
[
cSR −
(
sSR
)r] (
QSNR + Q
SS
R
)
− sSR.
The first-order condition for the globally optimal Southern R&D sub-
sidy under an international duopoly denoted by sS∗R
∣∣GO
C is:[
pFEε′
(
QNR |C
L
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣∣GOC )r] dQSNRdsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QNR |C
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR |C
L
)
− cSR +
(
sS∗R
∣∣∣GOC )r
]
dQSSR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR |C
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNSR
dsSR
+ r
(
sS∗R
∣∣∣GOC )r−1 (QSNR + QSSR )+ [pFEε′ (QNR |CL
)
− cNR
]
+ νe
[
ε′
(
QNR |C
L
)
dQNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
+ε′
(
QSR |C
L
)
dQSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= 1. (3.9)
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Comparing (3.9) with (3.8), the differences between the cooperat-
ive Southern R&D subsidy under an international duopoly and that
under a Southern monopoly are as follows:
(1) Since the Southern firm is more efficient and the Northern mar-
ket is larger than the Southern market due to more generous
FIT subsidies, we have QSNR > Q
NS
R . Thus, the negative price
effect is likely to become a net positive price effect under a co-
operative strategy which works towards sS∗R
∣∣GO
C > s
S∗
R |C .
(2) The marginal Northern profit effect changes to the Northern
efficiency effect, which works towards sS∗R
∣∣GO
C > s
S∗
R |C if the FIT
premium is not too large. The reason is similar to the discussion
point (2) in Section 3.2.1.4.
(3) Since R&D subsidy dampens Northern firm’s output in both
markets, there are additional negative efficiency effects associ-
ated with the Northern firm’s output in both markets, which
work towards sS∗R
∣∣GO
C < s
S∗
R |C .
(4) There is an additional positive Northern environmental effect
which works towards sS∗R
∣∣GO
C > s
S∗
R |C .
Overall, if the Northern FIT premium is not too low, the Northern im-
port tariff is low enough, and the environmental effect is not too high,
it is likely to see an over-provision of the Southern R&D subsidy in
the non-cooperative strategy relative to the cooperative strategy un-
der an international duopoly: sSR
∣∣GO
C < s
S∗
R |C . This relationship is
opposite to the likely under-provision of the Southern R&D subsidy
under a Southern monopoly. We summarise the above results in Co-
rollary 3.4 (i) below. (ii) follows from the results in Corollary 3.1,
Corollary 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 (i).
Corollary 3.4. In the same context as Corollary 3.3, then (i) an over-
provision of Southern R&D subsidy is likely to occur under a non-
cooperative strategy relative to cooperative strategy in the presence of an
international duopoly, i.e. sS∗R
∣∣GO
C < s
S∗
R |C ; (ii) the cooperative Southern
R&D subsidy under an international duopoly is likely to be lower than that
under a Southern monopoly, i.e. sS∗R
∣∣GO
C < s
S∗
R
∣∣GO .
Proof. See Appendix C.3.3.
To sum up the findings in Corollary 3.1, Corollary 3.3 and Corol-
lary 3.4, we have the following likely ranking of Southern R&D sub-
sidy levels across different scenarios:
sSR
∣∣∣GOC < sS∗R |C < sS∗R < sSR ∣∣∣GO .
The likely under-provision in the Southern monopoly case and the
likely over-provision in the international duopoly case imply that in
the presence of fixed Northern policies, the environment in both coun-
tries is likely to be under-protected in the Southern monopoly case but
it is likely to be over-protected in the international duopoly case.
108 r&d subsidy, output subsidy and environmental targets
3.3 northern output subsidy for domestic equipment
firm
This section examines a Northern output subsidy and its interac-
tion with the other two Northern policies. Unlike the Northern
FIT premium and import tariff, an output subsidy is generally only
provided when there exists a domestic equipment firm. So the South-
ern monopoly case is not relevant in this section.
3.3.1 Supply of RE equipment
The first-order condition for Northern equipment producer’s choice
of output in the domestic market is:
ΠNR QNNR
(
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
, QNNR
)
=
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR
QNNR
+ PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
+ σN − cNR = 0.
(3.10)
Given the Northern households’ demand shown by (1.1), we have:
ΠNR QNNR = β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNNR + β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ σN − cNR
= 0.
(3.11)
The first-order condition for Southern equipment producer’s choice
of output in the domestic market is:
ΠSRQSNR =
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR
QSNR + P
N
R
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR = 0. (3.12)
Given (1.1), we have:
ΠSRQSNR = β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QSNR + β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cSR = 0.
(3.13)
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3.3.2 Northern and Southern welfare
The North can potentially choose a FIT premium sN , an import tariff
τN or an output subsidy σN for the RE equipment sector to maximise
Northern welfare:
WN |C =
(
PNR − cNR + σN
)
QNNR +
(
PSR − cNR + σN
)
QNSR
+ L
{
w + pFE
[
ε
(
QNR
L
)
− µdHNE
(
sN
)
− (1− µ) dLE
]
− PNR
QNR
L
+ µ
dHNE (sN)∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
+ (1− µ)
dLE∫
0
pE (qE) dqE
}
− σN
(
QNNR + Q
NS
R
)
+ τNQSNR
− νe
[
Q˜NE + Ld
L
E − Lε
(
QNR
L
)]
.
(3.14)
Southern welfare is shown in (3.7).
3.3.3 Optimal Northern policies and interactions
Optimal Northern output subsidy is determined by:
WNσN |C = −QSNR
dPNR |C
dσN
+ τN
dQSNR
dσN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dσN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR |C
dσN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR |C
dσN
= 0.
(3.15)
The first term on the left-hand side is a positive price effect of the
Northern output subsidy, since it dampens domestic equipment price
and reduces the rent shifting to the foreign competitor. This effect
contrasts with the negative price effect of a domestic FIT premium.
The second term on the left-hand side is a negative tariff revenue
effect. This effect contrasts with the likely positive tariff revenue of
a domestic FIT premium. The third term on the left-hand side is a
positive efficiency effect as it promotes the domestic firm’s output in
the North, which partially corrects the under-provision of equipment.
This effect is similar to the likely positive efficiency effect of a do-
mestic FIT premium. The fourth term on the left-hand side refers to
a negative FIT cost effect since it promotes domestic installation and
increases the FIT revenue cost. This effect contrasts with the posit-
ive FIT cost effect of a domestic import tariff. The last term on the
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left-hand side corresponds to a positive environmental effect due to
the output subsidy’s domestic installation-promoting effect, which is
similar to that of a domestic FIT premium, but it is opposite to that
of a domestic import tariff.
The optimal Northern FIT premium and import tariff have the
same expression as in (1.8) and (1.9) respectively, except that the
equipment outputs and price in the North also depend on the North-
ern output subsidy, as shown in Section 3.3.2.
Proposition 3.2. In the same context as Corollary 3.3, if the marginal dam-
age of pollution is zero, then (i) there is an ambiguous relationship between
a domestic output subsidy and a domestic FIT premium; (ii) the Northern
policy substitutability between a domestic output subsidy and a domestic
import tariff always holds, i.e. dσ
N∗
dτN
∣∣∣
C
< 0 and dτ
N∗
dσN
∣∣∣
C
< 0; (iii) a higher
marginal damage of pollution reinforces the policy substitutability in (i) but
counteracts the policy substitutability in (ii) since ddν
[
WNsNσN
]
> 0 and
d
dν
[
WNτNσN
]
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.4 and Appendix C.5.
The intuition for dσ
N∗
dsN
∣∣
C< 0 in (i) is as follows:
(1) A higher Northern FIT premium is likely to promote imports
which reinforces the positive price effect of the Northern output
subsidy.
(2) A higher Northern FIT premium reduces the import-dampening
effect of the Northern output subsidy, thereby alleviating the
negative tariff revenue effect of the latter.
(3) A higher Northern FIT premium raises domestic equipment
price, but reduces the quantity-promoting effect of the Northern
output subsidy on the domestic firm’s domestic output. Never-
theless, the net impact on the efficiency effect of domestic out-
put subsidy is likely to be positive.
(4) A higher Northern FIT premium directly increases per-unit FIT
revenue cost and exacerbates the negative FIT cost effect of
the domestic output subsidy. However, there are another two
indirect opposite impacts which alleviates the latter: first, it
increases Northern installation and reduces the marginal pro-
ductivity of renewable electricity generation; second, it reduces
the installation-promoting effect of the Northern output subsidy
on total Northern installation. Nevertheless, the direct exacer-
bation is likely to outweigh the two indirect alleviation impacts.
(5) Due to the two indirect impacts in (4), more generous Northern
FIT subsidies are likely to weaken the positive environmental
effect of domestic output subsidy.
Overall, the sum of impacts in points (1) and (3) is always positive,
which is independent of the Southern unit cost and Northern import
tariff. The positive sum of impacts in points (1), (2) and (3) is may be
dominated by the likely negative impact in point (4) , which is further
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counteracted by the likely negative impact in point (5) (the impact in
point (5) is negative if the impact in point (4) is negative). So the over
policy relationship is ambiguous.
The intuition for ds
N∗
dσN
∣∣
C< 0 in (i) is as follows:
(1) A higher Northern output subsidy dampens imports and allevi-
ates the negative price effect of a domestic FIT premium.
(2) A higher Northern output subsidy promotes the likely import-
promoting effect of a domestic FIT premium and thereby rein-
forces the likely positive tariff revenue effect of the latter.
(3) A higher Northern output subsidy reduces the domestic equip-
ment price but reinforces the likely positive quantity-promoting
effect of Northern FIT premium on the domestic firm’s output
in the North.
(4) A higher Northern output subsidy promotes installation
and reduces the marginal productivity of renewable elec-
tricity generation. It also reduces the likely positive
installation-promoting effect (or exacerbates the unlikely neg-
ative installation-dampening effect) of the FIT premium. Both
impacts alleviate the deadweight loss of domestic FIT premium
associated with over-supply.
(5) Due to the same reasons in (4) above, the Northern output
subsidy weakens the likely positive environmental effect of do-
mestic FIT premium.
The explanation for the overall impact is the same as that of dσ
N∗
dsN
∣∣
C in
the previous paragraph, according to Young’s theorem.
The intuition for dσ
N∗
dτN
∣∣
C< 0 in (ii) is as follows:
(1) A higher Northern trade barrier dampens imports which re-
duces the positive price effect of the Northern output subsidy.
(2) A higher Northern import tariff exacerbates the negative tariff
revenue effect of the Northern output subsidy.
(3) A higher Northern import tariff raises domestic equipment
price and thereby reinforces the efficiency effect of the North-
ern output subsidy.
(4) A higher Northern import tariff reduces domestic installation
and increases the marginal productivity of renewable electricity
generation, which exacerbates the negative FIT cost effect of the
Northern output subsidy.
(5) Due to the same reason in point (4), a higher Northern import
tariff reinforces the environmental effect of the Northern output
subsidy.
Overall, the impacts in points (1) and (3) are cancelled out, so without
environmental harm, a higher Northern import tariff always reduces
the domestic output subsidy. However, a higher marginal damage
of pollution counteracts this negative policy interaction. In the ex-
treme case, excessively high environmental harm results in the sur-
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prising policy complementarity between a Northern import tariff and
a Northern output subsidy.
The intuition for dτ
N∗
dσN
∣∣
C< 0 in (ii) is as follows:
(1) A higher Northern output subsidy dampens imports which
weakens the positive terms-of-trade effect of a Northern import
tariff.
(2) A higher Northern output subsidy has no effect on the dead-
weight loss of the Northern import tariff.
(3) A higher Northern output subsidy reduces the domestic equip-
ment price and thereby weakens the positive efficiency effect of
the Northern import tariff.
(4) A higher Northern output subsidy promotes domestic installa-
tion and reduces the marginal productivity of renewable elec-
tricity generation, which weakens the positive FIT cost effect of
the Northern import tariff.
(5) Due to the same reason in point (4), a higher Northern out-
put subsidy alleviates the negative environmental effect of the
Northern import tariff.
The explanation for the overall impact is the same as that of dσ
N∗
dτN
∣∣
C in
the previous paragraph, according to Young’s theorem.
3.4 quantitative environmental targets
This section explores how an exogenous Northern import tariff affects
the domestic environmental policies, if the Northern government tar-
gets the pollution level or RE share instead of the overall welfare as a
sum of domestic economic welfare net of environmental harm. Max-
imising social welfare may not be the only metric, despite its useful-
ness (Fischer and Newell, 2008). This section aims to further examine
the theme of this thesis, i.e., the interaction between trade and en-
vironmental policies in RE equipment trade when the government’s
objective is pollution control. Essentially, we introduce an exogenous
Northern import tariff to a simplified version of the framework in Re-
quate (2015). To facilitate clear comparison, we follow the framework
of Requate (2015) by changing our previous residential renewable
electricity generation to centralised (or utility-scale) renewable elec-
tricity generation. We also simplify it by not distinguishing between
the base-load (typically coal-fired) and peak-load (typically natural
gas) fossil-fuel–based electricity generation. So we only consider two
types of perfectly substitutable electricity – fossil-fuel–generated and
renewable electricity, as in our previous setting. As in Requate (2015),
the electricity market is perfectly competitive. There are i = 1, ..., I
fossil-fuel–based electricity producers and j = 1, ..., J renewable elec-
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tricity producers. As in Requate (2015), conventional electricity gen-
eration exhibits increasing marginal costs of production:
(CiFE)
′
(
qiFE
)
> 0, (CiFE)
′′
(
qiFE
)
> 0,
where CiFE
(
qiFE
)
and qiFE are the total production cost and output of
fossil-fuel-based electricity producer i. In this extension work, we
add an international trade component by considering that renewable
electricity producers import all RE equipment from a foreign mono-
poly. As in our previous setting, there is only the purchasing cost
of RE equipment without any subsequent maintenance costs. Con-
sequently, increasing marginal cost of renewable electricity genera-
tion is only due to decreasing marginal productivity of RE equipment
in renewable electricity generation. Let qjRE and q
j
R denote the quant-
ity of renewable electricity generation and RE equipment installation
of the renewable electricity producer j respectively. We simplify the
renewable generation function by not distinguishing the good and
bad generating time:
qjRE = ε
(
qjR
)
, ε′
(
qjR
)
> 0, ε′′
(
qjR
)
< 0.
Let the price of RE equipment be PR. Thus, the cost function for
a renewable electricity producer j to produce qjRE units of output is
CjRE
(
qjRE
)
= PRq
j
R, with:
(CjRE)
′
(
qjRE
)
= PR · d
dqjRE
[
ε−1
(
qjRE
)]
> 0,
(CjRE)
′′
(
qjRE
)
= PR · d
2(
dqjRE
)2 [ε−1 (qjRE)] > 0.
As before, the emission is assumed to be proportional to the output
of fossil-fuel-generated electricity, except that the constant emission
coefficient is now producer-specific, which is denoted by ei for produ-
cer i.
3.4.1 Emissions target
3.4.1.1 Social optimum
If emissions reduction is the single target of the government, a bene-
volent domestic social planner maximises domestic welfare:
max W
qiFE,q
j
R
=
QE∫
0
PE (QE) dQE + τ
J
∑
j=1
qjR
−
I
∑
i=1
CiFE
(
qiFE
)
−
J
∑
j=1
PR
(
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
)
, τ
)
· qjR
(3.16)
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subject to the emissions constraint:
ei
I
∑
i=1
qiFE ≤ E,
where PE and QE =
I
∑
i=1
qiFE +
J
∑
j=1
qjRE =
I
∑
i=1
qiFE +
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
)
are the
price and total output of electricity in the country respectively, τ is
the import tariff on the renewable energy equipment imports, and E
is the emissions target.
Kuhn-tucker conditions for fossil-fuel-based electricity producers:
PE (QE)− (CiFE)′
(
qiFE
)
− λei ≤ 0,[
PE (QE)− (CiFE)′
(
qiFE
)
− λei
]
qiFE = 0,
where λ is the associated Lagrange multiplier. and for renewable
electricity producers (they do not receive the import tariff revenue)
we have:
PE (QE) εj
′ (
qjR
)
− PR ≤ 0,[
PE (QE) εj
′ (
qjR
)
− PR
]
qjR = 0.
Optimal allocation requires that the equal marginal cost principle
holds:
PE (QE) = (CiFE)
′
(
qiFE
)
= (CkFE)
′
(
qkFE
)
.
In addition, as in Requate (2015), at the social optimum, fossil-fuel-
based electricity producers i and k which produce positive quantities
have the same marginal abatement costs, which refers to the marginal
reduction of profit due to tighten of the emissions target:
PE (QE)− (CiFE)′
(
qiFE
)
ei
=
PE (QE)− (CkFE)′
(
qkFE
)
ek
= λ.
Thus, λ can be interpreted as the optimal shadow price of pollu-
tion. To better interpret this equality, note that the possible meas-
urement units for the numerator and denominator on the right-hand
side are $/kWh and kg CO2/kWh, referring to the unit profit and
producer-specific emission coefficient respectively. So the possible
measurement unit for the common marginal abatement cost is $/ kg
CO2, indicating the common profit loss associated with one unit of
emission reduction to meet the emissions target most efficiently.
Socially optimal allocation is characterised by the following system
of equations:4
PE (QE)− (CFE)′ (QFE)− λe = 0, (3.17)
4 Following Requate (2015), we drop the superscripts of producers when considering
the aggregate model.
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PE (QE) ε′ (QR)− PR = 0, (3.18)
eQFE = E¯, (3.19)
where QR =
J
∑
j=1
qjR and QFE =
I
∑
i=1
qiFE are the total RE equipment
installation and fossilfuelgenerated electricity in the country respect-
ively.
Given the demand from domestic renewable electricity producers
as shown in (3.18), the foreign RE equipment producer’s monopoly
profit is given by
ΠFR =
[
PR (QR)− cFR − τ
]
QR,
where PR (QR) = PE (QE) ε′ (QR) and cFR is the unit cost of production
of the foreign RE equipment producer.
First-order condition:
ΠFRQR = PR (QR) + PR
′ (QR)QR − cFR − τ
= PE (QE)
[
ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR
]− cFR − τ
= 0.
(3.20)
Proposition 3.3. Given a binding emissions target and an interior solution
for all goods, we have dQFEdτ = 0,
dQRE
dτ < 0,
dλ
dτ > 0,
dQR
dτ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.6.1.
As expected, a higher domestic import tariff has no impact on
the production of conventional electricity since the emissions target
is binding. In addition, it increases the domestic equipment price,
dampens RE equipment installation and thereby dampens renewable
electricity generation. Consequently, a higher domestic trade barrier
increases the optimal shadow price of pollution as it is more costly to
achieve the emissions target.
3.4.1.2 Decentralisation by emission taxes or tradable permits
In the presence of a perfectly competitive electricity market, the social
optimum can be decentralised by an optimal emissions tax at the
same level as the optimal shadow price of pollution λ, or a cap-and-
trade system with an equilibrium price of optimal tradable permits
equal to λ as well. Thus, a higher import tariff increases the optimal
emissions tax or the equilibrium price of optimal tradable permits in
a decentralised economy.
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3.4.2 Renewable energy share (or quota or portfolio standard)
In this section, we alternatively assume that domestic social planner’s
objective is a particular share (quota) of renewable energy α :
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
)
I
∑
i=1
qiFE +
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
) ≥ α.
3.4.2.1 The constrained social optimum
Kuhn-tucker conditions for price-taking fossil-fuel-based electricity
producers:
PE (QE)− (CiFE)′
(
qiFE
)
− υα ≤ 0,[
PE (QE)− (CiFE)′
(
qiFE
)
− υα
]
qiFE = 0,
and for price-taking renewable electricity producers:
[PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] ε′
(
qjR
)
− PR ≤ 0,{
[PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] ε′
(
qjR
)
− PR
}
qjR = 0,
where υ is the associated Lagrange multiplier. The equal marginal
cost principle for renewable electricity producers which produce pos-
itive quantities is
PR = [PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] εj
(
qjR
)
= [PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] εj
(
qjR
)
⇔ PR (.)
(
εj
)−1 (
qjRE
)
= PR (.)
(
εk
)−1 (
qkRE
)
= PE (QE)+ υ (1− α) .
The constrained social optimum (aggregate model) is:
PE (QE)− (CFE)′ (QFE)− υα = 0, (3.21)
[PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] ε′ (QR)− PR = 0, (3.22)
(1− α) ε (QR) = αQFE, (3.23)
where υ can be interpreted as a higher common factor of marginal
abatement cost.
Proposition 3.4. Given a binding renewable energy share and an interior
solution for all goods, we have: dQFEdτ < 0,
dQRE
dτ < 0,
dυ
dτ > 0,
dQR
dτ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.6.2.
If the government targets the RE share instead of a fixed pollution
level, as expected, a higher domestic import tariff always increases the
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domestic equipment price, dampens RE equipment installation and
thereby dampens renewable electricity generation. Consequently, a
higher trade barrier increases the optimal shadow price of pollution.
However, interestingly and surprisingly, a higher domestic trade bar-
rier reduces the fossil-fuel-generated electricity as well. The intuition
is that higher domestic trade protection makes RE equipment more
expensive. More costly renewable electricity generation increase the
difficulty of meeting the RE share target, which is reflected by a
higher common factor of marginal abatement cost υ for both types
of electricity induced by a higher import tariff. To achieve the target,
reducing conventional electricity becomes more efficient relative to
increasing the renewable electricity generation at the margin.
3.4.2.2 Decentralisation by tradable green certificates
Fossil-fuel-based electricity producer i has to buy green certificates of
the amount zi to meet the renewable energy share target:
zi
qiFE + zi
≥ α.
So firm i faces the following optimisation problem:
Li = PE (QE) qiFE − CiFE
(
qiFE
)
− ρzi + υi
[
(1− α) zi − αqiFE
]
,
where ρ is the market price for tradable green certificates, and υi is
the Lagrange multiplier w.r.t. the renewable energy share target. The
renewable electricity producer j’ profit is:
pi
j
RE
(
qjR
)
= PE (QE) εj
(
qjR
)
+ ρzj − PRqjR
= [PE (QE) + ρ] εj
(
qjR
)
− PRqjR,
where the second equality is because the number of green certificates
created by renewable electricity producer j equals to its output: zj =
εj
(
qjR
)
.
First-order conditions for fossil-fuel-based electricity producers:
LiqiFE = PE −
(
CiFE
)′ (
qiFE
)
− υiα = 0,
Lizi = −ρ+ υi (1− α) = 0.
(3.24)
Thus, all fossil-fuel-based electricity producers have the same mar-
ginal abatement costs (shadow cost of meeting the quota): υi = υk =
ρ
1−α .
First-order conditions for renewable electricity producers:
pi
j
REqjR
= [PE (QE) + ρ] εj
′ (
qjR
)
− PR = 0.
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The equilibrium is determined by:
PE −
(
CiFE
)′ (
qiFE
)
− ρ α
1− α = 0,
[PE (QE) + ρ] εj
′ (
qjR
)
− PR = 0,
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
)
=
I
∑
i=1
zi.
From (3.24), the second-best price of tradable green certificates is ρ∗ =
υ∗ (1− α) . Thus, the import tariff increases the second-best price of
tradable green certificates:
dρ∗
dτ
= (1− α) dυ
∗
dτ
> 0.
3.4.2.3 Decentralisation by a budget balanced premium system or a budget
balanced FIT
We denote ξ and t as the premium and mark-up on the fossil-fuel-
based electricity producers’ cost respectively. The fossil-fuel-based
electricity producer i’s profit is:
piiFE
(
qiFE
)
= [PE (QE)− t] qiFE − CiFE
(
qiFE
)
,
First-order condition for profit maximisation of fossil-fuel-based elec-
tricity producer i is:
piiFEqiFE
= PE (QE)− t−
(
CiFE
)′ (
qiFE
)
= 0.
The renewable electricity producer j’s profit is:
pi
j
RE
(
qjR
)
= [PE (QE) + ξ] εj
(
qjR
)
− PRqjR.
First-order condition for profit maximisation of renewable electricity
producer j is:
pi
j
REqjR
= [PE (QE) + ξ] εj
′ (
qjR
)
− PR = 0.
The second-best emission tax and FIT premium are t∗ = υ∗α and
ξ∗ = υ∗ (1− α) respectively. A balanced budget requires:
t
I
∑
i=1
qiFE = ξ
J
∑
j=1
εj
′ (
qjR
)
⇔ υ∗α
I
∑
i=1
qiFE = υ
∗ (1− α)
J
∑
j=1
εj
′ (
qjR
)
⇔
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
)
I
∑
i=1
qiFE +
J
∑
j=1
εj
(
qjR
) = α.
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Under certainty, given that t∗ = υ∗α and ξ∗ = υ∗ (1− α) , and equi-
librium electricity price PE∗, the equivalent second best FIT is ς∗ =
PE∗ + ξ∗. Thus, the domestic import tariff increases the second-best
emission tax, budget-balanced FIT premium and budget-balanced
FIT:
dt∗
dτ
= α
dυ∗
dτ
> 0,
dξ∗
dτ
= (1− α) dυ
∗
dτ
> 0,
dς
dτ
=
dPE∗
dτ
+ (1− α) dυ
∗
dτ
> 0.
3.5 conclusion
Multiple trade and environmental policies in the renewable energy
sector are commonly observed in many countries and regions. Reg-
ulators often face various practical constraints and have some partic-
ular market or non-market targets. This chapter provides analytical
analysis of some other environmental policies that are commonly ad-
opted in the renewable energy equipment sector in different countries
and regions at present. We initially assess their welfare and envir-
onmental impacts, based on our stress on how these policies inter-
act with a Northern feed-in tariff (FIT) premium and/or a Northern
import tariff studied in Chapter 1. By exploring a wider choice of
policy tools, we are able to provide a more comprehensive as well
as deeper understanding of the welfare and environmental effects of
trade and environmental policies in the context of North–South trade
in RE equipment.
Our first attempt at incorporating a Southern research and devel-
opment (R&D) subsidy allows us to derive some novel insights, due
to strategic interactions at both the firm and government levels in
this bilateral policy setting. The Cournot duopolistic imperfect com-
petition is central to the policy game. One of our main conclusions
is that a lower trade barrier unsurprisingly induces a higher foreign
process R&D subsidy, which reduces the foreign production cost of
RE equipment. This finding offers a preliminary answer to the ques-
tion of assessing the impact of trade liberalisation in environmental
goods on R&D incentives (Nimubona, 2012, p. 339). Conversely, a
higher Southern R&D subsidy indeed leads to a higher Northern
import tariff, which is consistent with the recent anti-dumping and
countervailing duty imposed by developed countries against newly
industrialised countries. We also identify that the Southern R&D
subsidy under a non-cooperative strategy is surprisingly more than
that under a cooperative strategy in the case of a Cournot duopoly,
but unsurprisingly less than the latter in the case of Southern mono-
poly. Consequently, taking Northern policies as given, there is too
little environmental protection in the monopoly case but too much
120 r&d subsidy, output subsidy and environmental targets
environmental protection in the duopoly case. This finding contrasts
with the existing literature which generally argues for the existence
of under-subsidisation of environmental goods when both pollution
and imperfect competition externalities are present, which both lead
to under-supply of environmental goods.
Our next assessment of a Northern output (or production) sub-
sidy demonstrates its ambiguous relationship with a domestic FIT
premium, and its guaranteed substitutability with a domestic import
tariff when there is no environmental harm. Higher environmental
harm increases the possibility of substitutability of the former am-
biguous relationship, but counteracts rather than necessitates the lat-
ter substitutability. The former relationship is particularly relevant
for a country with overlapping upstream and downstream environ-
mental policies, to promote the RE equipment sector.
Our final investigation sheds light on the welfare and environ-
mental impacts of trade protection in the presence of a binding
non-market environmental target rather than the previously uncon-
strained welfare maximisation. As a first step, we limit our atten-
tion to the case in which the domestic country fully relies on for-
eign RE equipment imports. We find that trade protection against
foreign RE equipment imports leaves emissions unchanged as expec-
ted, but surprisingly reduces emissions when an RE share target is
in place instead. The latter result is because when an import tariff
leads to more expensive RE equipment deployment, so at the margin,
reducing conventional electricity becomes more efficient relative to
increasing the renewable electricity generation. As far as we know,
despite its elementary nature, this assessment is one of the seminal
works that theoretically examines the interaction between domestic
trade policy and quantitative environmental targets. We also provide
implications if the electricity market is decentralised. For example,
a higher trade barrier results in higher optimal emissions taxes or
more expensive optimal tradable permits. The reason is that when
renewable electricity generation is more costly, due to a higher im-
port tariff, polluting conventional electricity becomes relatively more
competitive and its output would rise if emissions are still priced at
the initial level. Hence, a higher emissions price has to be imposed
so as to keep emissions below the targeted level.
Overall, this chapter can at least provide some preliminary policy
recommendations for national and global regulators who try to
design better single or multiple RE policies. We also hope to facilitate
the work of industry decision makers in the RE equipment sector and
renewable electricity suppliers alike, to assist them to make better and
more informed investment decisions with a further understanding of
policy interactions and their effects.
The major limitation of this chapter is that we rely on comparative
statics analysis with a specific functional form (quadratic) of renew-
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able electricity generation. Therefore, in the next stage, we would
like to undertake a standard comparative statics analysis as we did
in Chapter 1, so as to study the net environmental impacts of these
alternative policies. In the future, it would be interesting to explore
innovation in RE equipment sector in more detail, such as model-
ling R&D spillovers, the demand-creating product R&D as well as
learning-by-doing and economies of scale. Another direction is to ex-
amine the net effect of trade protection on an endogenous emissions
target. On the one hand, according to this chapter, a higher import
tariff makes the target harder to meet, so it is likely to result in a
less ambitious emissions target. On the other hand, if the emissions
target is endogenously set to be increasing in the domestic welfare
or GDP (i.e. an intensity emissions target, see e.g., Jotzo and Pezzey,
2007; de Vries et al., 2014 for details), since the domestic welfare is
hump-shaped in the domestic import tariff, it is likely that we will
see an additional non-monotonic effect of the import tariff on the en-
dogenous emissions target via its non-monotonic welfare effect. We
also plan to verify whether the interaction between trade policies and
quantitative environmental targets respond differently to some altern-
ative market structures, such as an international oligopoly. Empirical
testing is another important future research direction.

A
A P P E N D I X F O R C H A P T E R 1
a.1 comparative-static analysis for a representative
northern household
Differentiating (1.1) w.r.t. sN yields:
β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
dPNR =0
+β′
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
= 0,
which solves for:
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
dPNR =0
= −
Lβ′
(
sN
)
εL
′ (QNR
L
)
β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) > 0. (A.1)
a.2 southern monopoly
a.2.1 Optimal Northern FIT premium
a.2.1.1 Comparative-Static Analysis for the equipment sector
Marginal effect of a Northern FIT premium on equilibrium Northern equip-
ment installation
Differentiating (1.2) w.r.t. sN and together with the assumption
εL
′′′ (QNR
L
)
= 0 (as mentioned in footnote 15, this assumption is also
adopted in Nimubona (2012), and it will be applied throughout the
Appendix), we have:
∂2PNR
∂QNR ∂sN
QNR + 2
∂PNR
∂QNR
dQNR
dsN
+
∂PNR
∂sN
= 0,
which solves for:
dQNR
dsN
=
β′
(
sN
) [
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
QNR
]
−2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
=
β′
(
sN
)
L
(
cSR + τ
N)
−2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) > 0, (A.2)
where the sign follows from the assumption that the equipment firm
always has positive marginal revenue at equilibrium:
MRNR = β
(
sN
) [
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
> 0.
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Marginal effect of a Northern FIT premium on equilibrium Northern equip-
ment price
Totally differentiating PNR
(
QNR , s
N) w.r.t. sN yields:
dPNR
(
QNR , s
N)
dsN
=
∂PNR
∂QNR
dQNR
dsN
+
∂PNR
∂sN
=
β′
(
sN
)
2
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
> 0.
(A.3)
The second-order effect of a Northern FIT premium on total equip-
ment output is given by:
d2QNR
dsN2
=
[
β′
(
sN
)]2 [LεL ′ (QNRL )+ εL ′′ (QNRL )QNR ]
2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
= −β
′ (sN)
β (sN)
dQNR
dsN
< 0.
a.2.1.2 Optimal Northern FIT premium under a Southern monopoly
The first-order condition for an optimal Northern FIT premium is:
WNsN = −QNR
dPNR
dsN
+ τN
dQNR
dsN
− LµsN∗
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
= 0,
(A.4)
which solves for the optimal Northern FIT premium as given by (1.4).
a.2.1.3 Effects of an exogenous change in import tariff under a Southern
monopoly
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.2) w.r.t. τN yield: ΠSRQNR sN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsNsN WNsN QNR
 [ dsNdτN
dQNR
dτN
]
=
 ΠSRQNR τN
WNsNτN
 ,
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where1
ΠSRQNR sN = β
′
(
sN
) [
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
> 0,
ΠSRQNR QNR = 2β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
< 0,
ΠSRQNR τN = 1 > 0,
WNsNτN = −
dQNR
dsN
< 0,
WNsNsN = τ
N d
2QNR
dsN2
− µL
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
−
[
µsNεH
′
(
QNR
L
)
− νeε′
(
QNR
L
)]
d2QNR
dsN2
=
β′
(
sN
)2
−2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) [− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL ′ (QNRL
)
−τN
]
×
[
LεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
QNR
]
+ µL
ddHNE
dsN
< 0,
WNsN QNR = −
dPNR
dsN
+ τN
d2QNR
dsNdQNR
−
[
µsN (1+ χ)− (1+ µχ) νe
]
×
[
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
+ εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
d2QNR
dsNdQNR
]
=
β′
(
sN
)
β (sN)
{[
µ (1+ χ) sN − 1
2
(1+ µχ) pFE
− (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+
[
µ (1+ χ) sN +
1
2
(1+ µχ) pFE
]
× εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
− 1
2
(1+ µχ) νe
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− τN
}
< 0 i f sN ≤ 1+ µχ
2µ (1+ χ)
(pFE + 2νe) ,
which follows from d
2PNR
dsNdQNR
= 0 and d
2QNR
dsNdQNR
=
β′(sN)
−β(sN) < 0.
1 For all subsequent comparative statics, we follow the notation in Appendix D in
Nimubona (2012) to omit the negative signs of the terms when they appear on the
right hand side.
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The determinant of the Hessian matrix is:
HS =
β′
(
sN
)2 [
εL
′ (QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L Q
N
R
]
β (sN)
×
{[
µ (1+ χ) sN − 3
2
(1+ µχ) pFE − 2 (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+
[
µ (1+ χ) sN +
1
2
(1+ µχ) pFE
]
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
−1
2
(1+ µχ) νe
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− 2τN
}
− 2µβ
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
ddHNE
dsN
.
A sufficient condition for HS < 0 is sN∗ ≤ (1+µχ)(3pFE+4νe)2µ(1+χ) , which is
independent of the unit cost of equipment.
Cramer’s rule implies that:
dsN
dτN
=
ST
HS
,
dQNR
dτN
=
QT
HS
,
dPNR
dτN
=
PT
HS
, (A.5)
where
ST =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR τ
N
WNsNτN
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
β′
(
sN
)
β (sN)
{
−1
2
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
×
[
3εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− τN
}
< 0,
QT =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR s
N ΠSRQNR τN
WNsNsN WNsNτN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −
β′
(
sN
)2 [LεL ′ (QNRL )+ εL ′′ (QNRL )QNR ]
2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
×
{
−
[
µ (1+ χ) sN − (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR + τ
N
}
− µL dd
HN
E
dsN
T 0.
Thus, we have ds
N∗
dτN > 0 if s
N∗ ≤ (1+µχ)(3pFE+4νe)2µ(1+χ) , and
dQNR
dτN < 0 if
sN∗ ≤ (1+µχ)νe
µ(1+χ) . From (1.2), the effect of an exogenous change in the
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Northern import tariff on the domestic equilibrium equipment price
is:
dPNR
dτN
= − ∂
2PNR
∂QNR ∂sN
dsN
dτN
QNR −
∂PNR
∂QNR
dQNR
dτN
+ 1
= − ∂
2PNR
∂QNR ∂sN
ST
HS
QNR −
∂PNR
∂QNR
QT
HS
+ 1
=
−β′ (sN) εL ′′ (QNRL ) 1L · ST ·QNR − β (sN) εL ′′ (QNRL ) 1L QT + HS
HS
=
PT
HS
,
(A.6)
where
PT = −εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
β′
(
sN
)2
β (sN)
×
{
−1
2
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
×
[
3εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− τN
}
+
β′
(
sN
)2 [
εL
′ (QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L Q
N
R
]
2β (sN)
×
{[
µ (1+ χ) sN − 3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ µ (1+ χ) sNεL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
− (1+ µχ) νe
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− 3τN
}
< 0 i f sN∗ ≤ 3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
µ (1+ χ)
.
Thus, dP
N
R
dτN > 0 i f s
N∗ ≤ 3(1+µχ)(pFE+νe)
µ(1+χ) . We immediately find that the
sufficient condition for HS < 0, i.e. sN∗ ≤ (1+µχ)(3pFE+4νe)2µ(1+χ) , is also
sufficient for PT < 0. Thus, we have dP
N
R
dτN > 0 if s
N∗ ≤ (1+µχ)(3pFE+4νe)2µ(1+χ) .
a.2.2 Optimal Northern import tariff
a.2.2.1 Comparative-Static Analysis for the equipment sector
Effects of Northern import tariff on equilibrium Northern equipment install-
ation
Differentiating (1.2) w.r.t. τN yields:
dQNR
dτN
=
L
2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) < 0, (A.7)
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and therefore d
2QNR
dτN 2
= 0.
Effects of Northern import tariff on equilibrium Northern equipment price
Totally differentiating PNR
(
QNR , s
N) w.r.t. τN yields:
dPNR
(
QNR , s
N)
dτN
=
∂PNR
∂QNR
dQNR
dτN
= β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) = 1
2
.
(A.8)
a.2.2.2 Optimal Northern import tariff in the presence of a monopolistic
Southern equipment firm
Differentiating (1.3) w.r.t. τN yields:
WNτN = −QNR
(
dPNR
dτN
− 1
)
+ τN∗
dQNR
dτN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
= 0,
(A.9)
which solves for the optimal Northern import tariff as given by (1.5).
a.2.2.3 Effects of an exogenous change in FIT premium in the presence of
a monopolistic Southern equipment firm
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.9) w.r.t. sN yields: ΠSRQNR τN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτNτN WNτN QNR
 [ dτNdsN
dQNR
dsN
]
=
 ΠSRQNR sN
WNτNsN
 ,
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where
ΠSRQNR τN = −1,
WNτNτN =
L
2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) < 0,
ΠSRQNR sN = −β
′
(
sN
) [
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
< 0,
WNτN QNR = 1−
dPNR
dτN
−
[
µsN (1+ χ)− νe (1+ µχ)
] εL ′′ (QNRL )
L
dQNR
dτN
=
1
2β (sN)
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) > 0,
WNτNsN = µε
H ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
+
[
−τN + µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
− νeε′
(
QNR
L
)]
d2QNR
dτNdsN
= − Lβ
′ (sN)
2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
×
[
− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL ′
(
QNR
L
)
− τN
]
< 0.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is:
HT = − 1
2β (sN)
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)− 1
= − 1
2β (sN)
[
(1+ µχ) (2pFE + νe) + 2µ (1+ χ) sN
]
< 0.
By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dτN∗
dsN
=
TS
HT
,
dQNR
dsN
=
QS
HT
, (A.10)
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where
TS =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR s
N ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτNsN WNτN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −β
′ (sN) (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
2β (sN)
×
[
3εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− β
′ (sN)
β (sN)
τN < 0,
QS =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR τ
N ΠSRQNR sN
WNτNτN WNτNsN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
−2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
×
[
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cSR
]
.
Since TS < 0 and QS > 0 if and only if (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′ (QNR
L
)
>
cSR, we have
dτN
dsN > 0, and
dQNR
dsN < 0 if and only if
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
> cSR.
Since νe > 0, the above sufficient and necessary condition is likely to
hold as long as the equilibrium Northern equipment price without
any FIT premium exceeds the Southern equipment firm:
PNR
∣∣
sN=0 = β
(
sN
) ∣∣
sN=0ε
L ′
(
QNR
L
)
= (1+ µχ) pFEεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
> cSR.
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From (1.2), we have the effect of a FIT premium change on the equi-
librium Northern equipment price is:
dPNR
(
QNR , s
N)
dsN
= −∂P
N
R
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR ∂sN
QNR −
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR
dQNR
dsN
+
dτN
dsN
= −β
′ (sN)
β (sN)
[(
cSR + τ
N
)
− β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)]
+
−β (sN) εL ′′ (QNRL ) 1L QS + TS
HT
= − β
′ (sN)
β (sN) HT
{[
µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (2pFE + νe)
]
× εL ′
(
QNR
L
)
− c
S
R
2
}
> − β
′ (sN)
β (sN) HT
(
PNR − cSR
)
> 0,
(A.11)
where the inequality follows from HT < 0 and
PNR =
[
(1+ µχ) pFE + µ (1+ χ) sN
]
εL
′ (QNR
L
)
.
a.2.3 Effects of incidence of good generating times under a Southern mono-
poly
a.2.3.1 Optimal FIT premium
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.4) w.r.t. µ yields: ΠSRQNR sN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsNsN WNsN QNR
 dsNdµ
dQNR
dµ
 =
 ΠSRQNR µ
WNsNµ
 ,
where
ΠSRQNR µ = −β
′ (µ)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
,
WNsNµ = Q
N
R
(1+ χ)
2
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
+
[(
µsN (1+ χ)− νe (1+ µχ)
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− τN
]
×
[
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
QNR
]
−2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) (1+ χ) (µ+ pFE)
β(sN)2
+
[
sN (1+ χ)− νeχ
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
×
µ (1+ χ)
[
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
QNR
]
−2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
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− LsN dd
HN
E
dsN
T 0.
By Cramer’s rule, we have:
dsN∗
dµ
=
SM
HT
,
dQNR
(
sN∗
)
dµ
=
QM |sN∗
HT
, (A.12)
where
SM =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR µ
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsNµ WNsN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −WNsN QNR β
′ (µ)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
− 2β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
WNsNµ
> 0 i f WNsN QNR < 0 and W
N
sNµ > 0,
QM |sN∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR s
N ΠSRQNR µ
WNsNsN WNsNµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 i f WNsNµ > 0.
We have ds
N∗
dµ T 0 and
dQNR (sN∗)
dµ T 0.
a.2.3.2 Optimal import tariff
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.9) w.r.t. µ yields: ΠSRQNR τN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτNτN WNτN QNR
 dτNdµ
dQNR
dµ
 =
 ΠSRQNR µ
WNτNµ
 ,
where
ΠSRQNR µ = −β
′ (µ)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
< 0,
WNτNµ =
L
−2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
×
{
−
(
µsN + pFE
)
(1+ χ) sNεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−β′ (µ)
[
(1+ µχ) νeεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ τN
]}
< 0,
ΠSRQNR µ = −β
′ (µ)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
< 0.
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By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dτN∗
dµ
=
TM
HT
,
dQNR
(
τN∗
)
dµ
=
QM |τN∗
HT
, (A.13)
where
TM =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR µ
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτNµ WNτN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ΠSRQNR µW
N
τN QNR
−WNτNµΠSRQNR QNR < 0,
QM |τN∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR τ
N ΠSRQNR µ
WNτNτN WNτNµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
L
−2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
){− (µsN + pFE) (1+ χ) sNεL ′ (QNRL
)
− β′ (µ)
[
(1+ µχ) νeεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ τN
]}
+
L
2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)β′ (µ) [εL ′ (QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
< 0.
Thus, we have dτ
N∗
dµ > 0 and
dQNR (τN∗)
dµ > 0.
a.2.4 Effects of fossil-fuel-generated electricity price under a Southern
monopoly
a.2.4.1 Optimal FIT premium
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.4) w.r.t. pFE yields: ΠSRQNR sN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsNsN WNsN QNR
 dsNdpFE
dQNR
dpFE
 =
 ΠSRQNR pFE
WNsN pFE
 ,
where
ΠSRQNR pFE = −β
′ (pFE)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
< 0,
WNsN pFE =
[
µ (1+ χ) sNεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− (1+ µχ) νe− τN
]
×
β′
(
sN
) [
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
QNR
]
−2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) [−β′ (pFE)
β(sN)2
]
< 0 i f f µ (1+ χ) sNεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
> (1+ µχ) νe + τN .
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By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dsN∗
dpFE
=
SF
HT
,
dQNR
(
sN∗
)
dpFE
=
QF |sN∗
HT
, (A.14)
where
SF =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR pFE
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsN pFE W
N
sN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= β′ (pFE)
β′
(
sN
)
β (sN)
[
LεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
QNR
]
×
{
−
[
µ (1+ χ) sN − 1
2
(1+ µχ) pFE − (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−
[
µ (1+ χ) sN +
1
2
(1+ µχ) pFE
]
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
+
1
2
(1+ µχ) νe
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
+ τN + 1
}
> 0 i f sN ≤ 1+ µχ
2µ (1+ χ)
(pFE + 2νe) ,
QF |sN∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR s
N ΠSRQNR pFE
WNsNsN WNsN pFE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)2
β′ (pFE) εL
′ (QNR
L
)
2β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) [εL ′ (QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]2
+
ddHNE
dsN
µLβ′ (pFE)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
< 0.
Hence, we have ds
N∗
dpFE
< 0 if sN ≤ 1+µχ2µ(1+χ) (pFE + 2νe) and
dQNR (sN∗)
dpFE
> 0.
a.2.4.2 Optimal import tariff
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.9) w.r.t. pFE yields: ΠSRQNR τN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτNτN WNτN QNR
 dτNdpFE
dQNR
dpFE
 =
 ΠSRQNR pFE
WNτN pFE
 ,
where
WNτN pFE =
[
µ (1+ χ) sNεL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− (1+ µχ) νe− τN
]
× L
2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) [− β′ (x)
β(sN)2
]
.
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By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dτN
dpFE
=
TF
HT
,
dQNR
(
τN∗
)
dpFE
=
QF |τN∗
HT
, (A.15)
where
TF =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR pFE
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτN pFE W
N
τN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
β′ (pFE)
2β (sN)
{
−
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
× (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
+ 2
[
µ (1+ χ) sN − (1+ µχ) νe
]
× εL ′
(
QNR
L
)
− 2τN
}
< 0 i f sN <
(1+ µχ) νe
µ (1+ χ)
,
QF |τN∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR τ
N ΠSRQNR pFE
WNτNτN WNτN pFE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
β′ (pFE) L
−2β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
){[(1+ µχ) (νe− pFE)− 2µ (1+ χ) sN]
× εL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ τN − β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
}
> 0 i f sN <
(1+ µχ) (νe− pFE)
2µ (1+ χ)
.
Thus, TF < 0 and thereby dτ
N∗
dpFE
> 0 if sN ≤ (1+µχ)νe
µ(1+χ) . In addition,
dQNR (τN∗)
dpFE
> 0 if sN ≤ (1+µχ)(νe−pFE)2µ(1+χ) .
a.2.5 Effects of marginal damage of pollution and emission coefficient un-
der a Southern monopoly
a.2.5.1 Optimal FIT premium
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.4) w.r.t. h, h′ = ν, e, h 6= h′ yields:
 ΠSRQNR sN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsNsN WNsN QNR
 [ dsNdh
dQNR
dh
]
=
 ΠSRQNR h
WNsN h
 = [ 0
WNsN h
]
,
where
WNsN h = −h′ε′
(
QNR
(
sN , τN
)
L
)
dQNR
dsN
< 0.
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By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dsN∗
dh
=
SH
HT
,
dQNR
(
sN∗
)
dh
=
QH |sN∗
HT
, (A.16)
where
SH =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR h
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNsN h WNsN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −2β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
[
−h′ε′
(
QNR
(
sN , τN
)
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
< 0,
QH |sN∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR s
N ΠSRQNR h
WNsNsN WNsN h
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= β′
(
sN
) [
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QNR
]
×
[
−y′ε′
(
QNR
(
sN , τN
)
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
< 0.
Hence, we have ds
N∗
dh > 0 and
dQNR (sN∗)
dh > 0, h = ν, e. Since
dHN(sN∗)
dh =
h′
[
Lε
(
QNR (sN∗)
L
)
− hε′
(
QNR (sN∗)
L
)
dQNR (sN∗)
dh
]
T 0, h, h′ = ν, e, h 6= h′,
the net environmental effect of h = ν, e is ambiguous.
a.2.5.2 Optimal import tariff
Differentiating (1.2) and (A.9) w.r.t. h, h′ = ν, e, h 6= h′ yields: ΠSRQNR τN ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτNτN WNτN QNR
 [ dτNdh
dQNR
dh
]
=
 ΠSRQNR h
WNτN h
 ,
where
ΠSRQNR h = 0,
WNτN h = −h′ε′
(
QNR
(
sN , τN
)
L
)
dQNR
dτN
> 0.
By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dτN∗
dh
=
TH
HT
,
dQNR
(
τN∗
)
dh
=
QH |τN∗
HT
,
where
TH =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR h
ΠSRQNR QNR
WNτN h WNτN QNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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= −2β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
[
−h′ε′
(
QNR
(
sN , τN
)
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
> 0,
QH |τN∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
S
RQNR τ
N ΠSRQNR h
WNτNτN WNτN h
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −
[
−h′ε′
(
QNR
(
sN , τN
)
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
< 0.
Thus, we have dτ
N∗
dh < 0 and
dQNR (τN∗)
dh > 0.
Since
dHN(τN∗)
dh = h
′
[
Lε
(
QNR (τN∗)
L
)
− hε′
(
QNR (τN∗)
L
)
dQNR (τN∗)
dh
]
T 0,
h, h′ = ν, e, h 6= h′, the net environmental effect of h = ν, e is ambigu-
ous.
a.3 asymmetric international duopoly
a.3.1 Optimal Northern FIT premium
a.3.1.1 Comparative-Static analysis for the equipment sector
Marginal effect of a Northern FIT premium on each firm’s output and total
installation in the North
Differentiating (1.6) w.r.t. sN and together with the assumption
εL
′′′ (QNR
L
)
= 0, we have:
∂2PNR
∂QNR ∂sN
QiNR +
∂PNR
∂QNR
(
2
dQiNR
dsN
+
dQjNR
dsN
)
+
∂PNR
∂sN
= 0, i, j = N, S, i 6= j
⇔

dQNNR
dsN =
β′(sN)
[
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
QNNR
]
−2β(sN)εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) − dQ
SN
R
dsN
2
dQSNR
dsN =
β′(sN)
[
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
QSNR
]
−2β(sN)εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) − dQ
NN
R
dsN
2 ,
which solves for:
dQiNR
dsN
=
β′
(
sN
) [
LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
− εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) (
QjNR − 2QiNR
)]
−3β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) . (A.17)
Substituting (1.6) into (A.17), we have:
dQNNR
dsN =
β′(sN)L[2cNR−(cSR+τN)]
−3β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) T 0
dQSNR
dsN =
β′(sN)L[2(cSR+τN)−cNR ]
−3β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) T 0. (A.18)
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Thus, a Northern FIT premium affects the total Northern equipment
installation as:
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
β′
(
sN
) [
2LεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
QNR
]
−3β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
=
β′
(
sN
)
L
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N)
−3β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) > 0. (A.19)
The second-order effect of a Northern FIT premium on equipment
output of producer in country i = N, S and total Northern equipment
installation are respectively given by:
d2QiNR
(dsN)2
=
[
β′
(
sN
)]2 [LεL ′ (QNRL )− εL ′′ (QNRL ) (QjNR − 2QiNR )]
3 [β (sN)]2 εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
= −β
′ (sN)
β (sN)
dQiNR
dsN
T 0,
d2QNR
(dsN)2
∣∣∣∣
C
=
[
β′
(
sN
)]2 [2LεL ′ (QNRL )+ εL ′′ (QNRL )QNR ]
3 [β (sN)]2 εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
= −β
′ (sN)
β (sN)
dQNR
dsN
< 0.
Marginal effect of a Northern FIT premium on Northern equipment price
Totally differentiating PNR
(
QNR , s
N) w.r.t. sN yields:
dPNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
∂PNR
∂QNR
dQNR
dsN
+
∂PNR
∂sN
= β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
β′
(
sN
)
L
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N)
−3 [β (sN)]2 εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
+ β′
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
=
β′
(
sN
)
3
[
3εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N)
β (sN)
]
> 0,
(A.20)
where the inequality sign follows from (1.6).
a.3.1.2 Optimal Northern FIT premium under an international duopoly
Total differentiation of (1.7) w.r.t. sN gives:
WNsN
∣∣C = −QSNR dPNRdsN + τN dQSNRdsN + (PNR − cNR ) dQNNRdsN
− LµsN∗
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
= 0.
(A.21)
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Substituting (1.1) into (A.21) we have:
WNsN
∣∣C = −QSNR dPNRdsN + τN dQSNRdsN +
[
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dsN
− LµsN∗
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
= 0.
(A.22)
which solves for the optimal Northern FIT premium in the presence
of a asymmetric equipment duopoly as given by (1.8).
a.3.1.3 Effects of an exogenous Northern import tariff change under an
international duopoly
Differentiating the system of first-order equations for both equipment
firms in (1.6) and (A.22) w.r.t. τN gives:
ΠNR QNNR sN Π
N
R QNNR Q
NN
R
ΠNR QNNR QSNR
ΠSRQSNR sN Π
S
RQSNR Q
NN
R
ΠSRQSNR QSNR
WNsNsN
∣∣
C W
N
sN QNNR
WNsN QSNR


dsN
dτN
∣∣
C
dQNNR
dτN
dQSNR
dτN

=

ΠNR QNNR τN
ΠSRQSNR τN
WNsNτN
∣∣
C
 ,
where
ΠNR QNNR τN = 0,
ΠSRQSNR τN = 1,
WNsNτN
∣∣
C= −
dQSNR
dsN
T0,
ΠNR QiNR sN = β
′
(
sN
) [(
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
+
(
εL
)′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
QiNR
]
> 0,
ΠNR QiNR QiNR = 2β
(
sN
) (
εL
)′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
< 0,
ΠNR QiNR Q
jN
R
= β
(
sN
) (
εL
)′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
< 0,
WNsNsN
∣∣
C= τ
N d
2QSNR
d(sN)2
+ β′
(
sN
) (
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
dQNNR
dsN
+
(
PNR − cNR
)
× d
2QNNR
d(sN)2
− µL
[
(1+ χ)
(
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
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−
[
µsN (1+ χ)− (1+ µχ) νe
] (
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
d2QNR
dsN2
− β
′(sN)2L
3β(sN)3 (εL)′′
(
QNR
L
)
×
{(
τN + cNR
) [
2cNR −
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
−
[
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) + τN
] (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)}
+ µL
ddHNE
dsN
,
WNsN QNNR =
(
PNR
)′ (
QNNR
) dQNNR
dsN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) d2QNNR
dsNdQNNR
− µsN (1+ χ)
(
εL
)′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
−
[
µsN (1+ χ)− (1+ µχ) νe
] (
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
d2QNR
dsNdQNNR
=
β′
(
sN
)
β (sN)
{
− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
(
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE + 2µ (1+ χ) sN
3β (sN)
] (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)}
,
which follows from d
2PNR
dsNdQiNR
=
d2QiNR
dsNdQjNR
= 0 and
d2QiNR
dsNdQiNR
=
d2QNR
dsNdQiNR
= −β
′ (sN)
β (sN)
< 0,
WNsN QSNR = −
dPNR
dsN
+ τN
d2QSNR
dsNdQSNR
+
(
PNR
)′ (
QNR
) dQNNR
dsN
− µsN (1+ χ)
(
εL
)′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
−
[
µsN (1+ χ)− (1+ µχ) νe
] (
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
d2QNR
dsNdQSNR
=
β′
(
sN
)
β (sN)
[
− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
(
εL
)′ (QNR
L
)
− (1+ µχ) pFE
3β (sN)
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+ cSR
]
.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is:
HS |C = −
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ 1
]
−
[
1− µ (1+ χ) s
N
3β (sN)
] (
cSR + τ
N
) (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+ cNR
[
1+
µ (1+ χ) sN
3β (sN)
] (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
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− cNR cSR +
(
τN + cNR
) [
2cNR −
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
− τN
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+
3β
(
sN
)2
εL
′′(QNR
L
)2
L
µ
ddHNE
dsN
<
[
− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)− cSR
+
−3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) + µ (1+ χ) sN
3β (sN)
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)]
×
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+ 3
(
cNR
)2 − cNR cSR − 3τN (cSR + τN)
+
3
[
β
(
sN
)
εL
′′ (QNR
L
)]2
L
× µdd
HN
E
dsN
.
A sufficient condition for HS |C < 0 is sN < 3(1+µχ)(pFE+νe)µ(1+χ) and(
cNR
)2
<
2cNR c
S
R+(3τN+cSR)(cSR+τN)
3 .
Cramer’s rule implies that:
dsN
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
ST |C
HS |C ,
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
QT |C
HS |C , (A.23)
where
ST |C =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΠNR QNNR τN Π
N
R QNNR Q
NN
R
ΠNR QNNR QSNR
ΠSRQSNR τN Π
S
RQSNR Q
NN
R
ΠSRQSNR QSNR
WNsNτN WNsN QNNR W
N
sN QSNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −β′
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
×
{
− (1+ µχ) pFEεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
−
[
2
3
+
(1+ µχ) pFE
3β (sN)
] (
cSR + τ
N
)
−2τN −
[
1
3
+
(1+ µχ) pFE
3β (sN)
]
cNR
}
< 0,
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QNT =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΠNR QNNR sN Π
N
R QNNR τ
N ΠNR QNNR QSNR
ΠSRQSNR sN Π
S
RQSNR τ
N ΠSRQSNR QSNR
WNsNsN
∣∣
C W
N
sNτN
∣∣
C W
N
sN QSNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
β′
(
sN
)2
3β (sN)2
{
−3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL ′
(
QNR
L
)
cNR
−
[
(1+ µχ) pFE
β (sN)
cNR + (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
+2
(
cNR − cSR
)] (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
− 3cNR
(
cSR + τ
N − 2cNR
)}
<
β′
(
sN
)2
3β (sN)2
[
− (1+ µχ) (4pFE + 3νe)
(
cSR + τ
N) cNR
β (sN)
− (1+ µχ) 3νe− µ (1+ χ) s
N
β (sN)
cNR
− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+
(
2cSR − 3cNR
) (
cSR + τ
N
)]
< 0 i f sN <
3 (1+ µχ) νe
µ (1+ χ)
and cSR <
3
2
cNR ,
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QST =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΠNR QNNR sN Π
N
R QNNR Q
NN
R
ΠNR QNNR τN
ΠSRQSNR sN Π
S
RQSNR Q
NN
R
ΠSRQSNR τN
WNsNsN
∣∣
C W
N
sN QNNR
WNsNτN
∣∣
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
β′
(
sN
)2
3β (sN)2
{
3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
cNR
+
[
2 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
+
(
3− µ (1+ χ) s
N
β (sN)
)
cNR − 4cSR
] (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+3cNR
(
2cSR − 3cNR
)}
>
β′
(
sN
)2
3β (sN)2
{[
3+
3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)− µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
]
× cNR
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+ [2 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)]
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
− 4cSR
(
cSR + τ
N
)
− 9
(
cNR
)
2 + 2cNR c
S
R
}
> 0 i f sN <
3 (1+ µχ) (νe− pFE)
7µ (1+ χ)
and cSR <
9
4
cNR ,
QT |C = QNT + QST
=
β′
(
sN
)2
3β (sN)2
{[
2
(
2cNR − 3cSR
)
+ 3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
]
×
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+ 3cNR
(
cSR − τN − cNR
)}
=
β′
(
sN
)2
3β (sN)2
[
3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+
(
cNR
)2
+cNR
(
cSR + τ
N
)
− 6
(
cSR
)2]
> 0 i f f
(
cSR
)2
<
1
6
[
3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+
(
cNR
)2
+ cNR
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
.
Since ST |C < 0 always hold, dsNdτN
∣∣
C> 0 if HS |C < 0, which holds if
the following condition holds:
Condition 1. sN < 3(1+µχ)(pFE+νe)
µ(1+χ) and
(
cNR
)2
<
2cNR c
S
R+(3τN+cSR)(cSR+τN)
3 .
In addition, dQ
N
R
dτN
∣∣
C< 0 holds if the following condition holds:
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Condition 2.
(
cSR
)2
<
3(1+µχ)(pFE+νe)(cNR +cSR+τN)+(cNR )
2
+cNR (cSR+τN)
6 , s
N <
3(1+µχ)(pFE+νe)
µ(1+χ) and
(
cNR
)2
<
2cNR c
S
R+(3τN+cSR)(cSR+τN)
3 .
The marginal effect of Northern import tariff on the equilibrium
Northern equipment price in the presence of an asymmetric equip-
ment duopoly is:
dPNR
(
QNR , s
N)
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
1
2
[
−∂
2PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR ∂sN
dsN
dτN
QNR −
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR
dQNR
dτN
+ 1
]
=
PT |C
2HS |C ,
where
PT |C = −β′
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
ST |C QNR
− β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QT |C + HS |C
= −β
′(sN)2
β (sN)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
×
{[
2β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)]
×
[
− (1+ µχ) pFEεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
−
(
2
3
+
(1+ µχ) pFE
3β (sN)
)
×
(
cSR + τ
N
)
− 2τN −
(
1
3
+
(1+ µχ) pFE
3β (sN)
)
cNR
]
+ (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+
(
cNR
)2
+ cNR
(
cSR + τ
N)
3
− 2
(
cSR
)2}
−
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ 1
]
− 3 (1+ µχ) pFE + 2µ (1+ χ) s
N
3β (sN)
(
cSR + τ
N
) (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+ cNR
[
1+
µ (1+ χ) sN
3β (sN)
] (
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
− cNR cSR
+
(
τN + cNR
) [
2cNR −
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
− τN
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)
+
3
[
β
(
sN
)
εL
′′ (QNR
L
)]2
L
µ
ddHNE
dsN
,
which is likely to be negative when HS |C < 0. Thus, dP
N
R (QNR ,sN)
dτN > 0
is likely to hold when HS |C < 0.
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a.3.2 Optimal Northern import tariff
a.3.2.1 Comparative-Static Analysis for the equipment sector
Marginal effect of a Northern import tariff on each firm’s output and total
installation in the North
Differentiating (1.6) w.r.t. τN and together with the assumption(
εL
)′′′ (QNR
L
)
= 0, we have:
∂PNR
∂QNR
(
2 dQ
NN
R
dτN +
dQSNR
dτN
)
= 0
∂PNR
∂QNR
(
2 dQ
SN
R
dτN +
dQNNR
dτN
)
− 1 = 0,
which solves for: 
dQNNR
dτN =
L
−3β(sN)εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) > 0
dQSNR
dτN =
2L
3β(sN)εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) < 0. (A.24)
Thus, we have the marginal effect of a Northern FIT premium on total
Northern equipment output as:
dQNR
dτN
=
L
3β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) < 0. (A.25)
Marginal effect of a Northern FIT premium on Northern equipment price
Totally differentiating PNR
(
QNR , s
N) w.r.t. τN yields:
dPNR
dτN
=
∂PNR
∂QNR
dQNR
dτN
= β
(
sN
) (
εL
)′′ (QNR
L
)
1
L
L
3β (sN) (εL)′′
(
QNR
L
) = 1
3
.
(A.26)
a.3.2.2 Optimal Northern import tariff under an international duopoly
Total differentiation of (1.7) w.r.t. τN gives:
WNτN
∣∣
C = −QSNR
(
dPNR
dτN
− 1
)
+ τN∗
dQSNR
dτN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
= 0.
(A.27)
Substituting (1.1) into (A.27), we have:
WNτN
∣∣
C = −QSNR
(
dPNR
dτN
− 1
)
+ τN∗
dQSNR
dτN
+
(
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
)
dQNNR
dτN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
= 0,
(A.28)
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which solves for the optimal Northern import tariff in the presence of
an asymmetric equipment duopoly as given by (1.9).
a.3.2.3 Effects of an exogenous change in Northern FIT premium under
an international duopoly
Differentiating the system of first-order equations for both equipment
firms in (1.6) and (A.28) w.r.t. sN gives:
ΠNR QNNR τN Π
N
R QNNR Q
NN
R
ΠNR QNNR QSNR
ΠSRQSNR τN Π
S
RQSNR Q
NN
R
ΠSRQSNR QSNR
WNτNτN
∣∣
C W
N
τN QNNR
WNτN QSNR


dτN
dsN
∣∣
C
dQNNR
dsN
dQSNR
dsN

=

ΠNR QNNR sN
ΠSRQSNR sN
WNτNsN
∣∣
C
 ,
where
ΠNR QNNR τN = 0,
ΠSRQSNR τN = −1,
ΠiRQiNR sN = −β
′
(
sN
) [
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+ εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
QiNR
]
,
WNτNτN
∣∣
C =
dQSNR
dτN
=
2L
3β (sN) εL ′′
(
QNR
L
) ,
WNτN QNNR = −
dPNR
dQNNR
dQNNR
dτN
×
[
µ (1+ χ) sN − (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dτN
= − (1+ µχ) (pFE − νe) + 2µ (1+ χ) s
N
3β (sN)
< 0 i f pFE > νe,
WNτN QSNR = 1−
dPNR
dτN
+
dPNR
dQSNR
dQNNR
dτN
−
[
µ (1+ χ) sN − (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dτN
=
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
3β (sN)
> 0,
WNτNsN
∣∣
C = −τN
d2QSNR
dτNdsN
− β′
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNNR
dτN
−
(
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
)
d2QNNR
dτNdsN
+ µεH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
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+
[
µ (1+ χ) sN − (1+ µχ) νe
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
d2QNR
dτNdsN
=
β′
(
sN
)
L
−3β(sN)2εL ′′
(
QNR
L
)
×
{
−2τN − cNR − (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL ′
(
QNR
L
)}
< 0.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is:
HT |C = 2β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
×
[
3µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (4pFE + νe)
3β (sN)
− 1
2
β
(
sN
)
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
]
< 0.
Cramer’s rule implies that:
dτN
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
TS |C
HT |C ,
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
QS |C
HT |C , (A.29)
where
TS |C =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΠNR QNNR sN Π
N
R QNNR Q
NN
R
ΠNR QNNR QSNR
ΠSRQSNR sN Π
S
RQSNR Q
NN
R
ΠSRQSNR QSNR
WNτNsN |C WNτN QNNR WNτN QSNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−β′ (sN) εL ′′ (QNRL )
3β (sN) L
×
{
−3 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−
[
2µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (3pFE + νe)
]
cSR
+ (1+ µχ) (pFE − νe) cNR
−
[
8µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (9pFE + νe)
]
τN
}
<
−β′ (sN) εL ′′ (QNRL )
3β (sN) L
×
{
− (1+ µχ) (2pFE + 4νe) β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−
[
2µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (3pFE + νe)
]
cSR
−
[
8µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (9pFE + νe)
]
τN
}
< 0,
in which the first inequality follows from (1.6):
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β
(
sN
)
εL
′ (QNR
L
)
> cNR ,
QNS =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΠNR QNNR τN Π
N
R QNNR s
N ΠNR QNNR QSNR
ΠSRQSNR τN Π
S
RQSNR s
N ΠSRQSNR QSNR
WNτNτN WNτNsN |C WNτN QSNR
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= − β
′ (sN)
3β (sN)
{[
5+
2 (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
β (sN)
]
cNR
+
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
β (sN)
τN
+
(1+ µχ) (νe− pFE)− 2µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
cSR
}
< 0 i f sN <
(1+ µχ)
2µ (1+ χ)
(νe− pFE) ,
QSS =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΠNR QNNR τN Π
N
R QNNR Q
NN
R
ΠNR QNNR sN
ΠSRQSNR τN Π
S
RQSNR Q
NN
R
ΠSRQSNR sN
WNτNτN WNτN QNNR W
N
τNsN |C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
2β′
(
sN
)
3β (sN)
{
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
+
[
1+
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
2β (sN)
]
cNR − 2cSR
}
>
2β′
(
sN
)
3β (sN)
{
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
β (sN)
+
[
1+
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
2β (sN)
]
cNR − 2cSR
}
=
2β′
(
sN
)
3β (sN)
{
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
cNR + τ
N
β (sN)
+
[
1+
(1+ µχ) (pFE + νe)
2β (sN)
]
cNR
+
(1+ µχ) (−pFE + νe)− 2µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
cSR
}
> 0 i f sN <
(1+ µχ)
2µ (1+ χ)
(νe− pFE) ,
where the first inequality follows from (1.6):
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
> cNR + c
S
R + τ
N ,
QS |C = QNS + QSS
=
β′
(
sN
)
3β (sN)
[
1+ µχ (pFE + νe) εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
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− 3cNR − 2cSR
]
< 0 i f f (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
< 3cNR + 2c
S
R.
Since HT |C < 0, TS |C < 0, we have dτNdsN
∣∣
C> 0. In addition, we have
dQNR
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 if and only if the following condition holds.
Condition 3. (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) εL
′ (QNR
L
)
< 3cNR + 2c
S
R.
The marginal effect of Northern FIT premium on the equilibrium
Northern equipment price in the presence of an asymmetric equip-
ment duopoly is positive as shown below:
dPNR
(
QNR , s
N)
dsN
∣∣∣∣C = −∂2PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR ∂sN
QSNR −
∂PNR
(
QNR , s
N)
∂QNR
dQSNR
dsN
+
dτN
dsN
=
β′
(
sN
)
εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
3β (sN) HT |C
×
{
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
) [
6µ (1+ χ) sN
+ (1+ µχ) (10pFE + 4νe)
− 3β
(
sN
)2
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
]
+
[
3µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (2pFE + νe)
]
cNR
−
[
2µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (3pFE + νe)
−3β
(
sN
)2
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)]
cSR
+
[
2µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) pFE
+ 3β
(
sN
)2
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
]
τN
}
>
β′
(
sN
)
εL
′′ (QNR
L
)
3β (sN) HT |C
×
{
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
) [
4µ (1+ χ) sN
+ (1+ µχ) (7pFE + 3νe)
]
+
[
3µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) (2pFE + νe)
]
cNR
+
[
2µ (1+ χ) sN + (1+ µχ) pFE
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+3β
(
sN
)2
εL
′′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
]
τN
}
> 0.
a.4 comparative-static analysis for policy comple-
mentarity with a specific function form
Suppose we have a specific functional form of renewable electricity
generation in a bad generating time:
εL (qR) = aqR − b(qR)2, a > 0, b > 0,
which implies that RE equipment has linearly decreasing mar-
ginal productivity in electricity generation: εL ′ (qR) = a − bqR >
0, εL ′′ (qR) = −b < 0.
a.4.1 The generation pattern
The generation pattern can be summarised as follows:
εL
′
(qR) = a− bqR,
εH
′
(qR) = (1+ χ) (a− bqR) ,
q¯′RE (qR) = (1− µ) εL ′ (qR) + µεH ′ (qR) = (1+ µχ) (a− bqR) ,
MCLcRE
(
qLcRE
)
= PcR
d
dqLcRE
[
εL −1
(
qLcRE
)]
= PcR
1√
a2 − 2bqLcRE
,
MCHcRE
(
qHRE
)
= PcR
d
dqHcRE
[
εH −1
(
qHcRE
)]
= PcR
1√
[a (1+ χ)]2 − 2 [b (1+ χ)] qHcRE
,
MCcRE (qRE) = P
c
R
d
dq¯cRE
[ε¯ −1 (q¯cRE)]
= PcR
1√
[a (1+ µχ)]2 − 2 [b (1+ µχ)] q¯cRE
.
a.4.2 Southern monopoly
Given the above specific function, we solve for the equilibrium North-
ern installation and price:
QNR =
L
2b
[
a− c
S
R + τ
N
β (sN)
]
,
PNR =
aβ
(
sN
)
+ cSR + τ
N
2
.
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Thus, we have the following comparative statics results for both
policy instruments:
dQNR
dsN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
(
cSR + τ
N
)
> 0,
dPNR
dsN
=
aβ′
(
sN
)
2
> 0,
dQNR
dτN
= − L
2bβ (sN)
< 0,
dPNR
dτN
=
1
2
,
d2QNR
dτNdsN
=
d2QNR
dsNdτN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
> 0,
d2PNR
dτNdsN
= 0.
a.4.2.1 Optimal Northern FIT premium
Decomposing the marginal effects of the Northern import tariff on
the marginal welfare effect of the Northern FIT premium: WNsN∗τN =
∂
∂τN
[
∂WN(sN∗(τN),τN)
∂sN∗(τN)
]
, we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂τN
(
−QNR
dPNR
dsN
)
= −∂Q
N
R
∂τN
dPNR
dsN
=
Laβ′
(
sN
)
4bβ (sN)
> 0,
which follows from d
2PNR
dsNdτN = 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂τN
(
τN
dQNR
dsN
)
=
dQNR
dsN
+ τN
d2QNR
dsNdτN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
(
cSR + 2τ
N
)
> 0;
(iii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of FIT premium
−µsN ∂
∂τN
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
= −Lβ
′(sN)2
4bβ(sN)3
[
β
(
sN
)
a + 2
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
< 0;
(iv) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂τN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
= νeL (1+ µχ)
∂
∂τN
[(
a− b Q
N
R
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
= νeL (1+ µχ)
[
1
2β (sN)
Lβ′
(
sN
) (
cSR + τ
N)
2bβ(sN)2
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+
β
(
sN
)
a +
(
cSR + τ
N)
2β (sN)
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
]
=
νeL (1+ µχ) Lβ′
(
sN
)
4bβ(sN)3
×
[
β
(
sN
)
a + 2
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
≥ 0.
Summing up (i)–(iii) yields:
Lβ′
(
sN
)
4bβ(sN)3
{[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2cSR
]
(1+ µχ) pFE
+ 2
[
β
(
sN
)
+ (1+ µχ) pFE
]
τN
}
> 0.
Since (iv) is positive, the total impact is positive: WNsN∗τN > 0.
Totally differentiating WNsN∗ |C = 0 and rearranging yields:
dsN∗
(
τN
)
dτN
=
WNsN∗τN
−WNsN∗sN∗
,
since −WNsN∗sN∗ > 0, we have sign
(
dsN∗(τN)
dτN
)
= sign
(
WNsN∗τN
)
>
0.
a.4.2.2 Optimal Northern import tariff
Young’s theorem implies that WNsN∗τN = WNτN∗sN . For the same reas-
oning as in Appendix A.4.2.1, we have:
sign
(
dτN∗
(
sN
)
dsN
)
= sign
(
WNτN∗sN
)
.
Therefore, we have:
sign
(
dτN∗
(
sN
)
dsN
)
= sign
(
WNτN∗sN
)
= sign
(
WNsN∗τN
)
> 0.
However, to facilitate our understanding for the intuition behind the
policy complementarity, we still explicitly solve for WNτN∗sN as fol-
lows.
Decomposing WNτN∗sN , we have:
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂sN
[
QNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
)]
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
4bβ(sN)2
(
cSR + τ
N
)
> 0;
(ii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂sN
[
τN
dQNR
dτN
]
=
β′
(
sN
)
LτN
2bβ(sN)2
≥ 0;
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(iii) Impact on FIT cost effect
∂
∂sN
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
=
µ (1+ χ) L
4bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEβ
(
sN
)
a
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
] (
cSR + τ
N
)}
T 0;
(iv) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
=
νeL (1+ µχ) β′
(
sN
)
4bβ(sN)3
[
β
(
sN
)
a + 2
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
≥ 0.
Summing up (i)–(iii), we have:
Lβ′
(
sN
)
4bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFE
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2cSR
]
+ 2
[
β
(
sN
)
+ (1+ µχ) pFE
]
τN
}
> 0.
Since the sum of (i)–(iii) and (iv) are equal to that in Appendix A.4.2.1,
we have WNsN∗τN = WNτN∗sN , which is consistent with Young’s the-
orem.
a.4.3 International duopoly
The Cournot equilibrium in the North is:2
QNNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR − 2cNR + τN
β (sN)
]
,
QSNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cNR − 2cSR − 2τN
β (sN)
]
,
QNR |C =
L
3b
[
2a− c
S
R + c
N
R + τ
N
β (sN)
]
,
PNR |C =
β
(
sN
)
3
a +
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
3
.
The Cournot equilibrium in the South is:
QNSR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR − 2cNR
β (sS)
]
,
2 Stability condition for the Northern market holds: piNR qNNR qNNR
piNR qSNR q
SN
R
−
piNR qSNR q
NN
R
piNR qNNR q
SN
R
= 3
[
b
L β
(
sN
)]2
> 0. Similar condition holds for the Southern
market too.
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QSSR =
L
3b
[
a +
cNR − 2cSR
β (sS)
]
,
QSR |C =
L
3b
[
2a− c
S
R + c
N
R
β (sS)
]
,
PSR |C =
β
(
sS
)
3
a +
cSR + c
N
R
3
.
The maximised profits for both firms are:
piNR |C =
L
9bβ (sN)
[
β
(
sN
)
a + cSR − 2cNR + τN
]2
+
L
9bβ (sS)
[
β
(
sS
)
a + cSR − 2cNR
]2
,
piSR |C =
L
9bβ (sN)
[
β
(
sN
)
a + cNR − 2cSR − 2τN
]2
+
L
9bβ (sS)
[
β
(
sS
)
a + cNR − 2cSR
]2
.
a.4.3.1 Optimal Northern FIT premium
Decomposing WNsN∗τN |C , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂τN
(
−QSNR
dPNR
dsN
)
= −∂Q
SN
R
∂τN
dPNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
=
2Laβ′
(
sN
)
9bβ (sN)
> 0,
which follows from d
2PNR
dsNdτN = 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂τN
(
τN
dQSNR
dsN
)
=
dQSNR
dsN
+ τN
dQSNR
dsNdτN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
3bβ(sN)2
×
(
2cSR + 4τ
N − cNR
)
T 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂τN
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dsN
]
=
∂PNR
∂τN
dQNNR
dsN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) d2QNNR
dsNdτN
= − Lβ
′ (sN)
9bβ(sN)2
×
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + τ
N − 2cNR
)]
T 0;
(iv) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of FIT premium
− µsN ∂
∂τN
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
−L dd
HN
E
dsN
]
A.4 comparative-static analysis with a specific function form 155
= −Lβ
′(sN)2sN
9bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cNR + c
S
R + τ
N
)]
< 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂τN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
=
νeL (1+ µχ)
9bβ(sN)2
[
a +
2
β (sN)
(
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
)] ∂β (sN)
∂sN
≥ 0.
Summing up (i)–(iii) yields:
Lβ′
(
sN
)
9bβ(sN)2
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 4cSR + 10τ
N + cNR
]
> 0.
Summing up (i)–(iv) yields:
Lµ (1+ χ)
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
+
[
2β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
cSR
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cNR
+
[
8β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
τN
}
.
(A.30)
We check the sign for the sum of (i)–(iv) as follows. First, Assump-
tion 1 implies that even if there are always bad times (i.e. µ = 0),
households still install positive amount of RE equipment. This re-
quires that the instantaneous cost (price) of first unit of equipment
installed is below the instantaneous benefit of renewable electricity
generated from it in a bad time. Thus, the only negative term in
(A.30) −µ (1+ χ) sNcNR has a lower bound:3
qLNRE > 0⇔ PNR |C < apFE
⇔ −µ (1+ χ) sNcNR >
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
a
+ µχpFEcNR − 2pFEcNR .
(A.31)
Second, Cournot competition in the North implies the Northern
equipment firm’s domestic output is positive:
QNNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR − 2cNR + τN
β (sN)
]
> 0
⇔ 2cNR < aβ
(
sN
)
+ cSR + τ
N .
(A.32)
Substituting (A.31) and (A.32) into (A.30), then −µ (1+ χ) sNcNR has
an even higher lower bound (put it another way, the absolute value
of this negative term has a lower upper bound):
−µ (1+ χ) sNcNR >
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
a
+ µχpFEcNR
3 Rearranging the condition as P
N
R
a < pFE, which indicates that Northern household’s
renewable electricity supply curve in a bad time starts below the electricity market
price line, so that qLNRE > 0.
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+ µχpFEcNR − pFE
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ cSR + τ
N
]
.
Substituting the above new lower bound into the sum of (i)–(iv)
yields:
Lµ (1+ χ)
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
+
[
2β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
×
(
cSR + τ
N
)
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cNR
}
>
Lµ (1+ χ)
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
+
[
2β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
×
(
cSR + τ
N
)
+ (1+ µχ) pFEc
N
R +
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
a
+ µχpFEcNR − pFE
(
aβ
(
sN
)
+ cSR + τ
N
)}
> 0.
Since (v) is positive, QNNR > 0 ⇒ ∂∂sN
[
∂WN(τN∗(sN),sN)
∂τN∗(sN)
] ∣∣∣∣
C
> 0 ⇔
dτN∗
dsN
∣∣C > 0.
a.4.3.2 Optimal Northern import tariff
Decomposing WNτN∗sN |C , we have:
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂sN
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
)]
=
2L
9bβ(sN)2
(
2cSR − cNR + 2τN
) ∂β (sN)
∂sN
> 0 i f f
∂QSNR
∂sN
> 0;
(ii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂sN
[
τN
dQSNR
dτN
]
=
2LτN
3bβ(sN)2
∂β
(
sN
)
∂sN
≥ 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂sN
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
]
=
L
(−cSR + 2cNR − τN)
9bβ(sN)2
∂β
(
sN
)
∂sN
> 0 i f f
∂QNNR
∂sN
> 0;
(iv) Impact on FIT cost effect
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∂
∂sN
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEβ
(
sN
)
a
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
}
T 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
=
νeL (1+ µχ)
9bβ(sN)2
[
a +
2
β (sN)
(
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
)] ∂β (sN)
∂sN
≥ 0.
Since (i)+(iii)>0, the only possible negative effect is (iv), which is
positive too if sN is not too large: sN ∈
[
0, 1+µχ
µ(1+χ) pFE
)
. Thus we
have an additional straightforward sufficient condition for the policy
complementarity:
sN ∈
[
0,
1+ µχ
µ (1+ χ)
pFE
)
⇒WNτN∗sN
∣∣C > 0⇔ dτN∗dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
> 0.
Summing up (i)–(iv), we have:
Lµ (1+ χ)
{
(1+ µχ) pFEβ
(
sN
)
a +
[
2β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
cSR
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cNR
+
[
8β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
τN
}
.
Since the sum of (i)–(iv) and (v) are equal to that in Appendix A.4.3.1,
we have WNτN∗sN
∣∣C = WNsN∗τN ∣∣C > 0, which is consistent with
Young’s theorem. Consequently, dτ
N∗
dsN
∣∣
C> 0.
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b.1 numerical results under a southern monopoly
This section shows the main numerical results in the presence of
a Southern equipment monopoly across different Northern policy
regimes and marginal damage of pollution. All results refer to the
equilibrium values. All differences are calculated by using the follow-
ing formula: Northern values−Southern valuesSouthern values . The following table describes
the cases we examine. The Northern government does not intervene
in Case 1 and 2, but chooses a single optimal FIT premium in Case
3 and a single optimal import tariff in Case 4. We do not examine a
policy mix since it does not arise given our parameter values under
the Southern monopoly case.
Table B.1: Description of simulation cases under a Southern monopoly
RE
equipment
prices in
both markets
marginal
damage of
pollution
($/kg)
Northern
FIT
premium
($)
Northern
import
tariff ($)
Case 1 Southern
unit
production
cost
0 0
Case 2.1
profit-
maximising
monopolistic
prices
Case 2.2 0.05
Case 3 0.1 endogenous 340
Case 4.1 0
0 endogenousCase 4.2 0.05
Case 4.3 0.1
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Figure B.1: Numerical results under a Southern monopoly (part 1)
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Figure B.2: Numerical results under a Southern monopoly (part 2)
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Figure B.3: Numerical results under a Southern monopoly (part 3)
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b.2 sensitivity analysis under a southern monopoly
The following table also shows the case when certain parameter val-
ues facilitate a positive Northern FIT premium, which are indicated
by the numbers in the brackets.
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Low
conventional
electricity
price
p
FE
=
0.191(0.199)
−
10.2212
−
15.591
N
ot
applicable
(−
21.8394)
−
9.08548
−
15.0516
−
20.7814
H
igh
incidence
of
good
generating
tim
es
µ
=
0.79(0.31)
−
14.3318
−
17.1351
N
ot
applicable
(−
21.4583)
−
12.7394
−
16.2926
−
19.5852
Low
incidence
of
good
generating
tim
esµ
=
0.01(0.17)
−
9.7145
−
15.8019
N
ot
applicable
(−
21.9791)
−
8.63511
−
15.2762
−
21.7046
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Low
conventional
electricity
price
p
FE
=
0.191(0.199)
−
50.
−
50.
N
ot
applicable
(−
68.598)
−
66.6667
−
61.1272
−
56.2289
H
igh
incidence
of
good
generating
tim
es
µ
=
0.79(0.31)
−
50.
−
50.
N
ot
applicable
(−
67.8005)
−
66.6667
−
61.7606
−
57.3997
Low
incidence
of
good
generating
tim
esµ
=
0.01(0.17)
−
50.
−
50.
N
ot
applicable
(−
68.7794)
−
66.6667
−
61.2836
−
56.4987
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b.3 summary of policy, welfare and environmental ef-
fects of policies and parameters
The following table displays the complete results for how policies
and parameters affect the Northern policies, national and global wel-
fare as well as Northern equipment installation under the Southern
monopoly case. We assume that the marginal damage of pollution
is $0.1/kg and $0.05/kg throughout the following analysis for the
Southern monopoly and international duopoly cases respectively.1
As shown by the common description of curves we analyse through-
out this chapter, we evaluate the single optimal policies when fixing
the exogenous policy instrument at zero under both market struc-
tures, except for the case of the optimal Northern FIT premium under
a Southern monopoly, in which we fix the import tariff at $340. This
is again because we need a sufficiently high domestic import tariff
to generate a positive optimal Northern FIT premium. For brevity,
we only show some selected examples in the following sections. Full
graphical results are available upon request.
1 As mentioned in the text, the more realistic marginal damage of $0.05/kg is not high
enough to generate a positive FIT premium tariff even when the import tariff is high
under a Southern monopoly.
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Example B.1. Effect of Southern equipment firm’s unit production
cost on optimal Northern policies under a Southern monopoly
(a) Effect on optimal Northern FIT premium
(b) Effect on optimal Northern import tariff
Figure B.4: Effects of Southern equipment firm’s unit production cost on
optimal Northern policies under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.2. Welfare effects of Northern policies under a Southern
monopoly
Figure B.5: Welfare effects of Northern policies under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.3. Welfare effects of Southern equipment firm’s unit pro-
duction cost under a Southern monopoly
The subsequent graphs in this appendix have the common descrip-
tions for the policy scenarios associated with different curves as be-
low:
Figure B.6: Welfare effects of unit cost of equipment under a Southern mono-
poly
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Example B.4. Welfare effects of the incidence and productivity
premium associated with good generating times under a Southern
monopoly
Figure B.7: Welfare effects of incidence and productivity premium associ-
ated with good generating times under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.5. Welfare effects of the renewable-electricity-intercept
and slope of marginal product curve of marginal product curve of
RE equipment under a Southern monopoly
Figure B.8: Welfare effects of renewable-electricity-intercept and slope of
marginal product curve of marginal product curve of RE equip-
ment under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.6. Welfare effects of price-intercept and slope of house-
hold demand curve under a Southern monopoly
Figure B.9: Welfare effects of price-intercept and slope of household demand
curve under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.7. Welfare effects of country-specific marginal damage of
pollution under a Southern monopoly
For this sensitivity analysis alone, we allow the North and the
South to have different marginal damage of pollution of vN and vS
respectively, so that we can disentangle the effects of country-specific
marginal damage of pollution. If they are equal, the effects would be
similar to the emission coefficient which is the same across countries,
as shown in the following example.
Figure B.10: Welfare effects of country-specific marginal damage of pollu-
tion under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.8. Welfare effects of emission coefficient and fossil-fuel-
generated electricity price under a Southern monopoly
Figure B.11: Welfare effects of emission coefficient and fossil-fuel-generated
electricity price under a Southern monopoly
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Example B.9. Parameter effects on Northern equipment installation
under a Southern monopoly
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Figure B.12: Parameter effects on Northern equipment installation under a
Southern monopoly
b.4 numerical results in the presence of an interna-
tional re equipment duopoly
This section shows the main numerical results in the presence of an in-
ternational RE equipment duopoly across different Northern policy
regimes and marginal damage of pollution. All results refer to the
equilibrium values and all differences are calculated by using the
same formula in the previous section. The following table describes
the cases we examine. The Northern government does not intervene
in Case 1, but chooses a single optimal FIT premium in Case 2, a
single optimal import tariff in Case 3, and a policy mix in Case 4.
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Table B.5: Description of simulation cases under an international duopoly
RE
equipment
prices in
both markets
marginal
damage of
pollution
($/kg)
Northern
FIT
premium
($)
Northern
import
tariff ($)
Case 1.1
profit-
maximising
monopolistic
prices
0 0
Case 1.2 0.05
Case 2 0.05 endogenous 0
Case 3.1 0
0 endogenous
Case 3.2 0.05
Case 4.1 0
Case 4.2
0.05
endogenous (policy mix)
Nash
equi-
libirum
(NE)
Global
op-
timum
(GO)
endogenous (cooperative)
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Figure B.13: Numerical results under an international duopoly (part 1)
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Figure B.14: Numerical results under an international duopoly (part 2)
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Figure B.15: Numerical results under an international duopoly (part 3)
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b.5 summary of policy, welfare and environmental ef-
fects of policies and parameters under an interna-
tional duopoly
We generate a summary table which is the same to Table B.4. Since
we want to compare Case 2 with others cases, we assume that the
marginal damage of pollution is $0.05/kg throughout the following
analysis for the duopoly case. As before, we show some selected
examples in the following sections.
Example B.10. Welfare effects of Northern policies under an interna-
tional duopoly
Figure B.16: Welfare effects of Northern policies under an international duo-
poly
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Example B.11. Welfare effects of Southern equipment firm’s unit pro-
duction cost under an international duopoly
Figure B.17: Welfare effects of Southern equipment firm’s unit production
cost under an international duopoly
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Example B.12. Welfare effects of incidence and productivity premium
associated with good generating times under an international duo-
poly
Figure B.18: Welfare effects of incidence and productivity premium associ-
ated with good generating times under an international duo-
poly
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Example B.13. Welfare effects of renewable-electricity-intercept and
slope of marginal product curve of marginal product curve of RE
equipment under an international duopoly
Figure B.19: Welfare effects of renewable-electricityintercept and slope of
marginal product curve of marginal product curve of RE equip-
ment under an international duopoly
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Example B.14. Welfare effects of price-intercept and slope of house-
hold demand curve under an international duopoly
Figure B.20: Welfare effects of price-intercept and slope of household de-
mand curve under an international duopoly
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Example B.15. Welfare effects of country-specific marginal damage
of pollution under an international duopoly
Figure B.21: Welfare effects of country-specific marginal damage of pollu-
tion under an international duopoly
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Example B.16. Welfare effects of emission coefficient and fossil-fuel-
generated electricity price under an international duopoly
Figure B.22: Welfare effects of emission coefficient and fossil-fuel-generated
electricity price under an international duopoly
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Example B.17. Parameter effects on Northern equipment installation
under an international duopoly
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Figure B.23: Parameter effects on Northern equipment installation under an
international duopoly
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b.6 effects of unit costs of northern and southern
equipment on northern policies
b.6.1 Southern monopoly
b.6.1.1 Marginal effect of unit costs of Southern equipment production on
Northern FIT premium
Decomposing WNsN∗cSR , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂cSR
(
−QNR
dPNR
dsN
)
=
aµ (1+ χ) L
4bβ (sN)
> 0;
(ii) Marginal tariff revenue effect
∂
∂cSR
(
τN
dQNR
dsN
)
=
Lµ (1+ χ) τN
2bβ(sN)2
≥ 0;
(iii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of FIT premium
− µsN ∂
∂cSR
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
− L dd
HN
E
dsN
]
= −µ
2(1+ χ)2LsN
4bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
≤ 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂cSR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
= νeL (1+ µχ)
µ (1+ χ)
4bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + τ
N
)]
≥ 0;
Overall effect:
∂
∂cSR
[
∂WN(sN∗(τN),τN)
∂sN∗(τN)
]
= µ(1+χ)L
4bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFE
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2τN
]− 2µ (1+ χ) sNcSR}
> µ(1+χ)L
4bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFE
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2τN
]
−2µ (1+ χ) sN [aβ (sN)− τN]}
= µ(1+χ)L
4bβ(sN)3
×
{[
(1+ µχ) pFE − 2µ (1+ χ) sN
]
aβ
(
sN
)
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE + 2µ (1+ χ) sN
]
τN
}
> 0 i f sN ≤ (1+µχ)pFE2µ(1+χ) .
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Thus, ∂s
N∗
∂cSR
< 0 if sN ≤ (1+µχ)pFE2µ(1+χ) . The environmental effect (v)
makes ∂s
N∗
∂cSR
> 0 more likely to hold.
b.6.1.2 Marginal effect of unit costs of Southern equipment production on
Northern import tariff
Decomposing WNτN∗cSR , we have:
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂cSR
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
)]
=
−L
4bβ (sN)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂cSR
[
τN
dQSNR
dτN
]
= 0;
(iii) Impact on FIT cost effect
∂
∂cSR
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
=
Lµ (1+ χ) sN
4bβ(sN)2
≥ 0, i = N, S;
(iv) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂cSR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
= −νeL (1+ µχ)
4bβ(sN)2
≤ 0;
Overall impact: summing up the effects (i)-(iii) yields that
∂
∂cSR
[
∂WN
(
τN∗
(
sN
)
, sN
)
∂τN∗ (sN)
]
=
L
4bβ (sN)
[
µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
− 1
]
< 0⇔ ∂τ
N∗
∂cSR
< 0.
Thus, we always have ∂τ
N∗
∂cSR
< 0. The environmental effect (v) rein-
forces ∂τ
N∗
∂cSR
< 0, so ∂τ
N∗
∂cSR
< 0 holds and it is even more negative if νe is
higher.
b.6.2 International duopoly
b.6.2.1 Marginal effect of unit costs of Northern and Southern equipment
production on Northern FIT premium
Decomposing WNsN∗ccR |C , c = N, S, we have:
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(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂cNR
(
−QSNR
dPNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
)
= − aµ (1+ χ) L
9bβ (sN)
≤ 0,
∂
∂cSR
(
−QSNR
dPNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
)
=
2aµ (1+ χ) L
9bβ (sN)
> 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂cNR
(
τN
dQSNR
dsN
)
= −Lµ (1+ χ) τ
N
3bβ(sN)2
≤ 0,
∂
∂cSR
(
τN
dQSNR
dsN
)
=
2Lµ (1+ χ) τN
3bβ(sN)2
≥ 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂cNR
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dsN
]
=
2µ (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)2
×
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR − 2cNR + τN
)]
> 0 i f
∂QNNR
∂sN
< 0,
∂
∂cSR
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dsN
]
= −µ (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)2
×
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR − 2cNR + τN
)]
< 0 i f
∂QNNR
∂sN
< 0;
(iv) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of FIT premium
−µsN ∂∂ccR
[
εH
′ (QNR |C
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
−L ddHNEdsN
]
= − µ2(1+χ)2LsN
9bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N)] ≤ 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂ccR
[
νeε′
(
QNR |C
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= νeL (1+ µχ)
µ (1+ χ)
9bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
)]
≥ 0.
Overall, for cNR ,
∂
∂cNR
[
∂WN
(
sN
(
τN
)
, τN
) |C
∂sN (τN)
]
B.6 effects of northern and southern unit costs 199
=
µ (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
+
[
2β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
cSR
+
[
β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
τN −
[
8β
(
sN
)
+ µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cNR
}
> 0 i f f cNR < c¯
N
R .
where c¯NR =
(1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
+
[
2β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
cSR
+
[
β
(
sN
)
+ 2 (1+ µχ) pFE
]
τN
8β(sN)+µ(1+χ)sN .
Thus, ∂s
N∗|C
∂cNR
≥ 0 iff cNR < c¯NR . The environmental effect (v) makes
∂sN∗|C
∂cNR
≥ 0 more likely to hold.
Overall, for cSR,
∂
∂cSR
[
∂WN(sN∗(τN),τN)|C
∂sN∗(τN)
]
= 2µ(1+χ)L
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+µχ)pFE
2 aβ
(
sN
)
+
[
β
(
sN
)
+ (1+ µχ) pFE
]
cNR
− [β (sN)+ µ (1+ χ) sN] cSR − µ (1+ χ) sNτN
}
> 0 i f f cSR < c¯
S
R,
where c¯SR =
(1+µχ)pFE
2 aβ(sN)+[β(sN)+(1+µχ)pFE]cNR +µ(1+χ)sN(−τN)
β(sN)+µ(1+χ)sN .
Thus, ∂s
N∗|C
∂cSR
> 0 iff cSR < c¯
S
R. The effect (v) makes
∂sN∗|C
∂cSR
> 0 more
likely to hold.
b.6.2.2 Marginal effect of unit costs of Northern and Southern equipment
production on Northern import tariff
Decomposing WNτN∗ccR |C , we have:
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂cNR
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
)]
=
2L
9bβ (sN)
> 0,
∂
∂cSR
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
)]
=
−4L
9bβ (sN)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂ccR
[
τN
dQSNR
dτN
]
= 0, c = N, S;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂cNR
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
]
= − 2L
9bβ (sN)
< 0,
∂
∂cSR
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
]
=
L
9bβ (sN)
> 0;
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(iv) Impact on FIT cost effect
∂
∂ccR
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
=
Lµ (1+ χ) sN
9bβ(sN)2
≥ 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂ccR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= −νeL (1+ µχ)
9bβ(sN)2
≤ 0.
Overall, for cNR , the effects (i) and (iii) are cancelled out. Summing up
the effects (i)-(iv) yields that
∂
∂cNR
[
∂WN(τN∗(sN),sN)|C
∂τN∗(sN)
]
= Lµ(1+χ)s
N
9bβ(sN)2
≥ 0,
Thus, ∂τ
N∗|C
∂cNR
≥ 0 if νe = 0. The environmental effect (v) counteracts
∂τN∗|C
∂cNR
> 0, so the overall sign of ∂τ
N∗|C
∂cNR
depends on the magnitude of
νe.
Overall, for cSR, summing up the effects (i)-(iv) yields that
∂
∂cSR
[
∂WN
(
τN∗
(
sN
)
, sN
) |C
∂τN∗ (sN)
]
=
L
9bβ (sN)
[
µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
− 3
]
< 0
⇔ ∂τ
N∗ |C
∂cSR
< 0.
Thus, we always have ∂τ
N∗|C
∂cSR
< 0. The environmental effect (v) rein-
forces ∂τ
N∗|C
∂cSR
< 0, i.e., ∂τ
N∗|C
∂cSR
< 0 is even more negative if νe is higher.
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Figure B.24: Policy interactions between a Southern R&D subsidy and
Northern policies
Figure B.25: Welfare effects of Southern R&D subsidy and its degree of cost
under an international duopoly
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Figure B.26: Effects of Southern R&D subsidy and degree of R&D cost reduc-
tion on Northern equipment installation under an international
duopoly

C
A P P E N D I X F O R C H A P T E R 3
c.1 impacts of optimal northern policies on southern
r&d subsidy
c.1.1 Southern Monopoly
c.1.1.1 Standard comparative-statics analysis
Differentiating (3.1) w.r.t. sSR and together with the assumption
εL
′′′ (QNR
L
)
= 0, we have:
2
∂PcR (Q
c
R, s
c)
∂QiR
dQcR
dsSR
+ r
(
sSR
)r−1
= 0
⇒ dQ
c
R
dsSR
= − r
(
sSR
)r−1
2β (sc) εL ′′
(
QcR
L
)
1
L
> 0, c = N, S.
(C.1)
Totally differentiating PcR (Q
c
R, s
c) w.r.t. sSR yields:
dPcR
dsSR
=
∂PcR
∂QcR
dQcR
dsSR
= − r
(
sSR
)r−1
2
< 0. (C.2)
c.1.1.2 Comparative-statics analysis with a specific function
Given the specific renewable generation function εL (qR) = aqR −
b(qR)
2, a > 0, b > 0, we solve for the equilibrium Northern in-
stallation and price:
QNR =
L
2b
[
a− c
S
R −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
β (sN)
]
,
PNR =
aβ
(
sN
)
+ cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
2
,
and the equilibrium Southern installation and price:
QSR =
L
2b
[
a− c
S
R −
(
sSR
)r
β (sS)
]
,
PSR =
aβ
(
sS
)
+ cSR −
(
sSR
)r
2
.
Thus, the effects of the Southern R&D subsidy on the Northern equip-
ment market are:
dQcR
dsSR
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
2bβ (sc)
> 0,
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dPcR = −
r
(
sSR
)r−1
2
< 0,
The effects of the Northern FIT premium on the Northern equipment
market are:
dQNR =
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
(
cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
)
> 0,
dPNR
dsN
=
aβ′
(
sN
)
2
> 0,
d2QNR
dsNdsSR
=
d2QNR
dsSRdsN
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 Lβ′ (sN)
2bβ(sN)2
< 0.
The effects of the Northern import tariff on the Northern equipment
market are:
dQNR
dτN
= − L
2bβ (sN)
< 0,
dPNR
dτN
=
1
2
> 0,
d2QNR
dτNdsN
=
d2QNR
dsNdτN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
> 0.
c.1.1.3 Impact of Northern FIT premium on optimal Southern R&D sub-
sidy under a Southern monopoly
Decomposing WSsS∗R sN , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂sN
[
dPNR
dsSR
QNR
]
=
dPNR
dsSR
dQNR
dsN
= − r
(
sSR
)r−1
2
Lβ′
(
sN
)
2bβ(sN)2
(
cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on Northern marginal profit effect
∂
∂sN
{[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN] dQNR
dsSR
}
=
dPNR
dsN
dQNR
dsSR
+
[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN] d2QNR
dsSRdsN
=
aβ′
(
sN
)
2
r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
2bβ (sN)
+
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
2
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN]
×
[
−r
(
sSR
)r−1 Lβ′ (sN)
2bβ(sN)2
]
=
β′
(
sN
)
L
4bβ(sN)2
(
cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
)
> 0;
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(iii) Impact on unit-cost effect
∂
∂sN
[
r
(
sSR
)r−1
QNR
]
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 Lβ′ (sN)
2bβ(sN)2
(
cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
)
> 0.
Since (i) and (ii) are cancelled out, the overall impact is positive:
WSsS∗R sN > 0. Thus, we have
dsS∗R
dsN > 0.
c.1.1.4 Impact of Northern import tariff on optimal Southern R&D sub-
sidy under a Southern monopoly
Decomposing WSsS∗R τN , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂τN
[
dPNR
dsSR
QNR
]
=
dPNR
dsSR
dQNR
dτN
=
r
(
sSR
)r−1
2
L
2bβ (sN)
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
4bβ (sN)
> 0;
(ii) Impact on Northern marginal profit effect
∂
∂τN
{[
PNR
(
QNR , s
N
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN] dQNR
dsSR
}
=
(
dPNR
dτN
− 1
)
r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
2bβ (sN)
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
4bβ (sN)
< 0;
(iii) Impact on unit-cost effect
∂
∂τN
[
r
(
sSR
)r−1
QNR
]
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 dQNR
dτN
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
2bβ (sN)
< 0.
Since (i) and (ii) are cancelled out, the overall impact is negative:
WSsS∗R τN < 0. Thus, we have
dsS∗R
dτN < 0.
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c.1.2 International duopoly
c.1.2.1 Standard comparative-statics analysis
Differentiating (3.6) w.r.t. sSR |C and together with the assumption
εL
′′′ (QNR
L
)
= 0, we have:
∂PcR (Q
c
R, s
c)
∂QiR
|C
(
2
dQccR
dsSR
+
dQjcR
dsSR
)
+ r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
= 0
⇒ dQ
cc
R
dsSR
=
dQjcR
dsSR
= − r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
3β (sN) εL ′′
(
QcR
L
)
1
L
> 0 c, j = N, S, c 6= j.
(C.3)
Totally differentiating PcR (Q
c
R, s
c) w.r.t. sSR |C yields:
dPcR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
=
∂PcR
∂QcR
∣∣∣∣
C
dQcR
dsc
∣∣∣∣
C
= − r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
3
< 0.
(C.4)
c.1.2.2 Comparative-statics analysis with a specific function
The Cournot equilibrium in the North is:
QNNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r − 2cNR + τN
β (sN)
]
,
QSNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cNR − 2cSR + 2
(
sSR |C
)r − 2τN
β (sN)
]
,
QNR |C =
L
3b
[
2a− c
S
R −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ cNR + τ
N
β (sN)
]
,
PNR |C =
β
(
sN
)
a + cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ cNR + τ
N
3
.
The Cournot equilibrium in the South is:
QNSR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r − 2cNR
β (sS)
]
,
QSSR =
L
3b
[
a +
cNR − 2cSR + 2
(
sSR |C
)r
β (sS)
]
,
QSR |C =
L
3b
[
2a− c
S
R −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ cNR
β (sS)
]
,
PSR |C =
β
(
sS
)
a + cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ cNR
3
.
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Thus, we have the following comparative statics results for the South-
ern R&D subsidy:
dQcR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 L
3bβ (sc)
> 0,
dPcR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
= − r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
3
< 0,
dQScR
dsSR
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 2L
3bβ (sc)
> 0,
dQNcR
dsSR
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 L
3bβ (sc)
< 0.
c.1.2.3 Impact of Northern FIT premium on optimal Southern R&D sub-
sidy under an international duopoly
Decomposing WSsS∗R sN |C , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂sN
[
dPNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QSNR − dP
S
R
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QNSR
]
= − Lr(s
S
R|C )
r−1
9b
∂
∂sN
[
cNR−2cSR+2(sSR|C )
r−2τN
β(sN) −
cSR−(sSR|C )
r−2cNR
β(sS)
]
= − Lr(s
S
R|C )
r−1
9b
∂
∂sN
[
cNR−2cSR+2(sSR|C )
r−2τN
β(sN)
]
= − Lr(s
S
R|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
;
(ii) Impact on Northern marginal profit effect
∂
∂sN
{[
PNR |C − cSR +
(
sSR |C
)r − τN] dQSNR
dsSR
}
= ∂
∂sN
{
β(sN)a−2cSR+2(sSR)
r
+cNR−2τN
3 r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 2L
3bβ(sN)
}
=
2Lr(sSR|C )
r−1
9b
∂
∂sN
[
a +
−2cSR+2(sSR|C )
r
+cNR−2τN
β(sN)
]
=
2Lr(sSR|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
;
(iii) Impact on unit-cost effect
∂
∂sN
[
r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
QSNR
]
=
Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
3bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
;
The sum of (i) and (ii) are
Lr(sSR|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
,
which is likely to be positive.
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The overall impact is likely to be positive:
WSsS∗R sN |C =
Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
9bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
+
Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
3bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
=
4Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
9bβ(sN)2
{
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
− cNR
}
.
Thus, ds
S∗
R
dsN
∣∣
C> 0 is likely to hold, and it holds if and only if
2
[
cSR −
(
sSR |C
)r
+ τN
]
> cNR .
c.1.2.4 Impact of Northern import tariff on optimal Southern R&D sub-
sidy under an international duopoly
Decomposing WSsS∗R τN |C , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂τN
[
dPNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QSNR −
dPSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QNSR
]
= −Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
9b
∂
∂τN
[
cNR − 2cSR + 2
(
sSR |C
)r − 2τN
β (sN)
− c
S
R −
(
sSR |C
)r − 2cNR
β (sS)
]
=
2Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
9bβ (sN)
> 0;
(ii) Impact on Northern marginal profit effect
∂
∂τN
{[
PNR |C − cSR +
(
sSR |C
)r − τN] dQSNR
dsSR
}
= ∂
∂τN
{
β(sN)a−2cSR+2(sSR|C )
r
+cNR−2τN
3 r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 2L
3bβ(sN)
}
= − 4Lr(s
S
R|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN) < 0;
(iii) Impact on unit-cost effect
∂
∂τN
[
r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
QSNR
]
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣C = −Lr
(
sSR |C
)r−1
3bβ (sN)
< 0.
The sum of (i) and (ii) is negative: − 2Lr(s
S
R|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN) . So the overall impact
is negative: WSsS∗R τN |C = −
2Lr(sSR|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN) −
Lr(sSR|C )
r−1
3bβ(sN) = −
5Lr(sSR|C )
r−1
9bβ(sN) <
0. Thus, we have ds
S∗
R
dτN
∣∣
C< 0.
C.2 impact of southern r&d subsidy on optimal northern policies 211
c.2 impact of southern r&d subsidy on optimal north-
ern policies
c.2.1 Southern monopoly
c.2.1.1 Impact of Southern R&D subsidy on optimal Northern FIT pre-
mium
Decomposing WNsN∗sSR :
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂sSR
(
−QNR
dPNR
dsN
)
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 aµ (1+ χ) L
4bβ (sN)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂sSR
(
τN
dQNR
dsN
)
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 Lµ (1+ χ) τN
2bβ(sN)2
≤ 0;
(iii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of FIT premium
−µsN ∂
∂sSR
[
εH
′ (QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN − L
ddHNE
dsN
]
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 µ2(1+χ)2LsN
4bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + τ
N)] ≥ 0;
(iv) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sSR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
= −r(sSR)r−1νeL (1+ µχ) µ(1+χ)4bβ(sN)3 [aβ (sN)+ 2 (cSR + τN)] ≤ 0.
Summing up (i)–(iv):
∂
∂sSR
[
∂WN
(
sN∗
(
τN
)
, τN
)
∂sN∗ (τN)
]
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1µ (1+ χ) L
4bβ(sN)3
×
{
(1+ µχ) pFE
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2τN
]
− 2µ (1+ χ) sNcSR
}
< −r
(
sSR
)r−1µ (1+ χ) L
4bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFE
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2τN
]
−2µ (1+ χ) sN
[
aβ
(
sN
)
− τN
]}
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1µ (1+ χ) L
4bβ(sN)3{[
(1+ µχ) pFE − 2µ (1+ χ) sN
]
aβ
(
sN
)
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE + 2µ (1+ χ) sN
]
τN
}
< 0 i f sN ≤ (1+ µχ) pFE
2µ (1+ χ)
.
Thus, even if there is no pollution harm, we have ∂s
N∗
∂sSR
< 0 i f sN ≤
(1+µχ)pFE
2µ(1+χ) . The environmental effect (v) makes
∂sN∗
∂sSR
< 0 more likely to
hold.
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c.2.1.2 Impact of Southern R&D subsidy on optimal Northern import tar-
iff
Decomposing WNτN∗cSR , we have:
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂sSR
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
)]
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
4bβ (sN)
> 0;
(ii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂sSR
[
τN
dQSNR
dτN
]
= 0;
(iii) Impact on FIT cost effect
∂
∂sSR
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 Lµ (1+ χ) sN
4bβ(sN)2
≤ 0;
(iv) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sSR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
]
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 νeL (1+ µχ)
4bβ(sN)2
≥ 0.
Summing up (i)–(iii) yields that
∂
∂sSR
[
∂WN
(
τN∗
(
sN
)
, sN
)
∂τN∗ (sN)
]
= −r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
4bβ (sN)
[
µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
− 1
]
> 0⇔ ∂τ
N∗
∂sSR
> 0.
Thus, we always have ∂τ
N∗
∂sSR
> 0. The environmental effect (iv) rein-
forces ∂τ
N∗
∂sSR
> 0.
c.2.2 International duopoly
c.2.2.1 Impact of Southern R&D subsidy on optimal Northern FIT pre-
mium
Decomposing WNsN∗sSR |C , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂sSR
(
−QSNR
dPNR
dsN
)
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 2aµ (1+ χ) L
9bβ (sN)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂sSR
(
τN
dQSNR
dsN
)
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 2Lµ (1+ χ) τN
3bβ(sN)2
≤ 0;
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(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂sSR
[(
PNR |C − cNR
) dQNNR
dsN
]
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1µ (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)2
×
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR − 2cNR + τN
)]
;
(iv) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of FIT premium
− µsN ∂
∂sSR
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
−L dd
HN
E
dsN
]
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1µ2(1+ χ)2LsN
9bβ(sN)3
×
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
)]
≥ 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sSR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1
νeL (1+ µχ)
µ (1+ χ)
9bβ(sN)3
×
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cSR + c
N
R + τ
N
)]
≤ 0.
Overall,
∂
∂sSR
[
∂WN
(
sN∗
(
τN
)
, τN
) |C
∂sN∗ (τN)
]
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 2µ (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFE
2
aβ
(
sN
)
+
[
β
(
sN
)
+ (1+ µχ) pFE
]
cNR
−
[
β
(
sN
)
+ µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cSR − µ (1+ χ) sNτN
}
< 0 i f f cSR < c¯
S
R,
where c¯SR =
(1+µχ)pFE
2 aβ(sN)+[β(sN)+(1+µχ)pFE]cNR +µ(1+χ)sN(−τN)
β(sN)+µ(1+χ)sN .
The effect (v) makes ∂s
N∗
∂sSR
∣∣
C< 0 more likely to hold.
c.2.2.2 Impact of Southern R&D subsidy on optimal Northern import tar-
iff
Decomposing WNτN∗sSR |C , we have:
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂sSR
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
)]
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 4L
9bβ (sN)
> 0;
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(ii) Impact on marginal deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂sSR
[
τN
dQSNR
dτN
]
= 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂sSR
[(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
]
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 L
9bβ (sN)
< 0;
(iv) Impact on FIT cost effect
∂
∂sSR
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 Lµ (1+ χ) sN
9bβ(sN)2
< 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sSR
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 νeL (1+ µχ)
9bβ(sN)2
≥ 0.
Overall, summing up the effects (i)–(iv) yields that
∂
∂sSR
[
∂WN
(
τN∗
(
sN
)
, sN
) |C
∂τN∗ (sN)
]
= −r
(
sSR |C
)r−1 L
9bβ (sN)
[
µ (1+ χ) sN
β (sN)
− 3
]
> 0⇔ ∂τ
N∗ |C
∂sSR
> 0.
The environmental effect (v) reinforces ∂τ
N∗
∂sSR
∣∣
C> 0, i.e.,
∂τN∗
∂sSR
∣∣
C> 0 is
even more negative if νe is higher.
c.3 comparison of southern r&d subsidy levels
c.3.1 Cooperative v.s. non-cooperative Southern R&D subsidies under a
Southern monopoly
The difference of the marginal welfare effects of a Southern R&D sub-
sidy between the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies under a
Southern monopoly is:
d
(
WS
∣∣GO +WN ∣∣GO )
dsSR
− dW
S
dsSR
=
r
(
sSR
)r−1
2
L
2b
[
a− c
S
R −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
β (sN)
]
+
[
(1+ µχ) νe− µ (1+ χ) sN
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
2bβ (sN)
> r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
4bβ (sN)
{
β
(
sN
)
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
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−
[
cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
]
+ 2
[
(1+ µχ) νe− µ (1+ χ) sN
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)}
= r
(
sSR
)r−1 L
4bβ (sN)
{[
(1+ µχ) (pFE + 2νe)
− 2µ (1+ χ) sN
]
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
−
[
cSR −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
]}
> 0 i f f sN <
(1+ µχ) (pFE + 2νe)
2µ (1+ χ)
− c
S
R −
(
sSR
)r
+ τN
2µ (1+ χ) εL ′
(
QNR
L
) ,
so sS∗R
∣∣GO > sS∗R if and only if the following condition holds:
Condition 4. sN < (1+µχ)(pFE+2νe)2µ(1+χ) −
cSR−(sSR)
r
+τN
2µ(1+χ)εL ′
(
QNR
L
) .
c.3.2 Non-cooperative Southern R&D subsidies under different market
structures
The difference in the marginal welfare effects of a non-cooperative
Southern R&D subsidy between the Southern monopoly and interna-
tional duopoly cases is:
dWS |C
dsSR
− dW
S
dsSR
= −1
3
(
QSNR −QNSR
)
+
1
2
QNR
+
[
PNR |C − cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN] dQSNR
dsSR
−
[
PNR − cSR +
(
sSR
)r − τN] dQNR
dsSR
+
[
(pFE + νe) ε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r] dQSSR
dsSR
−
[
(pFE + νe) ε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
)r] dQSR
dsSR
+ r
(
sSR
)r−1 (
QSNR + Q
SS
R −QNR −QSR
)
,
which has ambiguous sign because:
(i) PNR |C < PNR is likely to hold since
PNR |C − PNR = −
β(sN)a+cSR−(sSR)
r
+τN−2cNR
6 ;
(ii) ε′
(
QSR|C
L
)
< ε′
(
QSR
L
)
is likely since PSR |C < PSR and thereby QSR |C >
QSR are likely;
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(iii) QSNR < Q
N
R , Q
SS
R < Q
S
R are likely;
(iv) dQ
SN
R
dsSR
>
dQNR
dsSR
, dQ
SS
R
dsSR
>
dQSR
dsSR
;
(v)
− 1
3
(
QSNR −QNSR
)
+
1
2
QNR
=
L
36b
[
36a− 5c
S
R − 5
(
sSR
)r
+ 8cNR + 9τ
N
β (sN)
]
+
L
9b
cSR −
(
sSR
)r − 2cNR
β (sS)
is likely to be positive, so the negative price effect under duopoly is
likely to be less severe.
Overall, (i)–(iii) work towards sS∗R |C < sS∗R , whereas (iv) and (v) work
towards sS∗R |C > sS∗R .
c.3.3 Cooperative v.s. non-cooperative Southern R&D subsidies under an
international duopoly
The difference in the marginal welfare effects of a Southern R&D sub-
sidy between the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies under
an international duopoly is:
d
(
WN
∣∣C +WS |C )
dsSR
− dW
S |C
dsSR
= −
[
dPNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QSNR −
dPSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QNSR
]
+
[
−µ (1+ χ) sNεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ τN − cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣∣GOC )r] dQSNRdsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNSR
dsSR
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
,
which has an ambiguous sign because:
(i)
−
[
dPNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QSNR −
dPSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
QNSR
]
=
L
9b
[
cSR −
(
sSR
)r − 2cNR
β (sS)
− c
N
R − 2cSR + 2
(
sSR
)r − 2τN
β (sN)
]
,
which is likely to be negative given that cSR < c
N
R , s
S ≤ sN ;
(ii) −µ (1+ χ) sNεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+ τN − cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣GO
C
)r T 0;
(iii)
[
pFEε′
(
QNR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dsSR
< 0 and
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cNR
]
dQNSR
dsSR
< 0;
(iv) νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
> 0.
However, if the Northern FIT premium is high enough and the North-
ern import tariff is low enough such that τN < µ (1+ χ) sNεL ′
(
QNR
L
)
+
cSR −
(
sSR
∣∣GO
C
)r, and the environmental effect measured by νe is small
C.3 comparison of southern r&d subsidy levels 217
enough, it is likely to see an over-provision of the Southern R&D
subsidy in the non-cooperative strategy relative to the cooperative
strategy under an international duopoly: sS∗R
∣∣GO
C < s
S∗
R |C .
c.3.4 Cooperative Southern R&D subsidies under different market struc-
tures
The difference in the welfare effects of a cooperative Southern R&D
subsidy between the Southern monopoly and international duopoly
cases is:
d
(
WN
∣∣GO
C +W
S
∣∣GO
C
)
dsSR
− d
(
WN
∣∣GO +WS∣∣GO)
dsSR
=
[
pFEε′
(
QNR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣∣GOC )r] dQSNRdsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QNR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
− cNR
]
dQNNR
dsSR
−
[
pFEε′
(
QNR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣∣GOC )r] dQNRdsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣∣GOC )r
]
dQSSR
dsSR
+
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
− cNR
]
dQNSR
dsSR
−
[
pFEε′
(
QSR
L
)
− cSR +
(
sSR
∣∣∣GOC )r
]
dQSR
dsSR
+ r
(
sSR
)r−1 (
QSNR + Q
SS
R −QNR −QSR
)
+ νe
[
ε′
(
QNR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
dQNR
dsSR
|C − ε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsSR
}
+ ε′
(
QSR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
dQSR
dsSR
∣∣∣∣
C
−ε′
(
QSR
L
)
dQSR
dsSR
]
,
which is likely to be negative because:
(i) ε′
(
QNR
L
∣∣∣
C
)
< ε′
(
QNR
L
)
is likely;
(ii) cNR > c
S
R;
(iii) dQ
SN
R
dsSR
= 2 dQ
N
R
dsSR
∣∣∣
C
= −2 dQNNR
dsSR
= 43
dQNR
dsSR
> 0;
(iv) QSNR < Q
N
R , Q
SS
R < Q
S
R are likely.
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c.4 policy interaction between a northern fit premium
and a northern equipment output subsidy under an
international duopoly
The Cournot equilibrium in the North is:
QNNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR − 2cNR + 2σN + τN
β (sN)
]
,
QSNR =
L
3b
[
a +
cNR − σN − 2cSR − 2τN
β (sN)
]
,
QNR |C =
L
3b
[
2a− c
S
R + c
N
R − σN + τN
β (sN)
]
,
PNR |C =
β
(
sN
)
3
a +
cSR + c
N
R − σN + τN
3
.
The Cournot equilibrium in the South is:
QNSR =
L
3b
[
a +
cSR − 2cNR + 2σN
β (sS)
]
,
QSSR =
L
3b
[
a +
cNR − σN − 2cSR
β (sS)
]
,
QSR |C =
L
3b
[
2a− c
S
R + c
N
R − σN
β (sS)
]
,
PSR |C =
β
(
sS
)
3
a +
cSR + c
N
R − σN
3
.
Thus, the effects of a Northern R&D subsidy on the Cournot equilib-
rium in both countries are:
dQcR |C
dσN
=
L
3bβ (sc)
> 0,
dPcR |C
dσN
= −1
3
,
dQScR
dσN
= − L
3bβ (sc)
< 0,
dQNcR
dσN
=
2L
3bβ (sc)
> 0,
dQcR |C
dscdσN
=
1
2
dQNcR
dscdσN
= − β
′ (sc) L
3bβ(sc)2
< 0,
dQScR
dscdσN
=
β′ (sc) L
3bβ(sc)2
> 0, c = N, S.
The effects of a Northern FIT premium on the Cournot equilibrium
in the North are:
dQNNR
dsN
= − Lβ
′ (sN)
3bβ(sN)2
(
cSR − 2cNR + 2σN + τN
)
,
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dQSNR
dsN
= − Lβ
′ (sN)
3bβ(sN)2
(
cNR − σN − 2cSR − 2τN
)
,
dQNR |C
dsN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
3bβ(sN)2
(
cSR + c
N
R − σN + τN
)
,
dPNR |C
dsN
=
β′
(
sN
)
3
a > 0.
The effects of a Northern import tariff on the Cournot equilibrium in
the North are:
dQNNR
dτN
=
1
2
dQNNR
dσN
=
L
3bβ (sN)
> 0,
dQSNR
dτN
= 2
dQSNR
dσN
= − 2L
3bβ (sN)
< 0,
dQNR |C
dτN
= −dQ
N
R |C
dσN
= − L
3bβ (sN)
< 0,
dPNR |C
dτN
= −dP
N
R |C
dσN
=
1
3
.
Optimal Northern output subsidy:
WNσN |C = −QSNR
dPNR
dσN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dσN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
= 0.
Optimal Northern FIT premium:
WNsN |C = −QSNR
dPNR
dsN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dsN
− LµsN
[
εH
′
(
QNR
L
)
1
L
dQNR
dsN
− dd
HN
E
dsN
]
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
= 0.
Optimal Northern import tariff:
WNτN |C = −QSNR
(
dPNR
dτN
− 1
)
+ τN∗
dQSNR
dτN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
− µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
+ νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
= 0.
Partially differentiating WNσN |C w.r.t. sN yields:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂sN
[
−QSNR
dPNR
dσN
]
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= − Lβ
′ (sN)
9bβ(sN)2
(
cNR − σN − 2cSR − 2τN
)
T 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂sN
[
τN
dQSNR
dσN
]
= τN
Lβ′
(
sN
)
3bβ(sN)2
> 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂sN
[(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dσN
]
=
∂PNR
∂sN
dQNNR
dσN
+
(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dσNdsN
= −2Lβ
′ (sN)
9bβ(sN)2
(
cSR − 2cNR − σN + τN
)
T 0;
(iv) Impact on FIT cost effect
− ∂
∂sN
[
µsNεH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
]
− Lβ
′ (sN)
9bβ(sN)3
{
(1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
+
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
]
×
(
cSR + c
N
R − σN + τN
)}
T 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂sN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
]
= −β
′ (sN) νe (1+ µχ) L [β (sN) a + 2 (cSR + cNR − σN + τN)]
9bβ(sN)3
T 0.
Summing up (i) and (iii):
− Lβ
′ (sN)
9bβ(sN)2
(
cNR − σN − 2cSR − 2τN
)
− 2Lβ
′ (sN)
9bβ(sN)2
(
cSR − 2cNR − σN + τN
)
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
3bβ(sN)2
(
cNR + σ
N
)
> 0.
Summing up (i)–(iv):
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Lβ′
(
sN
)
9bβ(sN)3
{
− (1+ µχ) pFEaβ
(
sN
)
−
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN
]
cSR
+ 2
[
(1+ µχ) pFE + 2µ (1+ χ) sN
] (
cNR + τ
N
)
+2
[
2 (1+ µχ) pFE + µ (1+ χ) sN
]
σN
}
T 0.
Total impact (i)–(v):
∂WNσN |C
∂sN
=
Lβ′
(
sN
)
9bβ(sN)3
{
− (1+ µχ) (pFE + νe) aβ
(
sN
)
−
[
(1+ µχ) pFE − µ (1+ χ) sN + 2νe (1+ µχ)
]
cSR
+ 2
[
(1+ µχ) (pFE − νe) + 2µ (1+ χ) sN
] (
cNR + τ
N
)
+2
[
(1+ µχ) (2pFE + νe) + µ (1+ χ) sN
]
σN
}
T 0.
Higher νe makes ∂σ
N∗
∂sN < 0 more likely to hold.
Partially differentiating WNsN w.r.t. σN , we have:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂σN
[
−QSNR
dPNR
dsN
]
= −∂Q
SN
R
∂σN
dPNR
dsN
=
L
3bβ (sN)
aβ′
(
sN
)
3
=
Laβ′
(
sN
)
9bβ (sN)
> 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂σN
[
τN
dQSNR
dsN
]
= τN
∂
∂σN
[
dQSNR
dsN
]
= τN
Lβ′
(
sN
)
3bβ(sN)2
> 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂σN
[(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dsN
]
=
∂PNR
∂σN
dQNNR
dsN +
(
PNR − cNR
) d2QNNR
dsNdσN
= − Lβ
′(sN)
9bβ(sN)2
[
2aβ
(
sN
)
+
(
cSR − 2cNR − 4σN + τN
)]
T 0;
(iv) Impact on deadweight loss of the FIT premium
−µsN ∂
∂σN
[
εH
′ (QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN −
ddHNE
dsN
]
= −µsN
 ∂εH ′( QNRL )
∂σN
dQNR
dsN + ε
H ′
(
QNR
L
)
d2QNR
dsNdσN

=
Lβ′(sN)
2
sN
9bβ(sN)3
[
aβ
(
sN
)
+ 2
(
cNR + c
S
R − σN + τN
)]
T 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
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∂
∂σN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dsN
]
= − β
′(sN)νe(1+µχ)L[β(sN)a+2(cSR+cNR−σN+τN)]
9bβ(sN)3
T 0.
Thus, we have the equalised total impacts: ∂W
N
sN |C
∂σN
=
∂WN
σN |C
∂sN , as
implied by Young’s theorem.
c.5 policy interaction between a northern import tar-
iff and a northern equipment output subsidy under
an international duopoly
Partially differentiating WNσN |C w.r.t. τN yields:
(i) Impact on price effect
∂
∂τN
[
−QSNR
dPNR
dσN
]
=
2L
3bβ (sN)
(
−1
3
)
= − 2L
9bβ (sN)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on tariff revenue effect
∂
∂τN
[
τN
dQSNR
dσN
]
=
dQSNR
dσN
= − L
3bβ (sN)
< 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂τN
[(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dσN
]
=
2L
9bβ (sN)
> 0;
(iv) Impact on FIT cost effect
− ∂
∂τN
[
µsNεH
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
]
= −µsN (1+ χ) ∂
∂τN
[
εL
′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
]
= −µsN (1+ χ) ∂
∂τN
[
PNR
β (sN)
L
3bβ (sN)
]
= −µs
N (1+ χ) L
3bβ(sN)2
∂PNR
∂τN
= −µs
N (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)2
< 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂τN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dσN
]
= νe (1+ µχ)
∂
∂τN
[
PNR
β (sN)
L
3bβ (sN)
]
=
νe (1+ µχ) L
9bβ(sN)2
> 0.
Since (i) and (iii) are cancelled out, the sum of (i)–(iv) is:
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− L
3bβ (sN)
− µs
N (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)2
= − L
9bβ(sN)2
[
3β
(
sN
)
+ µsN (1+ χ)
]
=
L
9bβ(sN)2
[
−3 (1+ µχ) pFE − 4µsN (1+ χ)
]
< 0.
Total impact:
∂WNσN |C
∂τN
=
L
9bβ(sN)2
[(1+ µχ) (νe− 3pFE)
−4µsN (1+ χ)
]
T 0.
Partially differentiating WNτN w.r.t. σN :
(i) Impact on terms-of-trade effect
∂
∂σN
[
QSNR
(
1− dP
N
R
dτN
)]
= − 2L
9bβ (sN)
< 0;
(ii) Impact on deadweight loss of import tariff
∂
∂σN
[
τN
dQSNR
dτN
]
= 0;
(iii) Impact on efficiency effect
∂
∂σN
[(
PNR − cNR
) dQNNR
dτN
]
= − L
9bβ (sN)
< 0;
(iv) Impact on FIT cost effect
∂
∂σN
[
−µsNεH ′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
= −µs
N (1+ χ) L
9bβ(sN)2
< 0;
(v) Impact on environmental effect
∂
∂σN
[
νeε′
(
QNR
L
)
dQNR
dτN
∣∣∣∣
C
]
=
νe (1+ µχ)
β (sN)
dPNR
dσN
[
− L
3bβ (sN)
]
=
νe (1+ µχ) L
9bβ(sN)2
> 0.
Thus, we have the equalised total impacts: ∂W
N
τN |C
∂σN
=
∂WN
σN |C
∂τN
as
implied by Young’s theorem.
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c.6 quantitative environmental targets
c.6.1 Emissions target
Differentiating equations (3.17), (3.19) and (3.20) w.r.t. τ, we have: PE
′ (QE)− (CFE)′′ (QFE) −e PE ′ (QE) ε′ (QR)
e 0 0
PE ′ (QE) [ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR] 0 2PE (QE) ε′′ (QR)

×

dQFE
dτ
dλ
dτ
dQR
dτ
 =
 00
1
 .
The determinant is:
H = e22PE (QE) ε′′ (QR) < 0.
By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dQFE
dτ
=
F
H
= 0,
dQRE
dτ
=
dQRE
dQR
dQR
dτ
= ε′ (QR)
R
H
< 0,
dλ
dτ
=
L
H
> 0,
dQR
dτ
=
R
H
< 0,
where
F =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −e PE ′ (QE) ε′ (QR)
0 0 0
1 0 2PE (QE) ε′′ (QR)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0,
R =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
PE ′ (QE)− (CFE)′′ (QFE) −e 0
e 0 0
PE ′ (QE) [ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR] 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = e
2 > 0.
c.6.2 Renewable energy share target
Differentiating (3.17), (3.19) and (3.20) w.r.t. τ, we have:
PE ′ (QE)− C′′FE (QFE) −α PE ′ (QE) ε′ (QR)
−α 0 (1− α) ε′ (QR)
P′E (QE)
× [ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR] 0 2 [PE (QE) + υ (1− α)]×ε′′ (QR)

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×

dQFE
dτ
dυ
dτ
dQR
dτ
 =
 00
1
 .
The determinant is:
H = α
{−2α [PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] ε′′ (QR)
− (1− α) ε′ (QR) PE ′ (QE)
[
ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR
]}
> 0.
By Cramer’s rule, we get:
dQFE
dτ
=
F
H
< 0,
dQRE
dτ
=
dQRE
dQR
dQR
dτ
= ε′ (QR)
R
H
< 0,
dυ
dτ
=
U
H
> 0,
dQR
dτ
=
R
H
< 0,
where
F =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −α PE ′ (QE) ε′ (QR)
0 0 (1− α) ε′ (QR)
1 0 2 [PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] ε′′ (QR)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −α (1− α) ε
′ (QR) < 0,
U =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
PE ′ (QE)− (CFE)′′ (QFE) 0 PE ′ (QE) ε′ (QR)
−α 0 (1− α) ε′ (QR)
PE ′ (QE) [ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR] 1 2 [PE (QE) + υ (1− α)] ε′′ (QR)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −1× {[PE ′ (QE)− (CFE)′′ (QFE)] (1− α) ε′ (QR)
+αPE ′ (QE) ε′ (QR)
}
> 0,
R =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
PE ′ (QE)− (CFE)′′ (QFE) −α 0
−α 0 0
PE ′ (QE) [ε′ (QR) + ε′′ (QR)QR] 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −α
2 < 0.
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